Preamble

The House met at Half past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

MESSAGE FROM THE QUEEN

MINISTRY OF MATERIALS (TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS)

The VICE-CHAMBERLAIN OF THE HOUSEHOLD reported Her Majesty's answer to the Address, as follows:

I have received your Address praying that the Transfer of Functions (Ministry of Materials) Order, 1954, be made in the form of the Draft laid before Parliament.

I will comply with your request.

LIVING ANIMALS (EXPERIMENTS)

Address for
Return of experiments performed under the Act 39 and 40 Vict. c. 77, during 1953. (In continuation of Parliamentary Paper No. 312 of Session 1953–53)."—[Sir H. Lucas-Tooth.]

MOTOR VEHICLES (OFFENCES)

Address for
Return showing the number of offences relating to motor vehicles in England and Wales, the number of persons prosecuted for such offences, the results of proceedings in magistrates' courts, and the number of alleged offences in respect of which written warnings were issued by the police, together with the number of persons concerned, during the year ended 31st day of December, 1953."—[Sir H. Lucas-Tooth.]

Oral Answers to Questions — EDUCATION

Physical Recreation (Encouragement)

Mr. Ellis Smith: asked the Minister of Education (1) what steps she is taking to encourage and develop the game of association football; and what grants she has made to voluntary bodies in this connection;
(2) if she will make a full statement on what action she intends taking to encourage physical fitness and sport of all kinds;
(3) if she will call a conference of representative people interested in sport in order to receive suggestions and advice for future action.

The Minister of Education (Miss Florence Horsbrugh): Physical education forms part of the curriculum of all schools and of a great many establishments of further education. According to their age and sex children take part in a wide variety of games or sports, which will usually include association football for boys. Local education authorities also use their powers under Section 53 of the Education Act, 1944, to provide other facilities for physical training and recreation.
I make a substantial grant to the Central Council of Physical Recreation, which has close contacts with governing bodies of most national sports' organisations and which advises me on needs generally. I see no reason to call a conference or to suggest a change in our ways of encouraging young people to keep fit.

Mr. Smith: Will the Minister reconsider her answer in the light of the debate that took place last night and the excellent reply made by her Parliamentary Secretary? Will she consult her leading officials and then consider what action to take?

Miss Horsbrugh: I shall certainly consider the debate that took place last night, and also the excellent speech of my hon. Friend.

Lord Malcolm Douglas-Hamilton: asked the Minister of Education whether, in view of the extent of juvenile crime, she will take steps to facilitate the provision of more courses, on the now well-tried principles of the Outward Bound schools, to divert the young into the interesting and healthy channels which they provide.

Miss Horsbrugh: I regret that I cannot add to the answer given to my noble Friend by my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary on 8th July.

Lord Malcolm Douglas-Hamilton: Bearing in mind the gap between the school-leaving age and the time of call up, does not my right hon. Friend think


that a considerable extension of the type of training that is provided by the Outward Bound schools would have a tremendous effect not only in reducing juvenile crime but in diverting some of the activities of the "Edwardian" groups?

Miss Horsbrugh: The work that the schools are doing is excellent. I would remind my noble Friend that it is open to local education authorities to assist young people attending these courses and that their expenditure in this respect ranks for grant. I believe that local education authorities generally are aware of the work those schools are doing, and that it needs no further recommendation from me, but if it does I certainly say again in this House what tremendously good work they are doing.

Mr. Hector Hughes: Would the right hon. Lady specify what organised efforts are being made outside school hours to divert young people's minds into constructive channels?

Miss Horsbrugh: I think there are a very great many of them, such as through youth club schemes and further education. If the hon. and learned Gentleman would like details of any particular branch of these activities perhaps he would put a Question on the Order Paper.

Obsolete Schools (Rebuilding)

Mr. Morley: asked the Minister of Education whether, in view of the fact that she proposes to bring Part III of the Education Act, 1944, into operation about 1957, she will ensure that, by that date, obsolete schools which have been on the black list since 1926 will have been rebuilt.

Miss Horsbrugh: No, Sir. I cannot say precisely what progress will have been made by 1957 in dealing with unsatisfactory school buildings.

Mr. Morley: When does the Minister mean to modify Circular No. 245 so as to allow local authorities to get on with the rebuilding and rehabilitation of very old schools?

Miss Horsbrugh: I think I made the position clear in the debate on Monday. Children are going from old buildings into new schools. In fact, one in six of

all the children are now in schools that have been built since the war. That process is continuing. We shall have fewer children in the bad schools and will get to the stage in which we shall be able to pull down the old schools when we have sufficient new ones for the children to go into.

Brigadier Peto: Is my right hon. Friend aware that old buildings do not necessarily mean bad schools?

Playing Fields

Mrs. Slater: asked the Minister of Education when she expects to be able to lift the ban on the development of playing fields imposed in 1952.

Miss Horsbrugh: I would refer the hon. Member to the answer which my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary gave her on 22nd July.

Mrs. Slater: asked the Minister of Education how many schools in Stoke-on-Trent have no playing fields; how many have school yards inadequate for organised games; and how many of these are primary and how many secondary modern schools, respectively.

Miss Horsbrugh: I regret that this information is not available in the Department.

Catering Training Facilities, South-West Region

Mr. Wilkins: asked the Minister of Education if she is aware of the urgent need for a catering training school in the South-West region of England to meet the needs of the catering industry; and whether she is now prepared to give her consent to the inclusion in the 1955–56 education building programmes of such facilities.

Mr. Hayman: asked the Minister of Education what proposals she has received for providing a catering unit at Torquay Technical College to serve the South-Western counties; and what decision she has taken in this matter.

Miss Horsbrugh: I am aware of the need for better facilities for catering education in this region, but as I have explained to the Devon local education authority, I cannot at present approve a proposal which involves substantial new building.

Mr. Wilkins: May we take it that it is only a temporary embargo on the provision of these facilities? Is the right hon. Lady not aware that her Department not only sanctioned the proposals but, I am advised, set aside money to carry them through? Does she realise the urgency of this need in South-West England, in which the catering industry is a basic industry?

Miss Horsbrugh: I quite agree that we want to have better facilities for catering instruction, but we have certain urgent priorities in the building of technical colleges. The priorities are engineering, mining, textiles and building. However, I have suggested to the Devon authority that although it cannot put through its bigger project at the present time we should meet to discuss how its more pressing needs could be met by a relatively small project.

Mr. Hayman: Will the right hon. Lady bear in mind that this is intended to be a regional unit for the whole of the South-West? Will she remember that the tourist industry is one of the most important in the South-West, particularly in Cornwall and in my constituency, Falmouth and Camborne? If the Treasury is blocking the way to this much needed extension of the buildings will she ask the Chancellor to remove his embargo quickly?

Miss Horsbrugh: I do not think I can add to what I have said, and the hon. Gentleman will not disagree with me about the importance of mining, as well as catering, in his constituency.

Mr. C. Williams: Will my right hon. Friend, now that the Government's policy has progressed so much, use her influence with other Ministers who are in favour of amending this circular so that there can be better training for this great dollar-earning industry in future?

Miss Horsbrugh: I think that we must keep the priorities, and that the other Ministers and the House will agree that the four priorities we have in the types of technical education must come first.

Meals and Milk Service

Lieut.-Colonel Lockwood: asked the Minister of Education whether she is aware that children who receive education in premises specially sanctioned under the Education Act, 1944, by reason of the

fact that they receive education otherwise than at school, are ineligible to receive meals and milk service afforded to other children; and whether she will take whatever steps are necessary to put an end to this anomaly.

Miss Horsbrugh: Yes, Sir. Local education authorities have power to provide milk and meals only for children who are in attendance at school. Legislation would be required to change this position.

Lieut.-Colonel Lockwood: Will my right hon. Friend consider introducing legislation in view of the extreme importance of children receiving adequate meals? It is not more important that they should get adequate meals than that we should be put to a little trouble to amend or remove regulations that prevent them from having them?

Miss Horsbrugh: The children who go to the schools do, of course, get milk and meals. At present, I cannot ensure legislation could be brought in to deal with these particular groups of children.

Sir W. Smithers: Is there no limit to the activities and, therefore, to the expenditure of the taxpayers' money in my right hon. Friend's Department?

Miss Horsbrugh: Yes. I think the fact that there is a limit has been brought out in several debates and answers to Questions. I should like that limit to be as high as possible, and, perhaps, even higher than it is.

Modern Secondary Schools, Bristol

Mr. Awbery: asked the Minister of Education how many classes there are in the modern secondary schools in Bristol with over 30 pupils; to what extent the overcrowding is due to a shortage of teachers or accommodation; and if she will now agree to grant the number of schools requested by the local committee for the coming year.

Miss Horsbrugh: There were 263 such classes in January, 1954. The Bristol education authority would require both more teachers and more accommodation to enable it to reduce to 30 the size of classes in its secondary modern schools. I have included in the authority's 1955–56 building programme and its reserve list


all the projects designed to provide additional secondary school places for which they asked.

Mr. Awbery: In view of the serious position in Bristol, will the Minister now consider reversing her previous decision to reduce the number of schools required by the education authority from 10 to seven? Will she help the local authority by granting money for the three schools?

Miss Horsbrugh: As I pointed out, I have included in the authority's 1955–56 building programme and its reserve list new secondary schools designed to provide accommodation for about 2,750 children.

Mr. Awbery: Is it not a fact that the Minister reduced the number of schools required by the local authority last year from 10 to seven and now, in 1955 to 1956, she is restoring the number to 10?

Miss Horsbrugh: Bristol is carrying out an enormous building programme. It is building practically everything it possibly can and, in 1955–56, will be building to accommodate an extra 2,750 secondary school children.

Bec Grammar School, Wandsworth

Dr. King: asked the Minister of Education why she has refused to permit the London County Council to proceed with its development plan for Bec Grammar School and secondary education in that area.

Miss Horsbrugh: I would refer the hon. Member to the reply which I gave to the hon. Member for Rugby (Mr. J. Johnson), on 15th July last.

Dr. King: Is the Minister aware that that answer means that she is the sole arbiter of what is educationally advantageous to children, that it means that she has the right to flout the decisions of local education authorities, and that in this she is behaving like a French minister of education and not a British Minister of Education?

Miss Horsbrugh: I am rather surprised that the hon. Gentleman, who knows so much about the Education Act, 1944, did not look it up before making those remarks. If he will look at Section 13 he will see that although a local

authority may propose closing or opening a school the responsibility for the decision is the Minister's. I am also surprised that the hon. Gentleman and other hon. Members opposite should talk of the flouting of the opinions of local authorities by Ministers, when in their own statement of their future policy, they say they will insist on comprehensive schools in all parts and tear up, I presume, more than 140 development plans.

Minor Capital Work (Allocations)

Mr. Morley: asked the Minister of Education why, when Southampton local education authority asked for an allocation of £42,690 for supplementary allocations for minor capital work on school building, only £13,600 was allocated for that purpose.

Miss Horsbrugh: I made this allocation, as a supplement to the authority's basic allocation of £17,775, after taking into account the size of its major school building programme, its need for additional school places and the relative urgency of the need for the improvements which it wished to carry out.

Mr. Morley: Is the right hon. Lady aware that this reduced allocation is preventing the local authority from carrying out some very necessary and urgent work on the schools, particularly on improving sanitation? Will she be a bit more generous the year after?

Miss Horsbrugh: I would point out that the total allocation for minor works has been £31,375, and, in addition to any extra places provided, there will he about £15,000 for improvement.

Miss Bacon: asked the Minister of Education the total amount requested by local authorities in the last financial year for minor capital work; and how much was approved.

Miss Horsbrugh: I will write to the hon. Member as soon as I have the figures.

Miss Bacon: asked the Minister of Education how much of the money allowed for minor capital work in the last financial year was used for extensions.

Miss Horsbrugh: £2·1 million out of the allocation to local education authorities in 1953–54 for minor works.

Miss Bacon: I am not quite clear why the right hon. Lady is now able to answer this Question when she was not able to give me an answer to Question No. 28. This Question is consequential upon Question No. 28. How, therefore, is she able to give me one answer without the other?

Miss Horsbrugh: If the hon. Lady will look at the two Questions, she will see that in Question No. 28 she asked me to give the total amount requested by local authorities in the last financial year for minor capital work and how much was approved; and, in Question No. 29, she asked me how much of the money allowed for minor capital work in the last financial year was used for extensions. The first figures I cannot give her immediately, but I will let her have them in writing.

Boy, Midsomer Norton (Technical School Entry)

Mr. Leather: asked the Minister of Education why Michael Sandells, of Drill Hall Cottage, Steam Mills, Midsomer Norton, Somerset, was refused entry to a secondary technical school on the grounds that the Somerset County Education Authority did not consider him suitable, although he was top of his form, passed all his tests, and the said authority did not interview him.

Miss Horsbrugh: I am writing to my hon. Friend.

Boys, Durham (Corporal Punishment)

Mr. Peter Freeman: asked the Minister of Education whether her attention has been called to the action of Mr. Oliver Whitfield, of the Secondary Modern School, Durham, who caned 200 boys because he was unable to discover a misdemeanour alleged to have been made by one of them; whether such mass corporal punishment of children has her approval; and whether she will issue instructions for the dismissal of this headmaster for punishing 199 innocent boys.

Miss Horsbrugh: I have seen reports of the incident in the Press. Disciplinary matters of this kind are within the discretion of the headmaster and of the local education authority, and I would not wish to intervene. In any case, I have no

power to require the dismissal of the headmaster.

Mr. Freeman: Is the right hon. Lady aware of the statements made by the Home Secretary on this question of punishment a few days ago, when he said:
… the two requirements of natural justice that have gone back to the beginning of civilisation are that a person who may be punished should know what the complaint is against him and that he should be given an opportunity to meet it. That is the basis of the rule of law throughout the ages."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th July, 1954; Vol. 530, c. 1292.]
Was either of those conditions fulfilled in the case of any one of these 200 children? Is this not a gross abuse of the ordinary custom of justice which is being denied to these children and has not the right hon. Lady the responsibility of safeguarding their rights? What action does she intend to take to prevent this gross abuse of justice?

Miss Horsbrugh: Without expressing an opinion whether there was justice or not, I can only repeat that I shall not interfere with the duty and responsibility of the local authority and the headmaster.

Mr. G. Thomas: Is the Minister aware that the parents in this district are not complaining, and that it would be an advantage if my hon. Friend the Member for Newport (Mr. Peter Freeman) would leave the teaching profession alone for a while? [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Is the Minister further aware that the discipline of this school can only suffer from the publicity given to a Question of this sort?

New Secondary School, Cippenham

Mr. Fenner Brockway: asked the Minister of Education if she will authorise the building of a new secondary school at Cippenham, Slough, during 1955–56.

Miss Horsbrugh: I hope that, following discussion with the Buckinghamshire local education authority, it may be possible to include this project in the reserve list to their 1955–56 school building programme.

Mr. Brockway: While expressing appreciation of the Minister's consideration of this problem, as there will be 1,000 children in this school at the end


of 1956 and the school is built for only 540, may I ask whether she will give urgent consideration to the request for a new school?

Miss Horsbrugh: I cannot say anything precise at this stage. We are still in discussion about the reserve list. In the main programme settled for 1955–56 there are four secondary and four primary schools at an estimated cost of £631,000. An enormous programme is being undertaken. I know that the school is wanted urgently.

School, Bacton-Mendlesham

Colonel Harrison: asked the Minister of Education when the proposed central school in the Bacton-Mendlesham area of East Suffolk will be built; and on what approximate date it is anticipated that it will be ready for use.

Miss Horsbrugh: I have received no proposals from the local education authority for the inclusion of this proposed school in an early building programme.

Colonel Harrison: In view of that rather distressing reply, will my right hon. Friend take as much action as possible with county authorities to see that these schools are built in the rural areas and allay the fear of parents that children who are sent into small towns become urbanised?

Miss Horsbrugh: Yes, I think that what I said in the debate last Monday will show my hon. and gallant Friend that that is my desire. That is why I have been anxious to retain the village schools. We are getting a further programme of secondary schools.

Circulars 242 and 245

Mr. G. Thomas: asked the Minister of Education when she expects to be able to withdraw Circulars 242 and 245 and to restore the freedom which local education authorities enjoyed prior to these circulars being issued.

Miss Horsbrugh: These Circulars will continue in force so long as the national financial situation requires. I do not accept the implication of the last part of the Question.

Mr. Thomas: Is the education service to be the last to find any relief under the

apparent prosperity which the Government claim to have restored?

Miss Horsbrugh: The financial position is very much better, as the hon. Gentleman has said, thanks to the work of this Government. If he will look at the Estimates and the amount of building work that is being done, he will see that, thanks to the improvement, we are able to spend more on education and, I think, get better value.

School Building Programme

Mr. G. Thomas: asked the Minister of Education what protests she has received from the Welsh Joint Education Committee concerning the school building programme in Wales; and what reply she has sent.

Miss Horsbrugh: I have been informed that the Welsh Joint Education Committee wish to discuss with me the question of educational building programmes in Wales and Monmouthshire. I hope to arrange a meeting at a convenient date.

Mr. Thomas: Is the Minister aware that I should like to be there? Is she further aware that there is trouble on the way and that the Welsh local authorities are saying many things before they reach her office? Does she not realise that the best way to peace is to meet the requests of these authorities?

Miss Horsbrugh: The hon. Gentleman said that he would like to be there. Perhaps he will communicate his desire to the Welsh Joint Education Committee. As to what these people say before they reach me, perhaps when they have heard what I have to say they will go away saying something different.

Mr. G. Thomas: asked the Minister of Education how far local education authorities are permitted to decide their own priorities with regard to the selection of what new schools shall be built in their areas.

Miss Horsbrugh: Each year I invite local education authorities to list in order of priority the projects they wish me to include in the following year's programme and its reserve. I exclude from this list only those projects which fall outside the categories of work allowed by Circular 245, or which could without damage be deferred to a later programme, or which


cannot reasonably be expected to start during the period. This, of course, is normally done in consultation with the authority.

Mr. Thomas: Is the Minister aware that publicity has been given in the educational Press to a local authority in whose area No. 1 priority has been given to a school for a term of years, and that this has been crossed out by the Minister who has given priority to another school? Does she think that the woman in Whitehall knows best?

Miss Horsbrugh: I do not say that the people in Northamptonshire who drew up that list necessarily knew best, for this reason. The school that was listed was chiefly for reorganisation and, therefore, did not come under the provisions of Circular 245. That particular school has now been put into the reserve list because, I think, by 1958 there will be more children coming to the school, and that is the date when it is required. The other schools are for more children who will be coming there before that time.

Mr. Blackburn: asked the Minister of Education to what extent schools included in the reserve list for one year are included in the actual building programme for the following year.

Miss Horsbrugh: If I put a new school project unconditionally in a reserve list, authorities can assume that it will be included in the following year's main programme unless there has been a marked change in circumstances or they satisfy me that alternative arrangements can be made to accommodate the children.

Mr. Blackburn: Does that mean that the proposed new school at Newton Hyde, which the Minister placed in the reserve list for 1954–55, will definitely be in the building programme for 1955–56?

Miss Horsbrugh: I would have to refresh my memory about the school to which the hon. Gentleman refers.

New School, Trimdon

Mr. Slater: asked the Minister of Education what consideration is being given to the representations made to her by the hon. Member for Sedgefield for the building of a new school at Trimdon village; and whether this school is to be commenced in the 1954–55 programme of the Durham County Council.

Miss Horsbrugh: I cannot finally settle the Durham authority's school building programme for 1955–56 until I receive the further information from it for which I have asked. Meanwhile, its proposal to build a new infants' school at Trimdon has been included in the reserve list for that programme.

Mr. Slater: Who is responsible for determining the order of priority? Is it the right hon. Lady's Department or the county council? Is she aware that the parents in this area, which is a development area, are concerned at the number of accidents which have taken place on the highway which adjoins this new estate, through children having to travel to other parts of the district?

Miss Horsbrugh: I have just informed the hon. Gentleman that the programme is not settled because I have asked for further information. When I get that further information I will consider the whole matter.

Gateshead

Mr. J. T. Hall: asked the Minister of Education how far the county borough of Gateshead was permitted to select the type of schools to be built in its area in its latest building programme.

Miss Horsbrugh: The Gateshead local education authority listed three secondary schools in order of priority for inclusion in its 1955–56 school building programme. I included the first in its main programme and an instalment of the second in its reserve list, and deferred the third.

Mr. Hall: Is the right hon. Lady not aware that this local authority has pressed for permission to be allowed to build a Roman Catholic grammar school in Gateshead and that she gave me an assurance some time ago that she hoped to go as far as possible in increasing the number of grammar school places in Gateshead? Is this not the wrong way to carry out her assurances?

Miss Horsbrugh: No, I do not think it is. I think it is right to increase the number of secondary school places. Work on the new school which was started in March, 1953, will provide for about 700 children. The authority already has under construction a secondary school which will double the number of places in the maintained grammar


schools. The third school was, I know, for Roman Catholic children, but arrangements are being made for the authority to take up a number of places in Roman Catholic independent and direct-grant schools. At present, it has 29, but it is to increase that number this August.

Small Trusts (Rural Parishes)

Mr. Vane: asked the Minister of Education whether she will give an assurance that the many small trusts founded to further the betterment and education of children in rural parishes will be protected and the trustees encouraged, where necessary, to find new ways of carrying out the intentions of their founders rather than that the funds should be controlled centrally or merged into county founds.

Miss Horsbrugh: I cannot give an assurance that I will not in any circumstances make use of the powers given me by Parliament under Section 2 of the Education (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1948, but it is my policy to help the trustees of individual educational charities to play a useful rôle wherever possible.

Mr. Vane: While thanking my right hon., Friend for that partial assurance, may I ask whether she can tell us whether she has torn up the proposals made in the days of her predecessors for looting these endowments in many counties? I should like to think that she has.

Miss Horsbrugh: I do not know anything about looting in the time of any of my predecessors or in the time that I have been at the Ministry of Education.

Oral Answers to Questions — COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

Arms Thefts, Northern Ireland (Extradition Treaty)

Lieut.-Colonel Hyde: asked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations if he will initiate talks with the Government of the Irish Republic with a view to concluding an extradition treaty to cover individuals guilty of thefts of arms from military establishments in the United Kingdom and similar crimes.

The Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (Mr. John Foster): No, Sir. I do not think that this would be appropriate.

Lieut.-Colonel Hyde: Does my hon. Friend not consider that recent thefts of Crown property in Northern Ireland are extremely deplorable, and does he not think that it would help if an extradition treaty covering Northern Ireland were concluded?

Mr. Foster: No, Sir. There is a procedure in force for the mutual endorsement and execution of warrants of arrest between the Republic and Great Britain. With regard to the position in Northern Ireland, I am in consultation with my right hon. and learned Friend the Home Secretary as to improving the position.

British Bases, Middle East (Consultations)

Mr. P. Williams: asked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations what consultations have taken place between the United Kingdom Government and the various Commonwealth Governments on the future of British bases in the Middle East; and with what results.

Mr. J. Foster: In accordance with the usual practice, other Commonwealth Governments have been continuously informed of the views and intentions of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

Mr. Williams: Do I understand from my hon. Friend that decisions are now come to rather than that consultations take place?

Mr. Foster: No, Sir.

Mr. Grimond: Can the hon. Gentleman say whether the Commonwealth Governments were, in fact, consulted and, if so, what were their views?

Mr. Foster: The answer to the first part of that supplementary question is "Yes," and the answer to the second part is that it is not the practice to give details of consultations between Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries.

Mr. W. R. Williams: Is it not better that this matter should be referred to the United Nations rather than that either the Commonwealth countries or ourselves should deal with it independently?

Mr. Foster: No. Sir.

Mr. Shinwell: Is it the intention of Her Majesty's Government, in relation to defence in the Middle East, to include the question of a Middle East defence organisation?

Mr. Foster: I cannot say.

Mr. Shinwell: Does not the hon. Gentleman know anything about it, or is he not permitted to say anything about it?

Mr. Foster: It is another question.

African Affairs Board (Grain Marketing Regulations)

Mr. Fenner Brockway: asked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations if the provisions of the Federal Government Notice No. 112, 1st April, 1954, Grain Marketing Regulations, 1954, and in particular Regulation No. 9, were considered by the African Affairs Board; and whether the Board made any report under the terms of Article 77 (i) of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Constitution.

Mr. J. Foster: The proceedings of the African Affairs Board are not within the control of the Secretary of State and he is not informed about them. No report by the Board on the Regulations mentioned has been received by the Secretary of State under Article 77 (2) of the Constitution.

Mr. Brockway: As these regulations may have a serious effect on the prices paid to Africans for their goods, can the hon. Gentleman at least indicate that it is desirable that this matter should be considered with the African Affairs Board?

Mr. Foster: No, Sir. That would not be possible.

Commonwealth (New Members)

Mr. Sorensen: asked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations what representations have been made and what consultations have taken place between Her Majesty's Government and other Commonwealth Governments with the intention of determining the most appropriate and acceptable means of accepting new members of the Commonwealth.

Mr. J. Foster: None, Sir.

Mr. Sorensen: Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that this is a matter of some importance and should not be just laughed off? Membership of the Commonwealth of Nations is a very onerous and honourable position, and it should not depend merely on this country determining it but on the whole membership of the Commonwealth. Will he give a serious and constructive reply to this Question?

Mr. Foster: I quite agree with what the hon. Member has said about the importance of Commonwealth membership, and when the matter arises other Commonwealth members will be consulted, as was stated by the Prime Minister on 16th June, 1952.

Mr. Sorensen: Has not that already arisen in view of the possibility of two black Dominions ultimately coming into being and becoming members of the Commonwealth?

Mr. Foster: No, Sir. It has not arisen.

Mr. J. Johnson: Will the hon. Member give an assurance that he himself and the Government will not be party to any settlement in which we have a two-tier system inside the Commonwealth, and that future black Dominions will be on an equal status with the present white Dominions in the Commonwealth?

Mr. Foster: I cannot go beyond the statement of my right hon. Friend.

Mr. Gordon Walker: As new problems of this kind may arise, and as it is obvious that they cannot be settled in a rush, when they do arise would it not be wise to have some preliminary consultations with the other Commonwealth Governments on the principles involved in this matter?

Mr. Foster: I will put the right hon. Gentleman's suggestion to my right hon. and noble Friend.

Mr. Sorensen: Cannot the hon. Gentleman put my suggestion to him, too?

Oral Answers to Questions — TRADE AND COMMERCE

Coin-operated Phonographs

Mr. Erroll: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he is aware that the manufacturing capacity of British


firms is capable of satisfying all foreseeable demands in this country for coin-operated phonographs; and whether, in view of this, he will prohibit the importation of such machines from Western Germany.

The President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Peter Thorneycroft): Coin-operated phonographs are admissible from Western Germany under the open general licence as gramophones, and I regret that my hon. Friend was informed on 8th July that they are included in the quota for amusement machinery. I understand that British firms have considerable manufacturing capacity for these machines, but I am not prepared to prohibit their import from Western Germany since such a prohibition is not necessary to safeguard our balance of payments.

Mr. Erroll: As the Minister is not prepared to prohibit the importation of these machines, would he at least try to obtain an assurance from the importers that they will maintain the same standards of distribution of these machines as is at present operated by the United Kingdom manufacturers?

Mr. Thorneycroft: They are on open general licences in this country, and I do not think that we can impose on importers a condition about their distribution.

Racing (Industrial Production Loss)

Mr. T. Williams: asked the President of the Board of Trade (1) what estimate was made of the possible loss of industrial production through the running of the Two Thousand Guineas race on a Wednesday, the Epsom Derby on a Wednesday, the Royal Hunt Cup on a Wednesday and the forthcoming Goodwood Cup on a Thursday; and whether the Stewards of the Jockey Club were advised to run these races on a Saturday;
(2) what estimate was made of the possible loss of industrial production if the Doncaster St. Leger was run on a Wednesday; and why Her Majesty's Government advised the Jockey Club to change the traditional day from Wednesday to Saturday.

Mr. P. Thorneycroft: As regards the St. Leger, the Government have received strong representations about the serious effect which there would be on industrial

production, particularly coal-mining, if this race were to be run once again on a Wednesday. Those representations were considered very carefully before my right hon. Friend the Minister of Fuel and Power asked the Jockey Club to keep the St. Leger on a Saturday. No numerical estimates have been made of the loss of industrial production caused by running the St. Leger or continuing to run the other races, to which the hon. Member refers, in midweek.
We have received no representations about these other races, and we should not regard it as our business, save on the basis of some very substantial evidence, to request the Jockey Club to make alterations in the dates of these other races.

Mr. Williams: Are we to take it that Her Majesty's Government feel that those who attend the Two Thousand Guineas race in Cambridge, the Derby in Surrey, the Royal Hunt Cup in Berkshire, and the Goodwood Cup in Sussex are all non-workers and, therefore, production is of no account, and that only those in industrial Yorkshire are to be penalised because they cannot have their race meetings on a Wednesday?

Mr. Thorneycroft: I think that that would be rather a large assumption to draw.

Mr. Williams: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us why the Government show no concern at all when these four southern classic races are held on any day that the Jockey Club feel disposed to hold them, and only interest themselves in the North—in Doncaster—as to whether the St. Leger shall be run on a Wednesday or a Saturday?

Mr. Thorneycroft: Very strong representations were made about the date of the St. Leger, and it was in the light of these representations that the request was made to the Jockey Club. No such representations have been made in the case of the other races. I am not anxious to extend the activities of Her Majesty's Government to suggesting when various races should be held.

Mr. Williams: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that 47 of the largest pits in Yorkshire are already taking their holidays during Doncaster race week and


that it would have no material effect whatever on output if the St. Leger was run on the traditional day, Wednesday?

Mr. Ede: Will the President consult the Whips on both sides of the House about the desirability of running the Derby on a Saturday, and also consider the private views of the Prime Minister on the subject?

Mr. Llewellyn: Can my right hon. Friend say from whom the representations have been received?

Mr. Thorneycroft: From the National Production Advisory Council for Industry, the Sheffield and Rotherham Productivity Committees, which include both sides of industry, and the National Coal Board.

Mr. Williams: Is this not gross discrimination in favour of the South against the North?

United Kingdom-Pakistan

Mr. Russell: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will make a statement on the prospects of increasing trade between this country and Pakistan, especially by Britain buying more Pakistan cotton and selling more textile machinery to Pakistan.

Mr. P. Thorneycroft: The prospect of increasing trade between the two countries will depend in part at least on the scale on which Pakistan cotton can be sold here. A Lancashire-Pakistan Cotton Committee has been formed to encourage the use of Pakistan cotton in Lancashire and a representative delegation from Pakistan attended the inaugural meeting last month. I very much hope that the Committee will be successful in achieving its purpose and that, as a result, there will be an expansion of trade between the two countries.

Commonwealth Countries (Preference Rates)

Mr. Russell: asked the President of the Board of Trade if, in view of the fact that the average rate of preference granted to Commonwealth countries is now roughly only half the level of prewar and that the rise in prices has reduced the value of specific preference margins, he will make an investigation into the adequacy of existing rates in readiness for the time when convertibility of sterling is restored.

Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I do not think that at this stage it would be useful to undertake an investigation in the sense my hon. Friend suggests.

Mr. Russell: Can my right hon. Friend give an assurance that he will undertake such an investigation before this contingency arises, and not after it?

Mr. Thorneycroft: My hon. Friend will recognise that there are two sides to the question: the preferences which we give, and the preferences which we receive. My hon. Friend's suggestion would involve almost a re-negotiation of all the preferences in the Ottawa Agreements. I suggest that we await the outcome of the discussions which we are having with the Commonwealth on the broad issues of policy that are involved before we go further in this matter.

N.E. Trading Estate Factories

Mr. Willey: asked the President of the Board of Trade how many people, men and women, were employed in the factories in Sunderland administered by the North Eastern Trading Estates, Limited, on the latest available date.

Mr. P. Thorneycroft: On 29th May, 1954, the latest date for which official figures are available, 1,617 men and boys and 2,541 women and girls, making a total of 4,158, were employed in these factories.

Mr. Willey: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that these figures show a further decline in the numbers employed in these factories?

Mr. Thorneycroft: Yes, Sir. The decline in employment is due to the cessation of work in the two factories, of which the hon. Member is well aware.

Mr. Willey: asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will make a further statement on the Trading Estate Company factories in Sunderland, at present vacant or not fully used.

Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I cannot add anything to what was said by my hon. and learned Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the hon. Member during the Adjournment debate on 16th July. If any development occurs of which the hon. Gentleman would wish to know while the House is in recess, I will get in touch with him straight away.

Mr. Willey: I am obliged to the right hon. Gentleman. Do I understand that no decision has yet been taken about the third factory that is in danger of closing?

Mr. Thorneycroft: I think that is so, but I should like to look into the point.

Mr. Willey: asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware that 250 more women have lost their employment on the Trading Estate at Sunderland; and what action he now proposes to take to promote more employment for women in Sunderland.

Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I understand that the hon. Member is referring to a factory which, though nearby, is not on the Pallion Trading Estate, and is not owned by the Government. This company hopes to re-engage these women workers in the autumn.
As regards the second part of the Question, I can add nothing to what was said by my hon. and learned Friend during the Adjournment debate on 16th July.

Polish Bilberries

Lieut.-Colonel Schofield: asked the President of the Board of Trade to what extent he proposes to issue import licences this season for Polish bilberries; and to what extent the British firm which has contracted for the total exportable quantity of these bilberries will be enabled by such import licences to implement its contract.

Mr. P. Thorneycroft: As an interim measure, licences to a value of £125,000 for the import of Polish bilberries have already been issued this year and arrangements are now being made for the immediate issue of a further interim quota of £75,000. As regards contracts, no firm should enter into binding contract to act as importer without first ascertaining whether the goods will be admissible.

Lieut.-Colonel Schofield: Would my right hon. Friend not agree that there is something incongruous in the fact that the firm which secured the contract for the whole of the Polish bilberry crop has been granted import licences for only one-quarter, whereas a firm which was unsuccessful in tendering has an import licence for the remaining three-quarters? If the Department continues by granting licences on a repeat performance basis,

will it not lead, in the long run, to a complete monopoly by one firm? Would it not be better to open the whole thing to free competition, as exists in many other imports?

Mr. Thorneycroft: There is something incongruous about all forms of import licensing, but so long as it is necessary to maintain licensing one must have some system for distributing the licences. Up to the present we have tried to do it upon the basis of previous trade, but I shall be happy to discuss with my hon. and gallant Friend the problems to which he refers.

Film Industry (Eady Levy)

Mr. K. Robinson: asked the President of the Board of Trade if, in view of the failure of the film industry to agree on a basis for continuing the Eady Levy, he will introduce a statutory scheme forthwith.

Mr. G. Darling: asked the President of the Board of Trade whether, in view of the failure of the film producers and exhibitors to agree on the amount of the voluntary levy to aid film production and on the division of the recent tax reliefs, he will introduce statutory schemes for both purposes and place all sections of the film industry under his supervision and control.

Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I regret to say that while the other three associations concerned are willing to accept my suggestion to proceed at once to arbitration, the Cinematograph Exhibitors' Association is not, at this time, prepared to agree that matters have reached a stage which makes arbitration appropriate. I still hope that agreement may be reached, but I think the interest of all concerned will be best served if I make no further statement at this stage.

Mr. Robinson: Does the President not think it would encourage the Cinematograph Exhibitors' Association to agree to arbitration if he would make a categorical statement that he will introduce legislation in the event of failure to agree? Will he state, also, that this legislation will be made retrospective to the end of the present voluntary agreement?

Mr. Thorneycroft: I do not want to elaborate upon this rather complex problem at present, but I certainly have not


departed from the statement I made previously about the necessity of having a scheme of this kind, if necessary by statutory means.

Mr. Darling: While I appreciate that the right hon. Gentleman does not want to get too deeply involved in this business at the moment, will he bear in mind that he has a public responsibility in this matter and that in these discussions the interests of the cinemagoers, who pay for the industry and keep it going, ought to be borne in mind?

Mr. Thorneycroft: The industry, too, has a responsibility in this matter to try to arrive at a sensible solution of its own problems.

Film Producing Companies (Operations)

Mr. G. Darling: asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will arrange for the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission to inquire into the operations of film-producing companies which also control film laboratories and have substantial ownership of cinemas.

Mr. P. Thorneycroft: No, Sir.

Mr. Darling: As it is an odds on chance that the President will have to intervene in this industry owing to the failure of the trade associations in it to come to some agreement, would it not be as well to have a better picture of the structure of the industry, how it operates and how the big concerns dominate it through a report from the Monopolies Commission?

Mr. Thorneycroft: I have considerable doubt whether Monopolies Commission legislation would cover such a matter. There is a good deal of legislation dealing with monopoly inside the film industry, such as the Cinematograph Films Acts, and I think it is better to deal with those problems under Acts concerned with the film industry rather than by outside legislation.

Film Projectors (Price-fixing)

Sir L. Plummer: asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will refer to the Monopolies Commission the price-fixing arrangements made among themselves by the suppliers of projectors and other equipment for the showing of stereophonic sound films.

Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I am not sure what arrangements the hon. Member has in mind, but, if he will let me have details, I will consider the matter further.

Imported Goods (Marking)

Mr. Russell: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will give a decision about the withdrawal of the option under the Merchandise Marks Act, 1926, which allows imported goods which are required to be marked to bear the words "Foreign" or "Empire" instead of the name of the country of origin.

Mr. P. Thorneycroft: The matter is still under consideration, but I hope to announce a decision on policy soon.

Monopoly Commission Investigations (Time)

Sir L. Plummer: asked the President of the Board of Trade the average time now taken by the Monopolies Commission to investigate a case and to report on a case, respectively.

Mr. P. Thorneycroft: An investigation is not completed until the Commission's report is signed. For the three reports made during the three months ended last June, the average time between the making of the reference and the signature of the report was just under 23 months. But these averages are of little significance since some inquiries necessarily involve more work than others.

U.S. Contracts (British Tenders)

Mr. Jay: asked the President of the Board of Trade what reply he has received to the representations made to the United States Government about the award of contracts for the Chief Joseph and Dalles Dams to United States firms in spite of a tender by the English Electric Company at lower prices.

Mr. P. Thorneycroft: No reply has been received as yet, but I understand that we may expect one shortly.

Mr. de Freitas: asked the President of the Board of Trade in how many cases in the past three years British firms have been refused contracts by the United States Government although their tenders have been lower than competing American firms; and whether he has drawn the attention of the United States Government to each of these violations of the principles of fair competition.

Mr. P. Thorneycroft: United States Government procurement extends over an immense field and Her Majesty's Government do not necessarily hear of all cases where British firms have been unsuccessful. I am, however, aware of three cases in the last three years where the British bid, though both the lowest of all bids submitted and fully compliant, was rejected; and in each of these, representations were made to the United States Government.

Motor Vehicles (Export to Canada)

Mr. de Freitas: asked the President of the Board of Trade whether his attention has been drawn to the decline in the volume of our exports of motor vehicles to Canada; and what he is doing to remedy this.

Mr. P. Thorneycroft: Yes, Sir. I am aware of the drop in our exports to Canada of motor vehicles. It is due partly to a fall in the demand for new cars and partly to intensified competition by United States and Canadian manufacturers. My right hon. Friend the Minister of Supply and I are in close touch with our manufacturers on export and other problems affecting the industry, but I can give no assurance of an early reversal of a situation which arises mainly from conditions in Canada.

U.K. Trade Commissioner, Canada (Staff)

Mr. de Freitas: asked the President of the Board of Trade what plans he has for increasing the staff of the United Kingdom Trade Commissioner in Canada.

Mr. P. Thorneycroft: The staff needs of the Trade Commissioner offices in Canada are kept under constant review, and two additional Assistant Trade Commissioners have been sent to Canada this year.

Mr. de Freitas: Is the President sure that that is enough staff to tackle the enormous problems which confront us in this dollar market, which is becoming even more important in view of the trend in the United States as shown by recent tariff changes?

Mr. Thorneycroft: I think so. Only recently I had a good opportunity of seeing how our Trade Commissioners work

but I am fully alive to this matter and am keeping it under review. If any additional staff is necessary I will see that it is made available.

Oral Answers to Questions — PRIME MINISTER (ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS)

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: asked the Prime Minister on how many days of the week he will answer Oral Questions in the House after the Recess.

The Prime Minister (Sir Winston Churchill): Tuesdays and Thursdays are the most convenient days to me, but hon. Members can, of course, put down Questions for any Sitting day, except Friday.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: While we welcome the implied assurance that the right hon. Gentleman will still be Prime Minister in the present Administration after the Recess, is he aware that some inconvenience is caused to hon. Members who put Questions down on days other than the two he has mentioned when we get to know only a short while beforehand that the Prime Minister will not be present? I assure the right hon. Gentleman that we are all very interested in his future movements.

Oral Answers to Questions — INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Mr. Dodds: asked the Prime Minister what progress has been made towards meeting Mr. Malenkov.

The Prime Minister: I have nothing to add to the statement which I made to the House as recently as the day before yesterday. I said then that Her Majesty's Government intend to take all possible steps, of whatever nature, to decrease tension; but the situation is complex and I cannot yet be more specific on this point.

Mr. Dodds: Does the Prime Minister recollect that a few weeks ago, in reply to a similar Question, he referred to a horse in the Grand National not being expected to jump two obstacles at once? Does he not agree that if any horse was as hesitant as he is himself about his second hurdle, it would meet a rather sticky end? Will the Prime Minister see that he is not restrained until it is too late by those who yesterday acclaimed Syngman Rhee as the champion of freedom and liberty?

The Prime Minister: I am sure that that supplementary question is as clear to the House as it is to me.

Oral Answers to Questions — CIVIL SERVICE AND PARLIAMENT (RELATIONSHIP)

Mr. Harold Davies: asked the Prime Minister if he will recommend the appointment of a Royal Commission to investigate and report upon the relationship of the Civil Service to Ministers and Parliament.

The Prime Minister: No, Sir.

Mr. Davies: While thanking the right hon. Gentleman for the usual type of reply which seems to be supplied to him either by the 1922 Committee or by the Civil Service, may I, in all sincerity, ask him whether he does not think that because of the growing complexity of modern Government there is a need to clarify the relationship of the Civil Service to Ministers and Members of Parliament? I assure the right hon. Gentleman that this Question was not put down in any vindictive spirit but merely to clarify the position between the Civil Service and Ministers and Members of Parliament.

The Prime Minister: I think it is a great mistake to assume that a Royal Commission offers an immediate solution to great problems. Much thought is given to this matter, and custom and practice build upon each other. On the whole, I believe that in this country the best results have been achieved that have so far been experienced by modern Governments.

Oral Answers to Questions — ATOMIC ENERGY (COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE)

Mr. Steward: asked the Prime Minister whether he will reconsider calling a Commonwealth conference to co-ordinate policy for the production of uranium, research and the use of atomic energy in industrial processes.

The Prime Minister: No, Sir. I see no reason to disturb the current arrangements, outlined by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Supply in his reply to the hon. Member for Coventry, North (Mr. Edelman) on 17th November last, which are working satisfactorily.

Mr. Steward: Would the Prime Minister agree that it would be necessary in the future to set up a permanent Commonwealth standing committee to work with the United States and other free countries in the peaceful development of this new force?

The Prime Minister: It may well be that something of that kind will eventuate, particularly when we consider how the importance of this subject grows from year to year and that the close connection of the Commonwealth is also strengthened.

Oral Answers to Questions — NATIONAL FINANCE

Cement Works, Strood (Rating Assessment)

Sir R. Acland: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether it has yet been possible to reach agreement about the assessment for rating purposes of cement works in the area of the Strood Rural District Council.

The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. R. Maudling): Yes, Sir.

University Teachers' Salaries

Mr. K. Robinson: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he is aware that, apart from an increase in salaries below £600 per annum, the range of salaries laid down in 1949 for university teachers is still in operation; whether he is satisfied that these salaries are adequate; and what representations he has received on this matter in recent months.

Mr. Maudling: Apart from an increase in 1952 for junior staffs, existing rates of pay are those announced by Sir Stafford Cripps on 15th March, 1949. Revision of academic salaries is now under consideration, but I am not yet in a position to make a statement.

Mr. Robinson: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that since that time there has been a considerable increase in professional salaries generally—about 30 per cent.—and that university teachers have a strong case for reconsideration of these scales?

Mr. Maudling: I have no doubt that that point is being put forward in the course of these discussions that are taking place.

Dr. Stross: Would the Economic Secretary bear in mind that there is a very great difference between the medical and non-medical teaching staffs at the universities and that this alone is a cause of offence to those who are not so happy as to be medical people?

University Grants Committee (Welsh Representation)

Mr. Gower: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what steps have been taken, or will be taken, to secure representation from Wales on the University Grants Committee.

Mr. Maudling: Though the members of the University Grants Committee are chosen to cover among them the main fields of university study, as well as certain interests outside the universities, they serve in a personal capacity and not as representatives.

International Bank (Sterling Loan)

Mr. Roy Jenkins: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer the purpose of the sterling loan recently raised by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on the London market.

Mr. Maudling: The purpose of the loan of £5 million which the International Bank is now raising on the London market is to provide the Bank with sterling for lending to borrowers outside the sterling Commonwealth.

Dividends (Distribution Rate)

Mr. Roy Jenkins: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer the rate of dividend distribution by public companies in the first six months of this year as compared with the similar period for 1953.

Mr. Maudling: The figures available show that the shareholders' gross return on invested capital for the first six months of 1954 was about 6 per cent. compared with about 5·4 per cent. for the same period last year.

Mr. Jenkins: Could not the hon. Gentleman also tell us what has been the absolute increase as well as the increase relating to the amount of invested capital?

Mr. Maudling: If the hon. Gentleman would put that question on the Order

Paper I would be glad to give him the information, but it would be very misleading information.

Private Industry (Capital Investments)

Mr. Roy Jenkins: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what information he can give about current rates of capital investments in private industry.

Mr. Maudling: I regret that I have no current figures. The figures for 1953 were published in the Economic Survey, 1954.

Mr. Jenkins: Is the hon. Gentleman unable to give us any indication of the effect of the Budget and its investment allowances on the rate of capital investment?

Mr. Maudling: I think it is too early in July to hope for evidence of the effects of the Budget on investment through the investment allowances. It takes a little while for investment allowances to bear fruit through the building of plant.

Houses (Estate Duty Valuation)

Miss Ward: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer on what date, in the valuation of houses for the payment of Estate Duty on small estates, the term "vacant possession," and the concession made in 1944 in relation to the valuation of houses became the identical basis of calculation; and whether the directive to district valuers will be placed in the Library of the House.

Mr. Maudling: The statutory and concessional values for Estate Duty purposes of owner-occupied houses within the scope of the concession have now tended to coincide in some cases but not in all, and not as from any common date. No directive has been issued to district valuers in this connection; the assessment of the concessional figure is essentially a question of valuation and depends on the circumstances of each individual case.

Miss Ward: Is my hon. Friend aware that his answer is most unsatisfactory and that I am sending his right hon. Friend particulars of cases? Is he also aware that 1953 is the date by which the change of policy came into operation, and that,


when the House reassembles, I hope he will be able to give me a better answer?

Mr. Maudling: So far as that question conflicts with my statement, I cannot accept the point of view of my hon. Friend.

Oral Answers to Questions — NATIONAL AND TATE GALLERIES (TRUSTEES)

Captain Kerby: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer why Her Majesty's Government have departed from the hitherto customary policy of not appointing civil servants to the boards of trustees of the National Gallery and Tate Gallery; and what other departures from precedent in this respect have taken place during the past decade.

Mr. Maudling: Trustees of the National and Tate Galleries are chosen for their general suitability. In recent years it has not been customary to appoint serving civil servants other than as ex-officio trustees. One present trustee is now a civil servant, though at the time of his appointment he was not in the Civil Service. Thus there is not any marked departure from precedent.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Mr. Attlee: May I ask the Lord Privy Seal whether he has a statement to make about the business of the House on our resumption after the Recess?

The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Harry Crookshank): Yes, Sir. The business for the first week after the Summer Recess will be as follows:

TUESDAY, 19TH OCTOBER and WEDNESDAY, 20TH OCTOBER—Report and Third Reading: Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Bill, until 7 o'clock.

Second Reading: Overseas Resources Development Bill.

Committee stage: Money Resolution.

THURSDAY, 21ST OCTOBER—Draft Housing (Review of Contributions) Order.

Motions for Addresses: International Organisations (Immunities and Privileges) Orders.

Draft Insurance Contracts (War Settlement) (Finland and Italy) Orders.

FRIDAY, 22ND OCTOBER—Second Reading: Pests Bill [Lords].

Committee stage: Money Resolution.

Mr. Attlee: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman, for the convenience of hon. Members, having regard to the forthcoming debate, whether there have been any more Ministerial resignations this morning?

Mr. de Freitas: Since the Civil Defence Bill is one of the few sensible steps taken in this field recently, and since it has already left another place, why is it not to be dealt with as soon as we get back in the autumn?

Mr. Crookshank: I am only talking about the first week when we return. I thought the hon. Gentleman was among those who were wanting the Pests Bill.

Mr. de Freitas: I want the Civil Defence Bill as soon as possible, and "as soon as possible" means the first week when we return.

Mr. Dugdale: Does the right hon. Gentleman intend to take the Overseas Resources Development Bill late at night, or is it to be taken at a reasonable time of day?

Mr. Crookshank: What I said was that the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Bill would be taken until about 7 o'clock on the Wednesday. I hope the right hon. Gentleman considers that a proper arrangement.

Mr. Hayman: Would the Lord Privy Seal take the Teachers Superannuation Bill during the week we come back, so as to prevent another Cabinet resignation?

OSBORNE HOUSE PRIVATE APARTMENTS (OPENING)

The Minister of Works (Sir David Eccles): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, I will make a statement about Osborne House.
On the occasion of King Edward VII's Coronation and by reason of the Osborne Estate Act, 1902, Osborne House, in the Isle of Wight, became part of the public property of the Crown to be administered by the Ministry of Works. The Act directed that the House should be used as a memorial of Her late Majesty Queen Victoria. Since that date certain rooms which had been in the personal occupation of Queen Victoria, including that in which she died, have been maintained exactly as they were and never shown to visitors.
This year marks the jubilee of the opening of the House and Her Majesty the Queen has commanded that these rooms should now be open to the public. Her Majesty has also offered on permanent loan the furnishings and works of art which are lodged in Osborne House or in the Swiss Cottage and Museum. These objects are to remain permanently at Osborne and I shall have the duty and charge of maintaining and administering the collection in the interests of the visiting public and of the patients of the King Edward VII Convalescent Home.
I have had the honour to accept Her Majesty's gracious offer. It is hoped that the private apartments can be opened to the public early next year.

ADJOURNMENT (SUMMER)

Mr. Speaker: It may be for the convenience of hon. Members who are interested in the Adjournment Motion tomorrow to know that, owing to the change of business which has been announced, I have had to re-allocate the times. In brief, the only change is that I propose to put down the debate on disarmament as the first item from 11 o'clock until 1.15, and the other subjects I have allotted will be proportionately postponed.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House, at its rising Tomorrow, do adjourn till Tuesday, 19th October."—[The Prime Minister.]

3.36 p.m.

Mr. Sydney Silverman: I beg to move, to leave out "To-morrow," and to insert "on Monday next" instead thereof.
If the Motion should be accepted by the House as it has been moved, we shall adjourn tomorrow for a period of rather more than 11 weeks. I will concede at once to any critic of my Amendment that in those circumstances to defer the Adjournment of the House for only one day might not alter the position very much. Therefore, I explain at once that I am moving this Amendment in order to call attention to the really shocking mismanagement of Parliamentary business which has put the House of Commons this week into a position of confusion and impotence.
The last two days of the Session prior to the Adjournment day were to have been devoted to the Second Reading, subsequent and final stages of the Consolidated Fund Bill. Those days have always been days which have been used by Parliament, and particularly by private Members of Parliament, to deal with the accumulation of small but important matters which are not capable of being regarded as important enough to deserve a whole day's debate or an official Motion on either side, but which nevertheless are matters with which Parliament has always wished to deal. Because of the number of important statements that have been deferred by the Government until the last day—

Mr. Arthur Lewis: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I ask you, with respect, to ask the House to give order, because I am trying hard to hear what my hon. Friend is saying and I cannot hear a word.

Mr. Speaker: I was not aware that there was any unusual noise, but I ask hon. Members to conduct their conversations quietly.

Mr. Silverman: I can quite understand, Sir, that there are many hon. Members—perhaps the majority of those on the other side—who do not wish to hear what I
have to offer—[An HON. MEMBER: "Absolutely right."]—and they are perfectly entitled to leave the House if they wish. It would be a great convenience to them and would save them a good deal of boredom and mischief if they would all leave together instead of in these organised small groups. I would willingly wait for them to leave, and if they do not come back today or tomorrow or on 19th October, or ever, those of us on this side of the House would not regret their absence.

Sir Ian Fraser: On a point of order. Could you say, Mr. Speaker, how long an hon. Member can be in possession of the House without making a speech?

Mr. Speaker: I think that is a matter for me.

Mr. Silverman: I should like to call the attention of the House to the number of important, urgent matters which will be left undiscussed and undealt with if we adjourn tomorrow. One of them was to have been the subject of debate today, and, for reasons with which I shall deal in a moment, it is to be dealt with in private Members' time on the Adjournment tomorrow. That is the question of the conference on disarmament which proceeded in London over a number of weeks and at which this country was represented by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Minister of State. This is, I suppose, as important a subject as the country and the world are likely to be faced with, and it fits into a pattern of international affairs which are of mounting urgency.
We have never yet had any statement to the House, though it is many weeks since the conference closed, as to what

took place. There has been no report and no debate. For that reason, my right hon. Friends were compelled to place on the Order Paper for this afternoon a Motion to debate that subject. It is a matter which ought to have been reported to and dealt with by the House a long time ago. Now it is to be taken on the last day and the rights of private Members are again to be invaded and removed. The assurance which you, Mr. Speaker, gave to me yesterday that private Members' interests were in no way affected by taking the disarmament discussion on Friday, because it would be taken between 4 p.m. and 6 p.m. by the extension for two hours at the normal sitting time of the House on the Adjournment day, has now gone. The disarmament discussion is to take place in the first two hours of the Adjournment day, leaving only three hours of normal time.

The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Harry Crookshank): I should not like the hon. Member to argue from a misunderstanding. It is still my intention to move the extension of the Sitting tomorrow by two hours and therefore no time will be lost to private Members.

Mr. Silverman: The right hon. Gentleman is quite right, and I appreciate that he intervened in order that I should not make an argument which was falsely based. I recognise that it is the intention to add two hours. If that makes no difference to the rights of private Members, perhaps when the right hon. Gentleman replies he will tell me why the change has been made and the two hours placed at the beginning of the day instead of at the end, as was promised yesterday.
I suggest that the reason is that, for a variety of reasons which we all understand and about which nobody complains, the two hours from 4 p.m. to 6 p.m. on the Adjournment day are likely to be abortive. I suppose that the reason the disarmament discussion comes at the beginning of the day instead of at the end is that it is rightly regarded as an important subject which ought to be debated when there is a reasonably large attendance in the House, and not between 4 p.m. and 6 p.m. when, in the circumstances, it is not likely that there will be so large an attendance.
There is also the question of the proposed concession of full sovereignty to West Germany. The House is being asked to adjourn for 11 weeks without any statement from the Government or discussion by the House as to what that is to involve. Does it, for instance, mean that when we come back on 19th October we shall be faced with a situation in which German rearmament will have been conceded, as it were without discussion and informally? That is to say, shall we come back and be faced with the position that West Germany has been accorded by treaty full sovereignty, which must involve the right to rearm without condition and limitation? Full sovereignty can mean nothing else but that.
One recognises that this is not the time to discuss the merits of the case and I do not propose to do so, but everybody knows that there is keen controversy, which cuts across normal party division, about the desirability of German rearmament at all. Surely, very very few even of the most convinced and enthusiastic supporters of German rearmament within the limits of E.D.C. would be prepared to support German rearmament without such limitations and conditions as the E.D.C. Treaty imposes.
There ought to have been a proper discussion by Parliament long ago of what is intended. The Government ought to have told us what is in their minds and ought to have given us any assurances which might reasonably have been asked for, or which they felt that they could give, in order to make sure that in this important and controversial matter the House of Commons is not faced on 19th October with a fait accompli.
There is another matter connected with international affairs. There was a conference months ago in Berlin about the future of Europe and about security in Europe, involving also necessarily this question of the future of Germany. That conference failed. Proposals were made which were found to be unacceptable. Since then there has been another conference which succeeded, and since that conference new proposals for a new conference on European security have been made.
The House still does not know what is the Government's attitude to those pro-

posals. Again, I am not seeking to discuss or even to advert upon the merits of the proposals one way or another. I concede that this is not the time to discuss or debate what the Government's attitude ought to be or what kind of reply the Government ought to send, but we ought not to adjourn for three months without knowing what is in the Government's mind on this matter.
We are entitled to know. They may say, "We are discussing the matter with other nations. We desire to move in step with our friends and those with whom we have been in the habit of acting in concert in these matters." Even so, it is still surely right that the House of Commons itself, before it adjourns for three months, should have some idea of what the Government think about it, what proposals they will make to those friends and what kind of answer they would like to see made.

Sir Roland Jennings: The hon. Member is repeating himself.

Mr. Silverman: I should be out of order in repeating it often enough to enable the hon. Member to understand it. Therefore, I shall not attempt to do so. All I am attempting to do is to make the point—I make it again for the sake of clarity—that this is a matter on which the whole future of Western civilisation may well depend. Is there going to be peaceful co-existence or not? The answer to that question may very well depend on what decision is ultimately made about the future of Germany, and that question may well depend on what answer is given to the proposal which has now been made. I say that we are entitled to know, and ought not to disperse for three months unless we know, what is the attitude of the Government to that proposal.
There are one or two other matters. One reason the House of Commons has not been allowed to pursue its normal constitutional right of raising any debate on the Consolidated Fund (Appropriation) Bill, and of raising the variety of questions which normally are raised, is that there is a row going on in the Conservative Party about Egypt. Later this afternoon we shall see those whom I may refer to—I hope without disrespect—as the head hunters, hunting heads. In the


course of that there will be a general debate about the Egyptian Agreement. There ought to be such a debate. No one pretends for a moment that there is anything wrong in back benchers disagreeing with Governments. I certainly never complain of that. I do not regard it as an anti-democratic practice that groups of like-minded back benchers should take counsel together in order to see how they can further the causes in which they believe.
I say that with all sincerity and great diffidence, because I have never belonged to such a group myself. Whether what is in issue is a "keep left" group, a "keep right" group, or a "don't care" group, it remains true that there is this difference of opinion, and the proper place to debate such differences of opinion is the Floor of the House of Commons. There is no better and no more proper place for such debates. But why on the last day before the Recess? There has been no shortage of time about this. There is nothing new in the Agreement. The Heads of Agreement which were signed the other day were available to the Government two years ago. They have known that they had a group of their supporters who are not happy about this. There was a time when Members of the Government were not so happy about it themselves.

An Hon. Member: Including the Prime Minister.

Sir R. Jennings: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Is the hon. Member in order in making these arguments on the Amendment he has moved?

Mr. Speaker: I was waiting to see what relevance it had to the Amendment. The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) seemed to be discussing the Heads of Agreement with Egypt.

Mr. Silverman: The general point I am making, if I may respectfully explain it, is the one with which I opened the few observations I want to offer to the House as an illustration of the mismanagement of Parliamentary business which has put the House in the difficulty which has led me to move this Amendment. I say there can be no better example of such mismanagement than the necessity

to debate on the last day before we adjourn a subject which could have been debated two years ago, or at any time during that two-year period, and that we ought not to be put in that position by such shocking mismanagement.

Mr. Lewis: Repeat it so that the hon. Member opposite can understand.

Mr. Silverman: I am sure that even the hon. Member who interrupted earlier now understands that.
There is a final matter with which I want to deal, without wishing to keep the House too long. There is a question upon which the House would like some information before we adjourn for three months and which, I think, transcends, at any rate in immediate importance, any of those questions to which I have so far referred. It is the state of disintegration, bordering on total collapse, of the Government themselves. We do not even know who the Government are. We are entitled to know, before we adjourn for three months, which right hon. Gentleman or which right hon. Lady will be in charge of each Department when we come back, and during the period before we come back on 19th October.
There have been a number of recent moves whereby one or two Ministries have been abolished altogether. Whilst undoubtedly to that extent confidence in the Government will have been improved, it could have been done so much more speedily and satisfactorily if it had been done collectively. If they had all gone together instead of piecemeal, we would have known what the situation was and how to deal with it. Then we could have gone away for three months or six months with much greater ease of mind than we can as things are. Apart from the Ministries abolished altogether, there have been a number of changes—

Mr. Leslie Hale: Will my hon. Friend forgive me interrupting him? Up to now I have been in full agreement with him. He will have observed that in the most widely distributed Conservative newspaper today far less space, and apparently far less importance, is given to the disappearance of two Members of the Cabinet than to the disappearance of a fast bowler from the forthcoming Test team.

Mr. Silverman: My hon. Friend is quite right to draw my attention and the attention of the House to the sense of importance which Conservative newspapers have for Conservative Governments and for cricket.
I say that we are entitled to know who is likely to be in charge and who is to meet us on 19th October, if any of them do then meet us. We are entitled to know that before we adjourn tomorrow. Such an announcement would not take very long and could be made on Monday, if my Amendment were agreed to. We could then perhaps agree to adjourn for the rest of the period.

Mr. Ede: That is Bank Holiday.

Mr. Silverman: The House has sat on Bank Holiday before in a good cause, and no better cause than this could be found. Perhaps we would be told on Monday that the Government had resigned and we could nominate a new one. I am sure that my right hon. Friends would not object if that were done.
I conclude by saying in all seriousness that it must be very many years since the House of Commons was called upon to adjourn for three months with so many fundamentally important questions not merely unresolved but unexplained by the Government. I suppose the last occasion on which the House adjourned in a state of international affairs of greater—but not much greater—anxiety was the summer and autumn of 1939. I have pointed out a large number of weighty matters which will be left unresolved, and with the Government's attitude to them unexplained, if we adjourn in accordance with the Motion now before the House.

4.0 p.m.

Sir Richard Acland: I beg to second the Amendment.
I do so briefly because I, too, feel that the House, particularly the Opposition, have been treated with something very near to contempt by the Government in the last couple of weeks. I do not put it so high as to say that the Government have deliberately created the situation which we have run into, but I do say that they have seen it coming and that they have deliberately run the House and the Opposition into it. For at least the last three weeks, the Government must have known

that the Geneva Conference was going to come to an end one way or the other. Happily it came to an end which was reasonably satisfactory, but the Government ought surely to have known that, whichever way it came to an end, the House would wish for an opportunity to discuss the vital question, what comes next? We have been entirely deprived of that opportunity.
My hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) has said enough on Egypt for the House not to wish me to elaborate on that subject. Clearly the Government have known for a full three weeks that that matter, too, was coming to an end. Can anybody say that, in relation to this great act of Government policy, on which it was known that hon. and right hon. Gentlemen on the Government side of the House had very strong views, anything less than one whole day of Government time would have been appropriate?
They knew, too, that they were on the point of making a new announcement about Cyprus which they had every reason to know was bound to be of a highly controversial nature, and which the House would wish to discuss. Yet they deliberately allow a situation to develop in which the last two days before the Recess—I except the conventional Friday which is available for back-bench Members to raise relatively minor though no doubt locally very important matters—were two days wholly at the disposal of the Opposition.
My memory of past procedure in the House is not always of the brightest and sharpest; therefore I speak subject to correction. I do not, however, seem to remember the Second Reading and the Third Reading of the Consolidated Fund (Appropriation) Bill ever before being put into the last two days before a Recess. My memory of various and vigorous debates—once on the issue of Seretse Khama, once on the issue of arms for the Egyptians—is that those debates took place on the Consolidated Fund Bill a week or two weeks before the Adjournment for the Summer Recess; and that the last few days before the Adjournment were filled with Government business so that, if some emergency arose and a debate about it was imperatively demanded, time for such a debate was not given out of Opposition time but a day of Government time was used.
Yet the Government, with their eyes wide open, knowing that all these great and weighty matters were coming forward and that a demand for a debate on them would arise, have chosen to go on and leave the House and the Opposition in the position in which some of the subjects are not to be discussed at all. One of these is the aftermath of the Geneva Conference. Another great subject mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne, the future sovereignty of Germany, is not to be debated at all. Steel, on which the Opposition had a justifiable desire to move a Motion of their own, was squeezed out; Cyprus was debated for half a day; and Egypt is to be debated for what everybody in the House will regard as a wholly inadequate time—and all because the Government could not put off, until the autumn, the concluding stages of their Television Bill.
That is all they need have done, seeing, as they must have seen a fortnight or three weeks ago, the red light, or at least the amber light, of all these great world issues piling up against them. But no, they must use up the time of the House on the concluding stages of their Television Bill and other quite unnecessary Measures, to leave us in the position in which we find ourselves today. I hope that my hon. Friend will press this Amendment to a Division to mark our disapproval.

4.6 p.m.

Mr. William Warbey: The House should not part with the Motion without hearing a great deal more from the Government about their intentions on a number of matters which have been raised already by my hon. Friends, and also on a number of other questions of great importance on which we entirely lack information either about facts or about Government policy. I intended to put quite a number of questions to the Foreign Secretary, whom I expected to see on the Government Front Bench this afternoon. I am very glad that there is a representative of the Foreign Office here. No doubt the Foreign Secretary himself is drafting his resignation speech in succession to the other Members of the Government.
One matter I wish to put has not been answered. We have been told what are

the Heads of Agreement made with Egypt, but we are now left to have a debate on this vital matter sandwiched in between a debate on this Motion and Amendment and a debate on the Committee stage of the Consolidated Fund (Appropriation) Bill. I do not see how much time will be left for the debate on Egypt. I am quite sure that hon. Members opposite who are genuinely anxious to see this vital matter properly discussed will join with us in opposing the Motion and in seeking to ensure that proper time is given for the discussion of these serious questions.
I do not wish to deal any further with Egypt, but I should like to add one or two questions to those put by my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) on the question of the proposal to accord sovereignty to Western Germany. I should like to know, first, when this question is to come up. It seems to me that it will arise very soon after we adjourn, if the Motion is carried. The Government have been less than honest and courteous to the House about this whole matter.
When we had a debate recently I intervened to ask the Prime Minister whether any time limit had been set for the ratification of the E.D.C. by the French Government, and the Prime Minister categorically assured the House that no definite time limit had been set. Yet, on that very same day, Mr. Dulles announced that the French Government had been given until 15th August. Now we learn, not in this House but from a debate in another place, that a time limit of 15th August has in fact been set, according to a statement made yesterday by a noble Lord. That means that the time is very short indeed.
As I understand it—I hope that the Joint Under-Secretary will correct me if I am wrong—the Government will then proceed, in conjunction with the United States Government, to raise immediately this whole question of West German sovereignty. We would like to know in what form that is to be done. For example, is it proposed to amend the Bonn Convention? I think that we should be told, because the Bonn Convention says quite categorically in the first Article that
The Federal Republic shall have full authority over its internal and external affairs, except as provided in the present Convention.

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman is departing from the terms of the Motion.

Mr. Warbey: With respect, Mr. Speaker, I accept your Ruling, but I was trying to show first, that this question falls to be dealt with during the period in which we shall be in Recess, and secondly, that we are asked to disperse without being informed exactly what are the intentions of the Government in this matter. I think that we are entitled to know, before we disperse for the Recess, whether the Government intend to amend the Bonn Convention, and if so, in what form. If they do not intend to amend the Bonn Convention, how is it proposed to place restrictions on the power of the West German Government to have completely unlimited rearmament, an armed force without any control whatsoever?
In another place there were references to undertakings which are to be given. What will be the value of these undertakings? Will any undertakings have any value if they are not part of a solemn contract such as the Bonn Convention? I suggest that it is not treating the House fairly if we are not informed about these vital matters before we disperse.
Finally on this subject I wish to ask one further question. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition has on more than one occasion asked for a specific assurance from the Government that this House will be recalled before any decisions are taken in regard to West German sovereignty. We have not had any assurance whatsoever. All we have had from the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the House, is a reference to the Standing Order of the House. We know all about the Standing Order, but what we want is an assurance from the Government that they will pledge themselves to advise Mr. Speaker to recall the House in the event of their being on the point of taking any decision—[HON. MEMBERS: "Before that."]—and before they take any decision regarding West German sovereignty. I hope that we shall have that assurance before we disperse.
I wish to ask some questions about one or two other matters, first affecting the Far East. We have had the ending of the war in Indo-China, and I may perhaps be allowed to say that we are all

gratified to see that the cease-fire has been brought about even sooner than had been anticipated. But what is to follow? What about this South-East Asia security organisation? On this matter we have been greeted by dead silence from the Government. We have not had silence from Mr. Dulles. Mr. Dulles told us that there is to be a conference called very soon to confirm a military alliance with South-East Asia.
What is the policy of the Government in this matter? Are they proposing to call such a conference? Are they proposing to join in such a conference? Is a conference to be held? Are we to take part in this conference? Is it to be a conference to draw up a military pact, or to enter into certain specific commitments? And quite apart from the formation of a military alliance or a specific pact, what military commitments are the Government proposing to enter into with regard to South-East Asia?

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member is getting far away from the question of when we should adjourn. No doubt there are all sorts of questions which might be asked about public affairs, but they cannot be raised within the terms of this Motion.

Mr. Warbey: With respect, Mr. Speaker, I am suggesting, first, that these are matters of the highest state policy, affecting the welfare of the whole country, and possibly the issues of war and peace. Secondly, I am trying to call attention to the fact that these issues fall to be decided by the Government during the period in which they are seeking to disperse hon. Members for three months to their constituencies and to their holiday avocations. It is not treating the House properly that we should be left completely uninformed about the intentions of the Government in these vital matters.
Are they proposing to join in a military alliance with South-East Asia? Are they proposing to enter into any commitments, secret or avowed, with regard to South-East Asia? We ought to know the answers to those questions.

Mr. S. Silverman: Ought not my hon. Friend to add a request for an assurance by the Government that they will not enter into any final arrangements with anybody on these matters in the absence of the House of Commons?

Mr. Warbey: I am glad to welcome the assistance of my hon. Friend, and to ask that that assurance shall be given.
I wish to turn to another question which falls to be decided possibly within the next two or three weeks, namely, the question of Korea, with which this country is vitally concerned. Recently there was a conference at Geneva, and on 15th June the discussions on the Korean question were abandoned without any agreement being reached. Mr. Syngman Rhee, the President of Korea, has already announced to the world that, 60 days after the decision at the Geneva Conference, he intends to resolve this matter by force of arms. He has already stated that, and repeated the declaration on more than one occasion, that he proposes to use armed force in order to re-unite Korea. I wish to know what the Government propose to do about that situation. Do they propose that a renewal of fighting in Korea, brought about by the actions of the South Korean Government, shall be brought before the Security Council of the United Nations? Or do they propose that the matter should be by-passed, as was the Guatemala question?
These are matters about which the House should b informed. There is a state of acute tension in the whole of the Far East. There have been signs of extreme jitteriness in China—we have seen incidents arising out of it in the last day or two—and there is also something approaching hysteria in the United States which has even invaded the American Congress. I want to know what the Government are doing to protect this country against the possibility of rising tension in the Pacific area leading possibly to a state of war.
Have the Government any plans for preventing this country from being involved in a war which might arise in the Far East? This is a question which is important and urgent. I think that all of us must have been shocked to read the incredible speech made yesterday by Mr. Syngman Rhee to the joint meeting of Congress. What is the Government's attitude on that subject and its implications? What are they proposing to do to protect the interests of this country? It would be very convenient if one could dismiss the statements of Mr. Syngman Rhee as the ravings of an elderly lunatic; but, unfortunately, one reads that what he

said was repeatedly applauded by no less a person than Admiral Radford, the chief—

Mr. Speaker: Order. Again I must tell the hon. Member that he is going into far too much detail. He may discuss the importance of the subject, but the hon. Member is going too far into the merits. I think that there is a line between importance and merits which he is quite capable of drawing for himself.

Mr. Warbey: I am trying very carefully to draw that line, and I appreciate your assistance, Mr. Speaker, in drawing me back to the path from which I may have strayed.
I am seeking to show that there is a state of affairs in the Far East which is highly dangerous for this country. We ought not to separate for the Recess without knowing what is the Government's policy in these matters. When we have the leading military man in the United States, the chairman of the American Chiefs of Staff, applauding proposals for a declaration of war against China in which Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek should join, backed by American military assistance, then I want to know what is being done to protect the interests of this country. Can this country be kept out of a war arising in the Far East from such a development?
I come to another and related matter. The Prime Minister recently visited the United States with one very important matter on his mind, namely, the question of the hydrogen bomb and its implications. This is where the question of a possible conflict in the Pacific area comes right home to this country. There are American bases in this country from which atomic and hydrogen weapons might be launched in the event of war—

Mr. George Lawson: On a point of order. Would I be in order in moving the Closure?

Mr. Speaker: Yes.

Mr. Lawson: Then I move.

Question put, "That the Question be now put."

The House proceeded to a Division—.

Mr. Ivor Owen Thomas(seated and covered): On a point of


order, Mr. Speaker. I submit that no Motion has been moved. The question asked by the hon. Member was whether he would be in order in moving, "That the Question be now put." He did not move, "That the Question be now put." Therefore, I submit for your Ruling that there is no Question before the House.

Mr. Speaker: That is not so. I said "Yes" and the hon. Gentleman said "I move." The Chair is quite accustomed to correcting verbal inaccuracies in the form adopted by hon. Members in moving Motions.

Ayes, 264; Noes, 181.

Division No. 212.]
AYES
[4.24 p.m.


Allan, R. A. (Paddington, S.)
Finlay, Graeme
Longden, Gilbert


Alport, C. J. M.
Fleetwood-Hesketh, R. F.
Low, A. R. W.


Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)
Fletcher-Cooke, C.
Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)


Amory, Rt. Hon. Heathcoat (Tiverton)
Fort, R.
Lucas, P. B. (Brentford)


Anstruther-Gray, Major W. J.
Foster, John
Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh


Arbuthnot, John
Fraser, Hon. Hugh (Stone)
Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. O.


Assheton, Rt. Hon. R. (Blackburn, W.)
Fraser, Sir Ian (Morecambe &amp; Lonsdale)
Macdonald, Sir Peter


Astor, Hon. J. J.
Fyfe, Rt. Hon. Sir David Maxwell
Mackeson, Brig. Sir Harry


Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.
Galbraith, Rt. Hon. T. D. (Pollok)
McKibbin, A. J.


Baldwin, A. E.
Gammans, L. D.
Mackie, J. H. (Galloway)


Banks, Col. C.
Gamer-Evans, E. H.
Maclay, Rt. Hon. John


Barber, Anthony
George, Rt. Hon. Maj. G. Lloyd
Maclean, Fitzroy


Barlow, Sir John
Glover, D.
Macleod, Rt. Hon. Iain (Enfield, W.)


Beach, Maj. Hicks
Godber, J. B.
Macmillan, Rt. Hon. Harold (Bremley)


Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)
Gomme-Duncan, Col. A.
Macpherson, Wall (Dumfries)


Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.)
Gough, C. F. H
Maitland, Comdr. J. F. W. (Horncastle)


Bennett, F. M. (Reading, N.)
Gower, H. R.
Maitland, Patrick (Lanark)


Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gosport)
Graham, Sir Fergus
Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir Reginald


Bennett, William (Woodside)
Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)
Markham, Major Sir Frank


Bevins, J. R. (Toxteth)
Hall, John (Wycombe)
Marlowe, A. A. H.


Birch, Nigel
Hare, Hon J. H.
Marples, A. E.


Bishop, F. P.
Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)
Marshall, Douglas (Bodmi[...])


Black, C. W.
Harvey, Air Cdre. A. V. (Macclesfield)
Maude, Angus


Bossom, Sir A. C.
Harvie-Watt, Sir George
Maudling, R.


Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. J. A.
Hay, John
Maydon, Lt.-Comdr. S. L. C.


Boyle, Sir Edward
Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel
Medlicott, Brig. F.


Braine, B. R.
Heath, Edward
Mellor, Sir John


Braithwaite, Sir Albert (Harrow, W.)
Henderson, John (Cathcart)
Molson, A. H. E.


Braithwaite, Sir Gurney
Higgs, J. M. C.
Monckton, Rt. Hon. Sir Walter


Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W. H.
Hill, Dr. Charles (Luton)
Moore, Sir Thomas


Brooke, Henry (Hampstead)
Hinchingbrooke, Viscount
Morrison, John (Salisbury)


Browne, Jack (Govan)
Hirst, Geoffrey
Mott-Radclyffe, C. E.


Buchan-Hepburn, Rt. Hon. P. G. T.
Hollis, M. C.
Nabarro, G. D. N.


Bullard, D. G.
Hope, Lord John
Neave, Airey


Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.
Hopkinson, Rt. Hon. Henry
Nicholls, Harmar


Butler, Rt. Hon. R. A. (Saffron Walden)
Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.
Nicholson, Godfrey (Farnham)


Campbell, Sir David
Horobin, I. M.
Nicolson, Nigel (Bournemouth, E.)


Carr, Robert
Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Florence
Nield, Basil (Chester)


Cary, Sir Robert
Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)
Noble, Comdr. A. H. P.


Channon, H.
Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)
Nugent, G. R. H.


Churchill, Rt. Hon. Sir Winston
Hudson, Sir Austin (Lewisham, N.)
Nutting, Anthony


Clarke, Col. Ralph (East Grinstead)
Hulbert, Wing Cdr. N. J
Oakshott, H. D.


Cole, Norman
Hurd, A. R.
Odey, G. W.


Colegate, W. A.
Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'rgh, W.)
O'Neill, Hon. Phelim (Co. Antrim, N.)


Conant, Maj. Sir Roger
Hutchison, James (Scotsteun)
Orr, Capt. L. P. S.


Cooper-Key, E. M.
Hyde, Lt.-Col. H. M.
Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)


Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)
Hylton-Foster, H. B. H.
Orr-Ewing, Sir Ian (Weston-super-Mare)


Crookshank, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. F. C.
Iremonger, T. L.
Page, R. G.


Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.
Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)
Peake, Rt. Hon. O.


Crouch, R. F.
Jennings, Sir Roland
Perkins, Sir Robert


Crowder, Sir John (Finchley)
Johnson, Eric (Blackley)
Pickthorn, K. W. M.


Crowder, Petre (Ruislip—Northwood)
Johnson, Howard (Kemptown)
Pilkington, Capt. R. A


Darling, Sir William (Edinburgh, S.)
Jones, A. (Hall Green)
Pitman, I. J.


Davidson, Viscountess
Joynson-Hicks, Hon. L. W.
Powell, J. Enoch


De la Bére, Sir Rupert
Kaberry, D.
Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.)


Digby, S. Wingfield
Kerby, Capt. H. B.
Prior-Palmer, Brig. O. L.


Dodds-Parker, A. D.
Kerr, H. W.
Profumo, J. D.


Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. McA.
Lambert, Hon. G.
Raikes, Sir Victor


Donner, Sir P. W.
Lambton, Viscount
Ramsden, J. E.


Doughty, C. J. A.
Lancaster, Col. C. G.
Rayner, Brig. R.


Drayson, G. B.
Leather, E. H. C.
Redmayne, M.


Drewe, Sir C.
Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.
Rees-Davies, W. R.


Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.
Lennox-Boyd, Rt. Hon. A. T.
Renton, D. L. M.


Duthie, W. S.
Lindsay, Martin
Ridsdale, J. E.


Eccles, Rt. Hon. Sir D. M.
Linstead, Sir H. N.
Roberts, Peter (Heeley)


Eden, Rt. Hon. A.
Llewellyn, D. T.
Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)


Eden, J. B. (Bournemouth, West)
Lloyd, Rt. Hon. G. (King's Norton)
Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)


Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.
Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.)
Roper, Sir Harold


Erroll, F. J.
Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)
Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard


Fell, A.
Lockwood, Lt.-Col. J. C.
Russell, R. S.




Ryder, Capt. R. E. D.
Studholme, H. G.
Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)


Sandys, Rt. Hon. D.
Summers, G. S.
Wakefield, Sir Wavell (St. Marylebone)


Schofield, Li.-Col. W.
Sutcliffe, Sir Harold
Walker-Smith, D. C.


Scott, R. Donald
Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)
Wall, Major Patrick


Scott-Miller, Cmdr. R.
Taylor, William (Bradford, N.)
Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)


Shepherd, William
Teeling, W.
Ward, Miss I. (Tynemouth)


Smithers, Peter (Winchester)
Thomas, Rt. Hon. J. P. L. (Hereford)
Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.


Smithers, Sir Waldron (Orpington)
Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)
Watkinson, H. A.


Soames, Capt. C.
Thomas, P. J. M. (Conway)
Webbe, Sir H. (London &amp; Westminster)


Speir, R. M.
Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)
Wellwood, W.


Spence, H. R. (Aberdeenshire, W.)
Thorneycroft, Rt. Hn. Peter (Monmouth)
Williams, Rt. Hon. Charles (Torquay)


Spent, Rt. Hon. Sir P. (Kensington, S.)
Thornton-Kemsley, Col. C. N.
Williams, Gerald (Tonbridge)


Stevens, Geoffrey
Tilney, John
Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)


Steward, W. A. (Woolwich, W.)
Turner, H. F. L.
Williams, R. Dudley (Exeter)


Stewart, Henderson (Fife, E.)
Turton, R. H.
Wills, G.


Stoddard-Scott, Col. M.
Tweedsmuir, Lady
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Storey, S.
Vane, W. M. F.



Strauss, Henry (Norwich, S.)
Vaughan-Morgan, J. K
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Stuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray)
Vosper, D. F.
Mr. T. G. D. Galbraith and




Mr. Legh.




NOES


Acland, Sir Richard
Greenwood, Anthony
Paget, R. T.


Albu, A. H.
Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R.
Palmer, A. M. F.


Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)
Grey, C. F.
Pannell, Charles


Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)
Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)
Pargiter, G. A.


Attlee, Rt. Hon. C. R.
Grimond, J.
Paton, J.


Awbery, S. S.
Hale, Leslie
Peart, T. F.


Bacon, Miss Alice
Hall, Rt. Hon. Glenvil (Colne Valley)
Plummer, Sir Leslie


Balfour, A.
Hall, John T. (Gateshead, W.)
Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)


Bartley, P.
Hamilton, W W.
Price, Philips (Gloucestershire, W.)


Benn, Hon. Wedgwood
Hargreaves, A.
Proctor, W. T.


Benson, G.
Hastings, S.
Reeves, J.


Beswick, F.
Hayman, F. H.
Reid, Thomas (Swindon)


Blackburn, F.
Healey, Denis (Leeds, S.E.)
Reid, William (Camlachie)


Blenkinsop, A.
Henderson, Rt. Hon. A. (Rowley Regis)
Roberts, Rt. Hon. A.


Blyton, W. R.
Herbison, Miss M.
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)


Boardman, H.
Hobson, C. R.
Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)


Bowden, H. W.
Holman, P.
Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)


Bowles, F. G.
Holmes, Horace
Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)


Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth
Holt, A. F.
Royle, C.


Brockway, A. F.
Hudson, James (Ealing, N.)
Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.


Brook, Dryden (Halifax)
Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)
Shurmer, P. L. E.


Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)
Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)
Silverman, Julius (Erdington)


Burke, W. A.
Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)
Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)


Burton, Miss F. E.
Irving, W. J. (Wood Green)
Simmons, C. J. (Brierley Hill)


Callaghan, L. J.
Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.
Skeffington, A. M.


Carmichael, J.
Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.
Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke-on-Trent)


Chapman, W. D.
Jeger, George (Goole)
Slater, J. (Durham, Sedgefield)


Clunie, J.
Jeger, Mrs. Lena
Smith, Norman (Nottingham, S.)


Corbet, Mrs. Freda
Jenkins, R. H. (Stechford)
Sorensen, R. W.


Cove, W. G.
Johnson, James (Rugby)
Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank


Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)
Jones, Frederick Elwyn (West Ham, S.)
Sparks, J. A.


Crosland, C. A. R.
Jones, Jack (Rotherham)
Stokes, Rt. Hon. R. R.


Crossman, R. H. S.
Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)
Stross, Dr. Barnett


Daines, P.
Keenan, W.
Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.


Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.
Kenyon, C.
Thomas, George (Cardiff)


Darling, George (Hillsborough)
Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.
Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)


Davies, Rt. Hn. Clement (Montgomery)
King, Dr. H. M.
Thomas, Ivor Owen (Wrekin)


Davies, Ernest (Enfield, E.)
Lee, Frederick (Newton)
Thomson, George (Dundee, E.)


Davies, Harold (Look)
Lever, Harold (Cheetham)
Tomney, F.


de Freitas, Geoffrey
Lewis, Arthur
Turner-Samuels, M.


Delargy, H. J.
Lindgren, G. S.
Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn


Dodds, N. N.
Lipton, Lt.-Col. M.
Usborne, H. C.


Donnelly, D. L.
MacColl, J. E.
Viant, S. P.


Driberg, T. E. N.
McGovern, J.
Wallace, H. W.


Dugdale, Rt. Hon. John (W. Bromwich)
McLeavy, F.
Warbey, W. N.


Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.
Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.
Weitzman, D.


Edwards, Rt. Hon. John (Brighouse)
Mason, Roy
Wells, Percy (Faversham)


Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)
Mellish, R. J.
Wells, William (Walsall)


Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)
Messer, Sir F.
Wheeldon, W. E.


Evans, Stanley (Wednesbury)
Mitchison, G. R.
Whiteley, Rt. Hon. W.


Fernyhough, E
Monslow, W.
Wigg, George


Finch, H. J.
Morgan, Dr. H. B. W.
Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.


Fletcher, Eric (Islington, E.)
Morley, R.
Willey, F. T.


Foot, M. M.
Morrison, Rt. Hon. H. (Lewisham, S.)
Williams, W. R. (Dreylsden)


Forman, J. C.
Moyle, A.
Williams, W. T. (Hammersmith, S.)


Freeman, Peter (Newport)
Mulley, F. W.
Winterbottom, Richard (Brightside)


Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.
Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. J.
Wyatt, W. L.


Gibson, C. W.
Oliver, G. H.
Yates, V. F.


Glanville, James
Orbach, M.
Younger, Rt. Hon. K.


Gaoch, E. G.
Oswald, T.



Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon P. C.
Padley, W. E.
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:




Mr. Wilkins and Mr. John Taylor.

Mr. S. Silverman: On a point of order—

Mr. Speaker: There is no point of order. I am ordered by the House to put the Question. It must be put.

Question put accordingly, "That 'Tomorrow,' stand part of the Question."

The House proceeded to a Division—

Sir CEDRIC DREWE and Mr. VOSPER were appointed Tellers for the Ayes, but no Members being willing to act as Tellers for the Noes, Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER declared that the Ayes had it.

Mr. Silverman: On a point of order. I want to put this to you, Mr. Speaker, as a point of order, but to preface it by saying that the purpose for which I ventured to intervene just now was to seek the leave of the House to withdraw my Amendment, for a reason which I wish to give. You, Sir, ruled that because the Closure Motion had been put and agreed to, you had to proceed at once. Does that mean that if any new Member of the House, possibly not understanding the procedure, chooses to move the Closure without notice and it is carried, the mover of the Motion or an Amendment loses his opportunity to seek leave to withdraw it?

Mr. Speaker: When the Closure is moved it has to be put at once, without

Amendment or debate, unless I think it is an abuse of the rules of the House, which I did not in this case.

Mr. William Blyton: On a point of order. I want to make it clear that when the hon. Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Warbey) says that South Korea—which my own Government supported in the United Nations—was the aggressor, he speaks for himself, and not for hon. Members on this side of the House generally.

Mr. Warbey: On a point of order—

Mr. James Simmons: Sit down you Communist tool.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. P. G. T. Buchan-Hepburn): claimed, "That the main Question be now put."

Main Question put accordingly.

Mr. S. Silverman: Clear the Chair.

The House proceeded to a Division—

Sir Charles Taylor(seated and covered): On a point of order. The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) said "Clear the Chair." Is that not a reflection upon Mr. Speaker?

Mr. Speaker: It may well be, but I shall not allow it to interrupt the Division.

Ayes, 271; Noes, 187.

Division No. 213.]
AYES
[4.40 p.m.


Allan, R. A. (Paddington, S.)
Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.
Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.


Alport, C. J. M.
Butler, Rt. Hon. R. A. (Saffron Walden)
Erroll, F J.


Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)
Campbell, Sir David
Fell, A.


Amory, Rt. Hon. Heathcoat (Tiverton)
Carr, Robert
Finlay, Graeme


Anstruther-Gray, Major W. J.
Cary, Sir Robert
Fleetwood-Hesketh, R. F.


Arbuthnot, John
Channon, H.
Fletcher-Cooke, C.


Assheton, Rt. Hon. R. (Blackburn, W.)
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Sir Winston
Fort, R.


Astor, Hon. J. J.
Clarke, Col. Ralph (East Grinstead)
Foster, John


Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.
Cole, Norman
Fraser, Hon Hugh (Stone)


Baldwin, A. E.
Colegate, W. A.
Fraser, Sir Ian (Morecambe &amp; Lonsdale)


Banks, Col. C.
Conant, Maj. Sir Roger
Fyfe, Rt. Hon Sir David Maxwell


Barber, Anthony
Cooper, Sqn. Ldr. Albert
Galbraith, Rt. Hon. T. D (Pollok)


Barlow, Sir John
Cooper-Key, E. M.
Galbraith, T. G. D. (Hillhead)


Beach, Maj. Hicks
Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)
Gammans, L. D.


Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)
Crookshank, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. F. C.
Garner-Evans, E. H.


Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.)
Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col O. E.
George, Rt. Hon. Maj. G. Lloyd


Bennett, F. M. (Reading, N.)
Crouch, R. F.
Glover, D.


Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gosport)
Crowder, Sir John (Finchley)
Godber, J. B.


Bennett, William (Woodside)
Crowder, Petre (Ruislip—Northwood)
Gomme-Duncan, Col. A


Bevins, J. R. (Toxteth)
Darling, Sir William (Edinburgh, S.)
Gough, C. F. H.


Birch, Nigel
Davidson, Viscountess
Gower, H. R.


Bishop, F. P.
Davies, Rt. Hn. Clement (Montgomery)
Graham, Sir Fergus


Black, C. W.
De la Bére, Sir Rupert
Grimond, J.


Bossom, Sir A. C.
Digby, S. Wingfield
Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)


Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. J. A
Dodds-Parker, A. D.
Hall, John (Wycombe)


Boyle, Sir Edward
Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. McA.
Hare, Hon. J H


Braine, B. R.
Donner, Sir P. W.
Harrison, Col J. H. (Eye)


Braithwaite, Sir Albert (Harrow, W.)
Doughty, C. J. A.
Harvey, Air Cdre. A. V (Macclesfield)


Braithwaite, Sir Gurney
Drayson, G. B.
Harvie-Watt, Sir George


Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W. H.
Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.
Hay, John


Brooke, Henry (Hampstead)
Duthie, W. S.
Heald, Rt. Hon Sir Lionel


Browne, Jack (Govan)
Eccles, Rt. Hon. Sir D. M.
Heath, Edward


Buchan-Hepburn, Rt. Hon. P. G. T.
Eden, Rt. Hon. A.
Henderson, John (Cathcart)


Bullard, D. G.
Eden, J. B. (Bournemouth, West)
Higgs, J. M. C.




Hill, Dr. Charles (Luton)
Maitland, Comdr. J. F. W. (Horncastle)
Ryder, Capt. R. E. D.


Hinchingbrooke, Viscount
Maitland, Patrick (Lanark)
Sandys, Rt. Hon. D.


Hirst, Geoffrey
Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir Reginald
Schofield, Lt.-Col. W.


Hollis, M. C.
Markham, Major Sir Frank
Scott, R. Donald


Holt, A. F.
Marlowe, A. A. H.
Scott-Miller, Cmdr. R.


Hope, Lord John
Marples, A. E.
Shepherd, William


Hopkinson, Rt. Hon. Henry
Marshall, Douglas (Bodmin)
Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.)


Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.
Maude, Angus
Smithers, Peter (Winchester)


Horobin, I. M.
Maudling, R.
Smithers, Sir Waldron (Orpington)


Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Florence
Maydon, Lt.-Comdr. S. L. C.
Soames, Capt. C.


Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)
Medlicott, Brig. F.
Speir, R. M.


Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)
Mellor, Sir John
Spence, H. R. (Aberdeenshire, W.)


Hudson, Sir Austin (Lewisham, N.)
Molson, A. H. E.
Spens, Rt. Hon. Sir P. (Kensington, S.)


Hulbert, Wing Cdr. N. J.
Monckton, Rt. Hon. Sir Walter
Stevens, Geoffrey


Hurd, A. R.
Moore, Sir Thomas
Steward, W. A. (Woolwich, W.)


Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'rgh, W.)
Morrison, John (Salisbury)
Stewart, Henderson (Fife, E.)


Hutchison, James (Scotstoun)
Mott-Radclyffe, C. E.
Stoddart-Scott, Col. M.


Hyde, Lt. Col. H. M.
Nabarro, G. D. N.
Storey, S.


Hylton-Foster, H. B. H.
Neave, Airey
Strauss, Horny (Norwich, S.)


Iremongor, T. L.
Nicholls Harmar
Stuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray)


Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)
Nicholson, Godfrey (Farnham)
Studholme, H. G.


Jennings, Sir Roland
Nicolson, Nigel (Bournemouth, E.)
Summers, G. S.


Johnson, Eric (Blackley)
Nield, Basil (Chester)
Sutcliffe, Sir Harold


Johnson, Howard (Kemptown)
Noble, Comdr. A. H. P.
Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)


Jones, A. (Hall Green)
Nugent, G. R. H.
Taylor, William (Bradford, N.)


Joynson-Hicks, Hon. L. W.
Nutting, Anthony
Teeling, W.


Kaberry, D.
Oakshott, H. D.
Thomas, Rt. Hon. J. P. L. (Hereford)


Kerby, Capt. H. B.
Odey, G. W.
Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)


Kerr, H. W.
O'Neill, Hon. Phelim (Co. Antrim, N.)
Thomas, P. J. M. (Conway)


Lambert, Hon. G.
Orr, Capt. L. P. S.
Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)


Lambton, Viscount
Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)
Thorneycroft, Rt. Hn. Peter (Monmouth)


Lancaster, Col. C. G.
Orr-Ewing, Sir Ian (Weston-super-Mare)
Thornton-Kemsley, Col. C. N.


Leather, E. H. C.
Page, R. G.
Tilney, John


Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.
Peaks, Rt. Hon. O.
Turner, H. F. L.


Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)
Perkins, Sir Robert
Turton, R. H.


Lennox-Boyd, Rt. Hon. A. T.
Peto, Brig. C. H. M.
Tweedsmuir, Lady


Linstead, Sir H. N.
Pickthorn, K. W. M.
Vane, W. M. F.


Llewellyn, D. T.
Pilkington, Capt. R. A.
Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.


Lloyd, Rt. Hon. G. (King's Norton)
Pitman, I. J.
Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)


Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.)
Pitt, Miss E. M.
Wakefield, Sir Wavell (St. Marylebone)


Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)
Powell, J. Enoch
Walker-Smith, D. C.


Lockwood, Lt.-Col. J. C.
Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.)
Wall, Major Patrick


Longden, Gilbert
Prior-Palmer, Brig. O. L.
Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)


Low, A. R. W.
Profumo, J. D.
Ward, Miss I. (Tynemouth)


Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)
Raikes, Sir Victor
Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.


Lucas, P. B. (Brentford)
Ramsden, J. E.
Watkinson, H. A.


Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
Rayner, Brig. R.
Webbe, Sir H. (London &amp; Westminster)


Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. O.
Redmayne, M.
Wellwood, W.


Macdonald, Sir Peter
Rees-Davies, W. R.
Williams, Rt. Hon. Charles (Torquay)


Mackeson, Brig. Sir Harry
Renton, D. L. M.
Williams, Gerald (Tonbridge)


McKibbin, A. J.
Ridsdale, J. E.
Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)


Mackie, J. H. (Galloway)
Roberts, Peter (Heeley)
Williams, R. Dudley (Exeter)


Maclay, Rt. Hon. John
Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)
Wills, G.


Maclean, Fitzroy
Rodgers, John (Sovenoaks)
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Macleod, Rt. Hon. Iain (Enfield, W.)
Roper, Sir Harold



Macmillan, Rt. Hon. Harold (Bromley)
Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)
Russell, R. S.
Sir Cedric Drewe and Mr. Vosper.




NOES


Adams, Richard
Callaghan, L. J.
Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)


Albu, A. H.
Carmichael, J.
Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)


Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)
Castle, Mrs. B. A.
Evans, Stanley (Wednesbury)


Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)
Chapman, W. D.
Fernyhough, E.


Attlee, Rt. Hon. C. R.
Clunie, J.
Finch, H. J.


Awbery, S. S.
Corbet, Mrs. Freda
Fletcher, Eric (Islington, E.)


Bacon, Miss Alice
Cove, W. G.
Foot, M. M.


Balfour, A.
Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)
Forman, J. C.


Barnes, Rt. Hon. A. J.
Crosland, C. A. R.
Freeman, Peter (Newport)


Bartley, P.
Crossman, R. H. S.
Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.


Benn, Hon. Wedgwood
Daines, P.
Gibson, C. W.


Benson, G.
Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.
Gooch, E. G.


Beswick, F.
Darling, George (Hillsborough)
Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.


Blackburn, F.
Davies, Ernest (Enfield, E.)
Greenwood, Anthony


Blenkinsop, A.
Davies, Harold (Leek)
Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R.


Blyton, W. R.
de Freitas, Geoffrey
Grey, C. F.


Bowden, H. W.
Delargy, H. J.
Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)


Bowles, F. G.
Dodds, N. N.
Hale, Leslie


Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth
Donnelly, D. L.
Hall, Rt. Hon. Glenvil (Colne Valley)


Brockway, A. F.
Driberg, T. E. N.
Hall, John T. (Gateshead, W.)


Brook, Dryden (Halifax)
Dugdale, Rt. Hon. John (W. Bromwich)
Hamilton, W. W.


Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)
Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.
Hannan, W.


Burke, W. A.
Edwards, Rt. Hon. John (Brighouse)
Hargreaves, A.


Burton, Miss F. E.
Edwards, W. J. (Stepney)
Hastings, S.







Hayman, F. H.
Messer, Sir F.
Skeffington, A. M.


Healey, Denis (Leeds, S.E.)
Mitchison, G. R.
Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke-on-Trent)


Henderson, Rt. Hon. A. (Rowley Regis)
Monslow, W.
Slater, J. (Durham, Sedgefield)


Herbison, Miss M.
Morgan, Dr. H. B. W.
Smith, Norman (Nottingham, S.)


Hewitson, Capt. M.
Morley, R.
Sorensen, R. W.


Hobson, C. R.
Morrison, Rt. Hon. H. (Lewisham, S.)
Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank


Holman, P.
Moyle, A.
Sparks, J. A.


Holmes, Horace
Mulley, F. W.
Stokes, Rt. Hon. R. R.


Houghton, Douglas
Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. J.
Stross, Dr. Barnett


Hudson, James (Ealing, N.)
Oliver, G. H.
Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.


Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)
Orbach, M.
Thomas, George (Cardiff)


Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)
Oswald, T.
Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)


Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)
Padley, W. E.
Thomas, Ivor Owen (Wrekin)


Irving, W. J. (Wood Green)
Paget, R. T.
Thomson, George (Dundee, E.)


Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.
Palmer, A. M. F.
Tomney, F.


Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.
Pannell, Charles
Turner-Samuels, M.


Jeger, George (Goole)
Pargiter, G. A.
Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn


Jeger, Mrs. Lena
Parkin, B. T.
Usborne, H. C.


Jenkins, R. H. (Stechford)
Paton, J.
Viant, S. P.


Johnson, James (Rugby)
Peart, T. F.
Wallace, H. W.


Jones, Frederick Elwyn (West Ham, S.)
Plummer, Sir Leslie
Warbey, W. N.


Jones, Jack (Rotherham)
Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)
Weitzman, D.


Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)
Price, Philips (Gloucestershire, W.)
Wells, Percy (Faversham)


Keenan, W.
Proctor, W. T.
Wells, William (Walsall)


Kenyon, C.
Reeves, J.
Wheeldon, W. E.


Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.
Reid, Thomas (Swindon)
Whiteley, Rt. Hon. W.


King, Dr. H. M.
Reid, William (Camlachie)
Wigg, George


Lawson, G. M.
Robens, Rt. Hon. A.
Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.


Lee, Frederick (Newton)
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)
Willey, F. T.


Lever, Harold (Cheetham)
Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)
Williams, W. R. (Droylsden)


Lewis, Arthur
Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)
Williams, W. T. (Hammersmith, S.)


Lindgren, G. S.
Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)
Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)


Lipton, Lt.-Col. M.
Royle, C.
Winterbottom, Richard (Brightside)


MacColl, J. E.
Shackleton, E. A. A.
Wyatt, W. L.


McGovern, J.
Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.
Yates, V. F.


McLeavy, F.
Shurmer, P. L. E.
Younger, Rt. Hon. K.


Marquand, Rt. Han. H. A.
Silverman, Julius (Erdington)



Mason, Roy
Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Mellish, R. J.
Simmons, C. J. (Brierley Hill)
Mr. Wilkins and Mr. John Taylor.

Resolved,
That this House, at its rising To-morrow, do adjourn till Tuesday, 19th October.

4.49 p.m.

Mr. Warbey: I ask your leave, Mr. Speaker, to make a personal statement in connection with a statement made by the hon. Member for Houghton-le-Spring (Mr. Blyton) on an alleged point of order. In the course of that statement, possibly due to a misunderstanding, because I believe the hon. Member was not in the House when I made my speech, he said that I had accused South Korea of having committed an act of aggression. I did no such thing.
I have always supported the United Nations Security Council in taking action against the aggression committed by North Korea. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]What I did in the course of my speech was to ask what action the Government were proposing to take in reference to the threat which has been uttered recently and repeatedly by President Syngman Rhee in connection with a proposed use of force against North Korea. I suggest that the hon. Member who made that statement should now withdraw it.

Several Hon. Members: rose—

Mr. Speaker: There cannot be a debate on a personal statement. The hon. Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Warbey) was entitled to correct what he thought to be an aspersion upon himself.

Mr. S. Silverman: On a different point of order. Your attention, Mr. Speaker, was drawn a little while ago to a remark made by me, which was correctly said to be "Clear the Chair." It was a portmanteau way of trying to express in the circumstances of the moment what I wish to convey to you now more formally, and I hope more properly, and that is that we need some clarification of what the House has been doing during these last 10 minutes.
As I understand the situation, it is that a Motion was made from the Government Front Bench for the Adjournment of the House to a specified date when the House rises tomorrow. Immediately thereafter, when no speeches had been made at all with regard to the Motion—even the right hon. Gentleman who moved it did so formally and without a speech—I was called upon to move an Amendment to it. I moved the Amendment to it, and that, of course, was not enough to propose the Question to the House until the Amendment had been seconded. It was


seconded by my hon. Friend the Member for Gravesend (Sir R. Acland). My hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Warbey) continued the debate, as I understand it, on that Amendment.
He had made part of his speech when another hon. Member, rising as we all thought on a point of order, asked you whether it would be in order if a Motion for the Closure were moved. No one understood at that time—I do not think the hon. Member himself so understood—that he was moving any Motion whatever, but it seems to have been interpreted by you not merely that he had asked whether such a Motion would be in order but that he had, in fact, moved it.
A Division was taken upon it. I am not raising any question upon that Division, but upon what followed. Assume that the Motion had been properly moved but, as I say, without any speech having been made the Closure on the Amendment was then carried and there was a Division upon it, which I suppose disposed of the Amendment, but it did not dispose of the Motion. What I think we are all puzzled about is what has happened since.
In the attempt that some of us were making to clarify the previous procedure, and while that was still going on, the Government Chief Whip got up and mumbled something which you may have heard but which was not heard anywhere else in the House. I do not know what he said to you. He might have been supposed to have said that he would like to take a Division on the main Question. If that is what he was saying, I suppose the Closure could be put. I look at Standing Order 29, under the heading: "Closure of Debate." Paragraph (2) says:
When the Motion 'That the question be now put' has been carried, and the Question consequent thereon has been decided, any further Motion may be made (the assent of the Chair, as aforesaid, not having been withheld) which may be requisite to bring to a decision any Question already proposed from the Chair.
The Question already proposed from the Chair was no doubt the main Motion, and the Motion that was necessary in order to take a decision upon that was the motion for the Closure.
That Motion for the Closure has never been put to the House at all. What you proceeded to do was, not to put the Motion for the Closure, but to put the main Motion, before the debate upon it had been concluded. That was the point that I wanted to clarify.
There is another point. It has been always thought by most of us that the discretion of the Chair to accept a Motion for the Closure at any time is a judicial discretion and that the Motion is never accepted by the Chair in circumstances where there has not been adequate debate. In the case of the Amendment, the adequate debate consisted of half a speech after the Amendment had been moved and seconded.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member is asking for an explanation of what happened. What happened was that, after the Closure had been carried on his Amendment, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury claimed the main Question, which he is quite entitled to do. I then proceeded to put the main Question. As to the rest of the hon. Member's speech, if he has any criticism of my action in putting that Question, he ought to put it in the form of a Motion. I cannot allow it to be put in this way.

Mr. Silverman: I do not think I have had any Ruling on the point I was raising. With all respect, may I say that I should like to have it? It is true that a Minister may claim the main Question, but it does not follow that he is entitled to have it as of right. He is entitled to have it in the discretion of the Chair.

Mr. Speaker: Certainly. It is in the discretion of the Chair. I repeat what I said about the hon. Member's challenging that discretion. I thought that the debate on the Amendment covered the main Question sufficiently to entitle me to put the Question.

Mr. Tom Driberg: There was no reply.

Mr. Speaker: I cannot have the matter debated here now. If the hon. Member has any challenge on my action, he must put it in the form of a Motion.

Mr. Silverman: I would not wish to be responsible for putting a Motion on the Order Paper to challenge the action of Mr. Speaker until I was quite certain


what Mr. Speaker had done. I am asking these questions in order that I may make up my mind whether any question of challenge arises. It is a little difficult for us to understand without explanation that a debate can be held to have been completed when there has been no speech made for or against the Motion and when the speeches on an Amendment which was held to cover the main Motion had not been replied to by the Government. I think it quite wrong—

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member is putting the same point as he previously raised. I must again tell him that if he has any criticism to make he must make it in the form of a Motion.

Mr. W. T. Proctor: On a further point of order. The hon. Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas) and myself put down an Amendment on which it was our intention to raise the question of the old-age pensioners. You informed me, Mr. Speaker, that I would be able to speak on the main Motion, as you did not intend to call our Amendment. Have we no opportunity now of raising that very important question?

Mr. Speaker: Certainly not. The hon. Member's Amendment was not selected.

Sir C. Taylor: Further to the point of order raised by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman). I am the hon. Member who raised the question of what the hon. Gentleman opposite said, which was "Clear the Chair." Most of us on this side of the House think that a graceful apology to you, Sir, would be more in keeping with his action than the speech he has now made.

Mr. Speaker: That is a matter for me. I have taken the course which I have taken. The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne did put another construction upon it. I am quite prepared to accept it.

CLERK OF THE HOUSE (RETIREMENT)

4.58 p.m.

The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Harry Crookshank): I beg to move,
That Mr. Speaker be requested to convey to Sir Frederic William Metcalfe, K.C.B., on his retirement from the Office of Clerk of this House, the assurance of its just sense of the exemplary manner in which he has uniformly discharged the duties of his important office, and its appreciation of his thirty-five years of devoted service in different offices of the House, of which twenty-four were spent at the Table, where his experience and ready advice have rendered constant assistance to the House and its Members in the conduct of its business.
This Motion is on the Paper in the name of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and myself, and of the two right hon. Gentlemen opposite who are the Leaders of their parties. With his natural modesty, Sir Frederic himself would have preferred it that we should leave it at that today and make no personal references to him. He is essentially a modest man. I feel that the House, for the first time in many years, would be unwilling to take Sir Frederic's advice on that matter, even if he tendered it.
The resignation of a Clerk of the House inevitably marks the end of a Parliamentary chapter. Sir Frederic leaves us with the good wishes of everyone. He has served the House for 35 years, and at all times he has been a perfect model of patience with all those who sought his guidance. Courtesy was his hall-mark and friendliness his outstanding characteristic, and he joined us in other spheres besides his work. He was a private—there is the modesty again—in our Parliamentary Home Guard during the war. With some he played golf, and in earlier days he shone as a run-getter for the Lords and Commons on the cricket field.
Now he leaves us, his duty done, but young enough for us as a House—with confidence, I hope—to wish him a long and happy retirement. Today we want to thank him for his great services, and to say that we shall all miss him from his place at the Table.

Mr. C. R. Attlee: Only a few words are needed from me to associate very fully all hon. Members on this side of the House with what has


been so admirably said by the Lord Privy Seal. I think, perhaps, that we in this House are rather apt to take for granted the services of the officers of the House, but we all know what the unfailing help and courtesy we receive from the Table mean to Members.
Sir Frederic has a long line of distinguished predecessors, and he has himself added to a very great tradition. He is a personal friend of so many in this House, and we all join in wishing him a long and happy retirement.

Mr. Clement Davies: May I also add my word of thanks to Sir Frederic now that he is leaving us and thank him very sincerely on behalf of all for his kindliness, courtesy and readiness at all times to help us on any matter on which we approached him?

Sir Waldron Smithers: I think it right, as I have had the honour of Sir Frederic's friendship for 30 years, not only in this House but on the cricket field, for a back bencher—if I may presume to do so—to add our tribute to him for his work, his helpfulness and his kindliness at all times. I hope that the "Fellowes" that follow him will do equally well.

Mr. Charles Williams: May I put a point of view which I think very few others in the House can put—certainly one or two can—with regard to the immense value which Sir Frederic has been to those of us who had the honour of serving the House in the Chair? No one can know how difficult is the work of the Chair and how utterly impossible that work would be except for the services of the Clerk. Sir Frederic was an old friend of mine long before he occupied any of the seats at the Table, but I must say that whatever his services to private Members have been—and they have been very great indeed—his services to the occupants of the Chair have been quite invaluable and have made our job possible.

Mr. George Benson: I think it fitting that a back bencher on this side of the House should also express his appreciation of the services rendered by Sir Frederic to back benchers. It is a long time since I first came into this House, and in those days Sir Frederic was Second Clerk Assistant. I can remember

the advice which I received as a new Member, completely muddled and befuddled by our procedure and in finding my way about, and the problem I had with Questions. The advice was—and I pass it on to the House in the words in which it was given to me—"Get hold of that red-headed chap. He will help you." That was Sir Frederic. It was very good advice indeed. Sir Frederic has always been at the service of Members, and his services have been most helpful. I wish him God speed.

Question put, and agreed to, nemine contradicente.

Resolved,
That Mr. Speaker be requested to convey to Sir Frederic William Metcalfe, K.C.B., on his retirement from the Office of Clerk of this House, the assurance of its just sense of the exemplary manner in which he has uniformly discharged the duties of his important office, and its appreciation of his thirty-five years of devoted service in different offices of the House, of which twenty-four were spent at the Table, where his experience and ready advice have rendered constant assistance to the House and its Members in the conduct of its business.

SUEZ CANAL ZONE BASE (ANGLO-EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT)

5.10 p.m.

The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head): I beg to move,
That this House approves the heads of agreement initialled in Cairo on 27th July between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt.
I think that in opening this debate there is at least one point on which I shall have the support of the overwhelming majority of the House, and that is in saying that the speeches from the Front Bench will not be too long. I have my duty to deploy the arguments on behalf of the Government's case, and I think that if I am to do that briefly I must ask the House to be indulgent towards me with regard to giving way on interventions, because I think that to do so would serve to waste the time of the House and to make it harder for me to fulfil my job.
It seems to me that the main consideration of this debate, and the main discussion, will centre round two points, first, the context of the Heads of Agreement which, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, I initialled in Cairo the day


before yesterday, and, secondly, on whether or not Her Majesty's Government are correct in the policy which they are pursuing towards Egypt and in initiating a step which will lead to a formal ratification of an agreement with Egypt.
I think that both those points depend to a very large extent on strategic considerations, and, in particular, on a strategic review which was carried out by the Chiefs of Staff and agreed by the Cabinet in the light of present conditions and circumstances. Although, obviously, I cannot go deeply into that, I think that I should bring to the notice of the House three considerations—comparatively recent—which apply particularly to policy in Egypt.
The first of these is the advent of the hydrogen bomb, together with other thermo-nuclear weapons. In war, I do not think that we can do other than expect the use of these weapons, and, in particular, their use on this country. In such circumstances, I think that all hon. Members would agree that our ability to mobilise, equip, train and dispatch overseas large quantities of troops would be restricted. Furthermore, our ability to maintain them at long distances from home would also be severely strained.
Not only that, but I think it equally true to say that the same considerations would apply to any Power, say, Russia, which attempted to maintain large forces in a campaign in the Middle East. It, too, would be hampered by long lines of communications running through difficult mountainous country, peculiarly vulnerable to this form of attack. The deduction, therefore—which I think hon. Members will agree is a fair one—is that the likelihood of large-scale land campaigns in the Middle East in any war in the future has been considerably reduced.
The second point to which I would draw the attention of hon. Members is the coming into N.A.T.O. of Turkey and the considerable progress which she has made in re-equipping her army with a lot of modern equipment which the United States have provided for her together with their technical advice. Turkey is determined to fight and to defend herself, and in the circumstances of the increased difficulty which I have mentioned regarding the lines of communication from Russia towards Turkey,

the chances of her succeeding have very considerably increased.
That being so, I think that hon. Members will appreciate that the likelihood of our being able to take part in a more forward strategy on Turkey's right flank in the defence of the Middle East is very much increased. That being so, hon. Members would see at once, if they looked at a map, that that places the base in Egypt very much more remote from the area in which we are most likely to fight in war. Therefore, not only is the importance of the base—I would not say done away with; but it is the case that the likelihood of subsidiary bases closer to that area would be necessary in war. Further, the advent of all these very powerful weapons puts a premium on dispersion and is very much against concentration.
In addition, should that be the position in war—and this is true to some extent in peace—the geographical position of Egypt as a country, with the double sea entry to Egypt, with the Canal which may well be shut in war, with the communications which run parallel to the Canal, and as a large source of labour—those facilities will be of very great importance indeed, especially in the event of either the Canal and/or the Mediterranean being closed.
Those facilities would be of little or no use to us in peace or in war with a hostile Egypt. Unless there is a better spirit and more co-operation in Egypt, it will be vain to expect that we can take any useful advantage of these facilities. I therefore think that that second point suggests that strategically we need a better spirit and more co-operation from the Egyptian people if we are to strengthen our strategic position in the Middle East.
The third point which I would make is one which has often come up in this House. It is the fact that with the size of our forces—and particularly is this true of the Army—we are overstretched and overstrained. Our commitments are too large for the forces which we have, and we lack a strategic reserve. Time and again in every debate on this subject to which I have listened hon. Members have urged upon the Government the need to reduce our commitments. But I think that those commitments are the consequence not so much of any failing on the part of Her Majesty's Government


but of the deliberate purpose of the Kremlin to stir up trouble for this country wherever it can. I think that it would be unwise of anybody to count on those commitments being reduced.
It is for those reasons that, if we are to balance the Army, we must attempt to build up in this country a strategic reserve. I think that if hon. Members surveyed the general situation today they would agree that the only possibility of achieving that is through being able to free the equivalent of the two and one-third divisions now locked up in the Canal Zone.
Those three points then, I think, come to this. We can afford to have a smaller base; we must aim at better co-operation with Egypt; we must aim at strategic reserves. It is, I think on reflection, the aim of those Heads of Agreement and of the policy now being pursued by Her Majesty's Government to reduce the size of the base, to bring about a better spirit in Egypt, and to free those troops to build up a strategic reserve. Therefore, I would contend that on those considerations, strategically this policy is sound and justified up to the hilt.
Now I turn to the Heads of Agreement. I believe that the House would wish me briefly to consider those matters contained in the Heads of Agreement which are somewhat different from those which have been discussed at such length, and with such patience, by General Sir Brian Robertson and Sir Ralph Stevenson. The first, which is new, is that this reduced base should be manned by civilian technicians from this country. When the previous discussions were going on we aimed at a base which would require some 4,000 soldier technicians. Today, under the considerations which I have outlined, we consider that to retain the workshops, to keep the fixed installations in working order, with a minimum of stores necessary for local maintenance and some war reserves can be done with a very much smaller force—well under half the number of soldiers required. In such circumstances, and after examination, we believe it perfectly feasible to operate the base by civilians from this country. I would say, from my own point of view, that to have civilians is a very great deal better than to have soldiers disguised as civilians.
The second point which differs from the original agreement is that the evacuation of the base will now be completed in 20 months whereas previously 15 months was the time allotted. I think that hon. Members will appreciate that now that we are reducing the base we shall have more to disperse and more to move both locally in the Middle East and back to this country. The question of this period has been looked into closely at the War Office, and I have personally discussed it at some length both there and with General Keightley. I am satisfied that those 20 months will give us the opportunity to carry out an orderly and efficient evacuation of the base, but, as hon. Members who have seen the base will realise, it will be an extremely difficult task
The third point in the Heads of Agreement to which I think I should refer is the duration of the treaty, which is for seven years. There are some hon. Members who say that it should be for 20 or more years. There are other hon. Members who say that a treaty of this kind would not be worth the paper it is written on. There are still others who say both—which does not seem to me to be entirely logical. But I believe that both for the base itself and for the advantage of the use of Egypt as a place in the future, the main consideration, strategically, is our relations with the Egyptian people and with the Egyptian Government in the future.
In that seven years, we shall know full well whether or not our relations with Egypt have changed very considerably for the better. If they have not, then whether we have 80,000 men there or just a few technicians that base will never be a true asset. If they improve and if, as I believe, there is a gradual improvement in this way, we shall not only have the base of which we can take full opportunity, but have the use of Egypt as a place, which is of even greater value.
I know that there are many different opinions about our future relationships with Egypt, but I would say this. Since the present Government has been in power in Egypt they have had one target and one target only. That target has been the British. "Get the British out of Egypt" has been their cry, and, whatever one may think of their policy and views, that target has gone. I cannot conceive


that from the point of view of self-interest the Egyptian Government, which has to improve the economy and standard of living in Egypt, could gain any advantage whatsoever by continuing to abuse this country and remain on bad terms not only with us but with the United States of America.
I think that we have reason to hope for better relations in future. I was gratified to see that the initial statement of Colonel Nasser which, by what has gone before might have been very extreme, did show considerable moderation. To those who think that our future relationships with Egypt may be bad, I say that they may or may not be right, but I would suggest that they await the events which they expect in silence rather than, by saying anything, spoil the chances that those relationships will improve.
I know that there are many hon. Members who may agree with the strategic considerations which I have put forward, who may agree in general with the contents of the Heads of Agreement, but who disagree very violently with this policy because of reasons of prestige. I think that everybody realises and appreciates those reasons for disagreeing with this policy. For a proud and great nation to take a step which looks as though she is being forced by duress to do something which she has been shouted at to do for a long time, and to do it deliberately, is always unpalatable for national pride. I think that everyone feels that, and I can assure hon. Members that I am aware of it myself. I can equally well assure them that I would not speak in this debate, still less go to Cairo, were I not unquestionably and absolutely sure that the policy being pursued by Her Majesty's Government is a right one.
I would ask hon. Members who have a reason for disliking this policy, "Have they carefully considered the alternatives?" What are the alternatives? First, we can remain there indefinitely with the 80,000 already there. Would they be prepared to ask the British Army to sit it out indefinitely in conditions in which I do not believe any other Army would have shown such good temper for so long a period? Are they prepared to accept that expense and that waste of effort, which makes no contribution whatever to our difficulties in the cold war?

I have yet to hear an hon. Member on either side of the House who advocated that course.
What is the other alternative? My right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse) and one or two others have said that the correct course is to say to the Egyptians, "Until we get a proper treaty which we agree upon, we will sit it out with a force of 10,000 or 15,000 or 20,000 men." Because of difficulties which might arise, such a policy has been very carefully examined by the Chiefs-of-Staff.
It means that one would concentrate a proportion of the base at Fayid, including an airfield. In that portion one would have that force guarding itself, the base and the airfield, and from it one could afford a small force for the immediate port facilities and wharfage at Port Said or Suez or whichever port one chooses. But one could not have sufficient forces to guard one's lines of communication from Fayid to the port. That being so, and accepting, as I think hon. Members must accept, that such a course would be provocative and would result in an increase of banditry and terrorism, what should we do? If that happened what would one do about one's lines of communication? One could either supply that force by air, as in the case of the Berlin airlift—hut surely one would look rather stupid with a beleaguered garrison in Egypt being supplied by air; or one could reinforce with more troops in order to safeguard one's lines of communication.
I say to hon. Members: could there be a more provocative course of action than to bring reinforcements into Egypt, having previously stated the limitation on the number of one's troops and having no rights on that occasion to bring in the reinforcements? That solution has been turned down by the best military advice, and politically it is considered—and rightly so in my opinion—quite unacceptable.
What other alternatives are there? I have listened to all these debates, I have talked to many hon. Members and hon. Friends—in both senses of the word—on this subject; but I have yet to hear a practical proposal other than those two. That being the case, I suggest to hon. Members who oppose this policy that in


a serious subject like this, and with a full sense of responsibility, they should put these two questions to themselves: first, "Would I remain with the 80,000?"—and I believe that the answer is, "No"; and secondly, "Would I reject all military advice and remain there with a smaller force?"—and I believe that from any responsible consideration the answer again would be, "No."
If I am right and the answer is "No" to both those questions, then any hon. Member who votes against our policy comes face to face with one inescapable fact—that by voting against this policy he is voting for one of those two courses of action. Hon. Members cannot escape that fact because those are the only alternatives. I would say this very sincerely to all hon. Members who disagree with the Government: I appreciate the reasons of pride, and indeed of emotion, which prompt them to resist this policy, but this is an occasion on which emotions come into conflict with common sense. Before they vote tonight I feel that hon. Members should think very hard on this subject for, if they do not, then on further reflection they may well find that on this occasion they have not merely voted against their own party but, in my opinion a more serious matter, they have voted against their own common sense.

5.27 p.m.

Mr. C. R. Attlee: The right hon. Gentleman speaks in this House not only as a member of the Government and Secretary of State but as a distinguished soldier. I thought that he was speaking a lot of sound sense, but it differs very much from what he used to say when we were in Government. In fact, we have listened to a lot of special pleading. It is not true that the difference between the hydrogen bomb and the atomic bomb has created all that change in the position which existed when we left office.

Mr. Head: If we take the Hiroshima explosion and the hydrogen bomb in units, the Hiroshima explosion would be unit one and the hydrogen bomb would be unit 1,000, which is a radical change.

Mr. Attlee: A few atomic bombs on Cairo and Alexandria would, I think, be pretty effective vis-à-vis the Egyptian population.
I am afraid that the right hon. Gentleman proved rather too much because his colleague, the late Secretary of State for the Colonies, was at pains to explain the great importance of the base at Cyprus. Is Cyprus immune from the hydrogen bomb? The right hon. Gentleman's speech was a lot of special pleading to cover the fact that he and his colleagues have at last come to realise the rightness of the Labour Government's policy. While recognising the position in the base and the rest of it, I cannot accept that there has been this change. I much prefer to accept the Prime Minister's brief remark yesterday that it is a matter of necessity.
This is an historic occasion. It is the termination of the long presence of British troops in Egypt, and there are two aspects of the matter into which we must look closely. One concerns the merits of this Agreement, both in its entirety and in its detail, and the second is how it squares with the policy laid down year after year by leading members of the present Government who in the past were so bitter in their attack on the Labour Administration.
This is no new question. Negotiations have been prolonged over the years since the war. It will be remembered that in October, 1946, agreements were initialled between Mr. Bevin and Sidky Pasha providing for mutual arrangements for defence arrangements, for the evacuation and for the Sudan—terms which were infinitely better than those now laid before the House. Those arrangements broke down owing to the unwillingness of the Labour Government to sacrifice the people of the Sudan. Sudan has now been dealt with but in such a way that I fear that, through the dilatoriness and supineness of the present Government, in effect the Sudanese have been sold down the river. Owing to the period which was allowed to elapse before the election, the bribery and all the rest of it, I think there is a very great danger of the Sudan falling again into the hands of the Egyptians, and that is a very sad ending to a very great achievement by the British Administration.
I should like to recall to the House the statement which I made on 7th May, 1946, on the policy of the Labour Government. I said:
It is the considered policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to con-


solidate their alliance with Egypt as one between two equal nations having interests in common. In pursuance of this policy, negotiations have begun in an atmosphere of cordiality and good will. The Government of the United Kingdom have proposed the withdrawal of all British naval, military and air forces from Egyptian territory, and to settle in negotiation the stages and date of completion of this withdrawal, and the arrangements to be made by the Egyptian Government to make possible mutual assistance in time of war or imminent threat of war in accordance with the alliance.
How did the present Prime Minister react? He said:
Things are built up with great labour and cast away with great shame and folly."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th May, 1946; Vol. 422, c. 781–2.]
What would the right hon. Gentleman have said if the Labour Government had presented the present proposals?
The Adjournment of the House was moved and accepted, and the present Foreign Secretary said:
… our troops … are there for one purpose and one only, the defence of the Canal and its security …"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th May, 1946; Vol. 422, c. 850.]
The right hon. Gentleman called it "a British purpose," "an Imperial purpose," "an Anglo-Egyptian purpose" and "a world purpose." He said that the Canal was an essential artery to our imperial life.
In the right hon. Gentleman's speech today there was no mention of the Canal. It dropped out completely so far as I could see. However, on that previous occasion the present Prime Minister said:
… we know that there is no satisfactory method of keeping the Canal open, and making sure that it is kept open, except by keeping troops there."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th May, 1946; Vol. 422, c. 894.]
The right hon. Gentleman said over and over again that the British troops must be kept there.
When I announced the plan to withdraw our troops, the Prime Minister said that it was a most painful blow. He must have been in acute pain yesterday. Yet what we proposed then has the support of all informed military opinion. I am sure that the proposal to withdraw our troops from Egypt has been welcomed by all ranks in the Canal area. This has been pressed for a long time. There has been a great deal of cost in money, lives and discomfort for our troops before this Agreement has been reached. The Agree-

ment seems to be the result eventually of accepting what has been refused month after month and almost year after year by the present Government.
Besides the defence of the Canal there was also the question of the Base. The Labour Government sought an agreement whereby, as I stated, mutual assistance should be available in time of war or imminent threat of war. I was pressed on this by the present Prime Minister. I said, in May, 1946:
I am perfectly alive to the fact that under conditions of modern warfare we can only carry out our obligations if we have been put in a position by the Egyptian Government to bring our Forces into action in the area without loss of time in an emergency—

Mr. CHURCHILL: Before fighting begins?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Yes, certainly."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th May, 1946; Vol. 422, c. 857.]
This was followed up by the present Foreign Secretary on 24th May, 1946. He said:
It may be thought that if the necessary preparations can only be made in advance, the actual movement of Forces can await the sounding of the hour of menace. That may be strategically sound—I am not qualified to pronounce, although I have doubts about it —but I am quite sure that it is politically unsound and even politically very dangerous. What happens? When tension grows and peril menaces, it is not fair to put too much strain on a small country by saying at that very hour, 'You must agree that danger threatens and you must let us come, publicly before the world, into your country in order to share with you the averting of that danger'."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 24th May, 1946; Vol. 423, c. 706.]
There was stress upon that point over and over again, that it was not fair to leave this to the last minute. But if we look at the White Paper we read:
In the event of an armed attack by an outside Power on Egypt or any country which at the date of signature of the present agreement is a party to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States or on Turkey, Egypt will afford to the United Kingdom such facilities as may be necessary.
The war has then already broken out, which is just what was so roundly condemned previously by the right hon. Gentleman. It is true that the White Paper says:
In the event of a threat of an attack on any of the above-mentioned countries, there shall be immediate consultation between the United Kingdom and Egypt.
That puts a small country in just the difficulties to which the right hon. Gentleman referred. The Labour Government


were envisaging the possibility of war breaking out somewhere in the world and not necessarily in the Middle East, because, as we understood and as we have been told, this is our Imperial lifeline. Apparently it is now only a matter of attack on certain States.
What I am sure must have struck everybody is how curious it is that Palestine is left out. I was very surprised at that because the Prime Minister has always been a strong Zionist. There is no doubt that there is a great deal of apprehension, whether justified or not, in Palestine and in Israel.
The Labour Government envisaged an alliance in defence with the Egyptians, as we had had with the 1936 Treaty. We worked on from that and sought later to get a regional defence organisation. It was stated, and I believe it is true, that that it is necessary, in order to carry out our obligations and in order to keep the peace in that difficult area, that there should be some British troops somewhere in the region.
The right hon. Gentleman brushes it all away with his hydrogen bomb, but I do not believe that if there were trouble in hitherto undisturbed areas of the world we could use the hydrogen bomb. The Labour Party certainly do not want to use the hydrogen bomb. It is necessary, and has been stated over and over again, that there should be some troops there. There is nothing there now. There is only Wimpey's or some other contractor there.
What has become of all the talk about the Suez Canal as an international waterway which must be open and kept open? The Prime Minister has used that phrase over and over again. In the White Paper the 1888 Convention is invoked. We are all bound by that, it is said. But, of course, Egypt has been in default of that Convention for a number of years, and yet nothing has been done about it. It is not much good just affirming a convention which is not observed by one side.
What is to be done about it? When we asked about it, there was a vague reference to the effect "This is a matter for U.N.O. and not for us," and yet this is "our great Imperial lifeline." It is all very well for the right hon. Gentleman to come here now with his special pleading. Why did not right hon. Gentlemen opposite think of these things previously?
The Opposition entirely agree with the evacuation of our troops from Egypt. I can remember saying over and over again, and my right hon. Friends have also done so, how hopeless it was to try to have a base where there was a hostile population. We did not get much sympathy then, but that is acknowledged now. At all events, it is acknowledged today, but I do not think it was acknowledged by the Colonial Secretary yesterday because he was advocating putting troops and a base and everything else into Cyprus. At that time the right hon. Gentleman had not had his talk about the hydrogen bomb. I must point out that in all the talks that I have had with the military they have never thought that Cyprus was a satisfactory base, for obvious reasons.
However, we have our duties to the Arab States and to Turkey and to Israel—and, indeed, to Egypt. The question is, how are these to be carried out? What of the security of the Middle East? Let me remind the House of a statement by the late Ernest Bevin on 24th May, 1946:
There is one thing on which I will give the Committee an assurance. I will be no party to leaving a vacuum. There must not be a vacuum."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 24th May, 1946; Vol. 423, c. 788.]
That is exactly what we have got today—a vacuum.
We contended that this was an area of possible disturbance and that the right thing was that there should be an international force there. We wanted to build up, with others, in that area an international force for the preservation of peace. We have nothing at present. Apparently we are merely to shelter behind the Balkan Alliance of Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. That is not carrying out our obligations.
There is a case for a base of some kind. I wonder what the alternative is. We had to look at many alternatives, including the question of somewhere else in North Africa, and we actually looked at Cyprus. There is a possibility, and, I think, a much more likely possibility, of perhaps somewhere in Israel—say, at Haifa. There might be one possibly somewhere near Alexandretta—with agreement, of course.
But none of these alternatives is possible without the full agreement of the people. The day has gone when we can put bases in other people's territory when the people do not want them. That,


let me say, was quite as abundantly plain in 1945 and 1946 as it is today, and that is why our policy was right then, and it is a pity that the Government, when they were in opposition, did not recognise it.
I am quite sorry for a number of hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite who are, naturally, upset by this Agreement, because they took the Prime Minister's speech to be an expression of serious strategical views. I am afraid that they do not recognise that there is an immense difference between the Prime Minister in office and the Prime Minister in opposition. When he comes into office he has to face realities; he has to take responsibility instead of indulging in merely factious attacks on those who are bearing responsibility. We have borne for years these accusations, freely thrown about, of "scuttle."
Now we come down to this Agreement that we have got, and we all hope that it will be carried out, but its terms are worse than any I have ever seen. The right hon. Gentleman knows this could have been settled on better terms, and in fact on these very terms two years ago, if he had stood up to his own back benchers. He refrained from doing what was right. He has now to eat humble pie. We all hope that this may lead to a new and better era in the Middle East, but there is very little credit to the Government.

5.44 p.m.

Captain Charles Waterhouse: It is never easy for a Member of this House to get up and take a view strongly opposed to that of a leader whom he highly respects and whom he has followed with loyalty for so many years. It is never an easy task for any back bencher to follow the speeches made from the Front Bench, but when we have had two speeches such as we have had today, one of very high oratory, the other both of oratory and very close argument, it is more difficult still, and the House will, I hope, have sympathy with me.

Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: Which was which?

Captain Waterhouse: I always keep chronological order. The House will, perhaps, have sympathy with me when I am putting a view which is now, I know, definitely going to be disagreeable to my

right hon. Friends on the Front Bench. I want to assure the House and my right hon. Friends, too, that there is not the smallest bitterness in anything I intend to say or that will be said by anybody from these benches so far as I know. We speak in sorrow. We speak, I am sure, with very real sincerity.
I should like with very great respect to make a passing reference to our late colleague, Sir Herbert Williams, whose memorial service many of us attended this morning. Sir Herbert Williams took part in many hard fights in this House. He worked with us in this little party we have had in opposing what we believe to be a wrong policy. I believe it to be a cause of very deep regret in all parts of the House that he is not with us tonight.
There are not many aspects of this problem on which I can congratulate the Government, but I want to keep in as good odour with them as I can and, therefore, I shall start off by congratulating them on the manner in which this negotiation has been closed, although I certainly cannot congratulate them on the matter of its conclusion.
There is one very sound piece of advice which applies, I am told, both in matrimonial and in military matters, and that is, "If you are going to run away run fast, run far, and run in good company." Whether my right hon. Friends had that in mind or not I do not know, but they certainly decided that in this case we were going to run in good company when they sent the Secretary of State for War to do the deed. Nobody has had a better war record than he; nobody is more respected as a Minister than he. I wonder exactly what instructions he had. I have a very good idea of the sort of instructions he received—"Get out there and sign an agreement. Don't bother too much about the terms. Get it signed." I imagine the Patronage Secretary chipping in by saying, "And mind it is signed by Tuesday, or you are likely to lose some of your holidays." The Agreement was signed by Tuesday. Here it is, and in this piece of paper we have got all that is left of 80 years of British endeavour, thought and forethought.
My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister at the start of his career wrote one of the finest books in the English language, "The River War," on this subject. It


must be grave indeed for him now to have to take this decision. I am not saying that as a measure of blame; I have the very greatest sympathy, and I know how hard it must be for him to have so decided. I and my friends had feared that there would be a sell-out. This is not a sell-out. It is a give-away. Instead of having physical control of a great base, instead of having troops on the major waterway of the world, we have got this piece of paper in our hands. It is indeed a hard day for anybody on this side of the House to have to sit and support this Government which has, as we believe, not taken a wise decision on the Suez Canal.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War divided his speech into two portions; in one he discussed the terms, and in the other he discussed the reasons. I propose to follow him very closely in that. The terms are for the evacuation of all forces within 20 months. In other words, we have got to get out just as quick as our ships and our engineers can get us out. The stores, the equipment, installations, public utilities, communications, bridges, pipelines and wharves are to be handed over, and the Egyptian Government will assume responsibility for their security. We pay the bill.
Egyptian or British technicians will be sent in there under a contractor. That contractor will nominally be under the protection of the Egyptians. If any stuff is to be removed, we have got to discuss it with the Egyptians. If we want to do any building we have got to get their permission. We pay the bill for all this. We are actually to be allowed to use some of the airfields that we have built if we arrange when the flight is coming in and inform the Egyptians of the time of the flight, and if they give their consent.
What happens if these provisions are broken, as they may well be broken? We have got to be prepared for that. Are we going to re-enter forcibly? Do hon. Members opposite welcome that? I doubt whether all hon. Members on this side would welcome that. Are we going back there by force, in the face of everything that we have said, in the face of a hostile Egypt? I do not believe that that is feasible at all. Really and truly, we have handed over £500 million

worth of stores and buildings to the Egyptians, and if they like to use them against Palestine or against anybody else, who is going in to say, "No, you will not"?
We have got the right of re-entry and a treaty for seven years. I do not mind whether this treaty is for seven years or 70 years. What do we mean by saying that we have gained a right of re-entry? If Egypt wants us in in some future emergency, as she wanted us in when she was threatened by the Italians, she will invite us in, treaty or no treaty. If she does not want us in when the time comes, this piece of paper is not going to get us in. We shall then have to fight our way in, with this treaty, just as we would have had to fight our way in without the treaty if Egypt at that time was not friendly to us.
In all such papers there is a little bit of light relief, and in this paper we find our light relief in Article 8 where we read that both parties express their
determination … to uphold the 1888 Convention. …
That really is a pretty good one, considering that Egypt has consistently been breaking it for the last four years. It is for those reasons that I think this piece of paper is not worth anything at all to us, and it is because of that that I say we have not sold out but we have cleared out.
During the last Election my right hon. and hon. Friends spoke from the platforms and pointed out what we believed to be the errors of Abadan. We pointed to the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison) and told him that he had scuttled from Abadan. We pointed to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and said that, thank heaven, that policy would now be reversed. We said that the Canal would be re-opened and freed again. We said that we on this side of the House at least stood for a strong and a definite principle. It is with very great regret that I say that if the electorate of this country had seen or foreseen this paper in 1951, we would not now be sitting on this side of the House.
What are the arguments that have been adduced to persuade us to this course? One good argument is sufficient to convince anyone of any honourable course,


provided it is a good argument. If arguments are multiplied, doubts arise; but if arguments are changed, we have a right to have grave suspicions. When this proposal was started, when, as some hon. Members opposite suggested, we first thought of scuttling from Egypt under the preceding Government—and I do not hesitate to use the term—the main thing was nationality. It was wrong to fly in the face of Egyptian nationality.
I suggest that nationality is very like alcohol. It is extremely pleasant and it is definitely stimulating when it is taken in small quantities, and so is patriotism, but it is very dangerous and utterly besotting and misleading when it takes hold of a person, just as nationalism is when it takes hold of a nation. We have got to resist extreme nationalism because it is bad for the world and it is bad for the people who adumbrate it. It leads to murders. It leads to wars.
The second argument was that a friendly Egypt was necessary. That may be so, but the Egyptians have already said that there are two things necessary for Egypt; one is possession of the Canal. They have that. The other is a free hand in the Sudan, and the Leader of the Opposition mentioned that in his speech. Have we finished with the Sudan? Are we now saying to the Sudan, "You have had your chance. You have not taken it. You can lump it"? If we are not doing that, then there is little chance immediately of a friendly Egypt. If we are doing that, then I say we are grossly betraying an almost sacred trust.
Then I come to the main argument, the strategic argument. Obviously, anything that I say will be considered against what my right hon. Friend has said. That is one of the troubles of this argument. Does my right hon. Friend come to the House as a very eminent, successful and fine soldier, a brigadier or a major-general? Does the Minister of Defence when he speaks in another place speak as the most respected soldier certainly in England and probably in the world? Or are they both speaking as representatives of the Cabinet putting over Cabinet policy? It is extremely difficult for us to decide, and in saying that, I am in no way attributing any dishonesty in motive or any dishonesty at all. But it is quite impossible to have at the head of a Department, in my view, a man who can take a Depart-

mental view based on that of his advisers and completely exclude from his view the policy which he is in the Cabinet to sponsor.

Mr. Head: Will the right hon. and gallant Gentleman allow me to say, as he has made personal reference to my status, that I thought that I had already made it clear—and I should like now to make it clear—that I was referring to the strategic appreciation which was approved by the Defence Committee and the Cabinet, and it was as a member of Her Majesty's Government and not as a soldier that I was putting forward these matters.

Captain Waterhouse: I think that it is perfectly obvious that when the right hon. Gentleman speaks from that Box he speaks as a member of the Cabinet, but it is equally obvious, as the Leader of the Opposition said, that he speaks with the added weight of a soldier.
What we must base our argument on today is not the personal opinion, greatly as we respect it, of my right hon. Friends but that of the General Staff. We are told that the General Staff, having weighed up the position most closely, now take this definite view. Well, 18 months ago—the Foreign Secretary will correct me if I am wrong—they took quite a different view. They have been able to alter that now, but they will not be able to alter it again in another 18 months when we have left the Canal. We are now taking a decision which is absolutely irrevocable so far as the Canal goes.
We have heard the argument of strategic reserves, and the right hon. Gentleman spoke of the morale of our troops. I appreciate the great discomfort in which they live, but an Army does not lose its morale because it lives in discomfort. It most quickly loses its morale when it is used for a purpose which is proved to be wrong or abortive. If our troops now feel that the grave difficulties which they have been in have been of no avail, that their friends who have been killed have died in vain, are they going to be quite so ready and staunch when they are moved to other places? The British Army can stand up to any strain, it is one of the finest organisations in the whole world, but it is a very cruel strain that is being put upon it.
A third argument—and a recent one—is that of economy. I think that I can dismiss that in a few words. The Chancellor of the Exchequer answered a Question earlier this week, and said that if all the troops were brought back from the Canal to this country about £10 million would be saved. There is no question of bringing them all back. We shall be very fortunate if we get one-half back, so the saving will be about £5 million, and that has to be weighed against new installations, new barracks and new houses elsewhere. The economy argument is an utterly false one.
So we come to this most peculiar argument of the hydrogen bomb, on which "The Times" based a leading article quite recently, and which my right hon. Friend has expounded today. With great respect, I have to say to him that it is both the latest and the worst of all these arguments. If the hydrogen bomb is going to be awkward in the Canal, it is surely going to be a little more awkward in Cyprus.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: And in London.

Captain Waterhouse: After all. Cyprus is 500 miles nearer to the airfields of the potential enemy. Along with this question of the hydrogen bomb, may I finally ask my right hon. Friend this? If the hydrogen bomb is making our position in the Suez Canal completely untenable, why have we been fiercely arguing for six, eight or 10 months about the power of re-entry?
I do not believe that these are the real reasons at all. It grieves me to have to say so. I believe that the real reasons on that side of the House—and I believe that they have been almost accepted by some on this side of the House—are that we are becoming weary of our responsibilities, that our burdens are becoming too irksome for us and we are really losing our will to rule. [HON. MEMBERS: "If that is really happening, then, indeed, it is a sorry day for Britain.
In this we have been urged along by the United States of America. I am not one of those who normally carp and criticise that great country. I believe that we need close friendship with them more than anything else in the whole world, but I think that we have to realise this

as a House—that the United States have a real regard, almost an affection, for the British Isles. They have a very great respect for the Commonwealth, but they actively dislike the British Empire. Their actions throughout the whole world seem to me to have been activated by the motive of dislike for the Empire and anxiety to do it injuries, small or great.
For many years we have had a little American lamb bleating in Cairo, not helping and if anything hindering in most things. Well, he has got his way, but whether or not this will be to the lasting advantage of the Americans any more than to us is a very different consideration.
The Secretary of State for War has put up the alternatives. The first was that of keeping 80,000 troops there, and he spent several minutes on expounding it. Then he said that no one wanted that. Of course, no one does want that. With great humility, I challenge his second argument. I do not believe that it is impossible for us to hold, with something like a brigade or two brigades' strength and to keep supplied on the Canal, a small base. All over the world we have been doing that for hundreds of years. It is nothing fresh. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Hon. Members opposite may laugh, but that is true. All over the world we have been holding positions in the face of adversity and we are not unable to do it now if we really felt that we had to do so.
It is said that we cannot do it because the population is hostile. Is there a very friendly population in Cyprus? Are there any indications that our people are going to be welcomed in Cyprus any more than they have been in Egypt? [An HON. MEMBER: "Not after this speech.] Nor before the speech either. We have to look ahead in our whole appreciation of these grave affairs. Are we leaving Egypt as a final move in our retreat or is it just one more step? If it is one more step, then I, for one, shall lose much of my interest, much of my belief, in British politics. I believe that the British Empire and the British Commonwealth still have a mission to fulfil and that if we once forget that, or if we once just write it off as sentiment, then we shall get ourselves into a miserable and unhappy position indeed.
There is one other point before I come to my conclusion. In looking into the future, have my right hon. Friends considered the possibility of Communism in Egypt? We are told that some of their leaders are moving in that direction. What happens supposing Egypt were to go Communist? What is then our attitude? Is it going to be—"so far and no further," or is it going to be "peaceful co-existence"?
I want to close by asking my right hon. Friend four questions. The first is a comparatively small one, although it is of long-term importance. When the Egyptians denounced the treaty, they said that all goods going to our Army had to be subject to Customs. Already they have booked up some £20 or £30 million against us. There are other similar items to be dealt with. Is it the intention to deal with those in the treaty, or will they be left, as I hope they will not, to be a running sore in the future? The second question is: does our pledge of real independence to the Sudan still stand? Are we going to do any more about it, or do we feel that by the action we have already taken we are exonerated from that pledge?
The third question is this. We understand something of what the redeployment plans are to be to the north of the Canal. What is to be the position in the south? Is my right hon. Friend going to reinforce Africa or to reinforce any of the stations in the Persian Gulf? If we could get a reassuring statement on the position there, at least some of our fears would be removed.
My last question: What is to be the position if this treaty is broken like the others? I believe it would be an advantage if it were made clear that if this treaty goes the way of the other three, we will no longer tolerate it and that this treaty, such as it is, is our last word. If that is not made clear, I feel strongly that in signing it we may have opened the grave of British greatness.

6.11 p.m.

Mr. R. T. Paget: I should be deeply interested to know what the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse) means by "our last word." Does he mean war? Is it his view that if there be any breaches in the working out of the Agreement, the alternative is that

we should invade Egypt? That is an alternative that we would like to know about.
During the last Election, as the right hon. and gallant Member candidly and honourably pointed out, he and his colleagues on the benches opposite attacked people on this side of the House for scuttling from Abadan and pointed out that there would be a very different policy from the Prime Minister with regard to Egypt and the Canal. When we asked whether the alternative to that policy was war, the right hon. and gallant Member complained. What does this "last word" mean?
The right hon. and gallant Member made a highly important assertion, and I should like to ask this question. He asserted that the General Staff had changed their minds recently on this question. Is there any truth in that?

Mr. Head: I said that two matters have occurred recently which affect considerations about this. One is the invention of the very powerful thermo-nuclear weapons, and the other is the long-term situation of our very large commitments in the cold war.

Mr. Paget: Did not those both exist—and the transition from the atomic to the hydrogen bomb made little difference—two, three and four years ago. Has it not been the opinion of the Secretary of State for War, of the Foreign Secertary and of the General Staff throughout the life of this Government that it was quite futile to try to maintain ourselves within the Canal Base? All the General Stall and the two right hon. Gentlemen who understood this matter have known all along that we could not with profit maintain ourselves in the Canal Base. The reason has nothing to do with atomic bombs. It is a basic matter of theory.
What is a military base? Military bases were, I believe, the great strategic contribution of Marshal Turenne. Their purpose was one and one only: to give added mobility to one's forces. If a base does not give added mobility to one's forces, it has no purpose at all. A base is to provide alternative points of supply so that our forces may be more quickly manoeuvrable. Did that apply to the Canal Zone? In so far as ports, labour forces and a friendly population were


available, it fulfilled that function of a base. But the moment that ports ceased to be workable, communications within the area ceased to be available, and the population became hostile, it no longer gave added manoeuvrability; it no longer enabled us to move our forces. It did exactly the opposite. It tied down our forces, and that has been our position over these years.
We have had 80,000 troops tied down in the Canal Zone, not available to be moved elsewhere—tied, unmanoeuvrable, unusable, in rotten conditions and in conditions in which they could not be trained.

Major H. Legge-Bourke: I hope that the hon. and learned Member, in making that accusation, does not forget that the Government responsible for the size of the base being what it is today is not the Tory Government but was the Government which he supported. The base has doubled since 1948, before this Government ever came to power.

Mr. Paget: I have not made a party point and I am not going to make one. What I am concerned with is the defence and foreign policy of England which I regard as a matter for both parties. I am not trying to score advantages. The position which the Government faced when they came into office was that their whole strategic reserve, instead of being made more mobile and available by the existence of the base, was tied up with that base and could not be used. That was an intolerable situation and one which ought not to have been tolerated for any length of time.
Recently, and again today, the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East brought forward his proposal that we should retain a brigade in the Canal Zone. The Secretary of State for War illustrated the futility of that suggestion. When I asked the right hon. and gallant Member what the brigade was to do, his answer was that it would do the same as it did before the war: it was useful then. Before the war a brigade was useful in Egypt because it was a convenient place to move it from. It was useful in Egypt because it was a convenient place to train in. Now, the situation is entirely different. A brigade there would be a beleaguered garrison.

Any commander who puts a force deliberately into a position where it will be immediately beleaguered has the brains of a louse. That is the difference in the situation, and that is why what was sense before the war is lunacy afterwards. It is different circumstances.
So far as the H-bomb is concerned, there is no safety from it in Suez, in England, in Cyprus or anywhere else—that argument is irrelevant. The reason is that Suez is not a base. It cannot be a base. It is a tie-up; a commitment without profit; it gives no manoeuvreability of forces. The Secretary of State for War agrees. There were two alternatives. We could have moved out of the base by coming home or by going into Egypt.
In January, 1952, the opportunity arose to go into Egypt if we had wanted to. For a month our people were being murdered and Egyptians were being deliberately infiltrated into our lines as saboteurs and murderers under the guise of assistant police. This culminated in the Cairo riots in which, at the Turf Club, a number of our citizens were burnt alive by being thrown on a bonfire and between £10 million and £50 million—I do not think it has ever been ascertained—of our property was destroyed.
If the Government had meant to stay in Egypt and in the Canal Zone they had the opportunity to do it. It was an opportunity that would not recur. We could have gone into Egypt then and taught the pashas and the very small class of educated Egyptians a lesson which they would not have forgotten for a decade. We could have gone back and ruled Egypt, but it was only on those terms that we could have stayed in the Canal Zone. We decided not to do it, and I think that decision was right.
I would not have the least objection to ruling Egypt on any ethical grounds, because I do not regard it in the least moral to condemn the Egyptians to the horrible fate of being ruled by Egyptians. I do not regard the proposition that self-government is preferable to good government as being either a responsible or an ethical proposition, nor does even a Liberal if he has got a nursery.
This country has carried very formidable responsibilities throughout the world, and I believe that where we have gone we


have conferred immense benefits upon the nations we have governed. I do not think we have any need to be ashamed of the contributions that we have made.
The decision not to go into Egypt was right because it would have involved a commitment which it was not in our interests to undertake. With Germany destroyed, we became committed on the continent of Europe to the defence of her marches. We cannot at the same time also carry the commitment of ruling Egypt. But once that decision was taken it was abundantly clear that we could not stay in the Canal zone. The right hon. Gentlemen the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for War know that full well and they knew it then.
We had an opportunity to get out on honourable and advantageous terms. General Neguib overthrew the wretched royal Government in Cairo and the people who had inflicted injuries upon us by their irresponsibility. I urged upon the right hon. Gentlemen at that time that we should have gone to Neguib then and said, "We are delighted to see you. We want, as Ernest Bevin once said, to get out of the Canal Zone. You will, of course, realise that while the wretched King's Government was here we had nobody to whom we could hand over the base. Now, of course, a responsible strong man is in charge. Now there is somebody to whom we can hand it over. All that there remains for us to do is to make our arrangements to leave."
Neguib's whole prestige would have been built up on the fact not that he was going to get rid of the British but that he had done so. From that point onwards he would have gone into the negotiations for the arrangements committed to their success. He could not go back to his people and say, "I have not got rid of the British after all." He would have been committed to the fact that he had got rid of us, and we could have had any terms we liked for our withdrawal with the very best of good will from the new Egyptian Government. Under those circumstances, we would have come out not damaged, but with our prestige enhanced.
Instead of that, by delay we are having to withdraw on miserable terms, having carried a burden which has gravely injured our Army, which has weakened

recruitment, and has weakened our defence position. Why has it happened? For one reason only. It was not because the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs did not know what was the right thing to do. It was not because the Secretary of State for War did not know, but it was because of a back bench cabal in the Conservative Party encouraged under the table by the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister (Sir Winston Churchill): That is an absolute untruth.

Mr. Paget: Does the right hon. Gentleman say that he really was not obstructive in the Cabinet—and letting it be known to the people behind him—to the wish of the Service Departments and of the Foreign Office to conclude an agreement to get out of Egypt?

Mr. Ralph Assheton: That is absolutely untrue.

The Prime Minister: I behaved with perfect correctness in my relations with my colleagues and with Members of the House. I have not in the slightest degree concealed in public speech how much I regretted the course of events in Egypt. But I had not held my mind closed to the tremendous changes that have taken place in the whole strategic position in the world which make the thoughts which were well-founded and well knit together a year ago utterly obsolete, and which have changed the opinions of every competent soldier that I have been able to meet.
I am not going to attempt, in interrupting the hon. and learned Gentleman, to lay this argument before the House, but I should be prepared to do so and to show how utterly out of all proportion to the Suez Canal and the position which we held in Egypt are the appalling developments and the appalling spectacle which imagination raises before us. Merely to try to imagine in outline the first few weeks of a war under conditions about which we did not know when this Session commenced, and about which we had not been told—merely to portray that picture and submit it to the House would, I am sure, convince hon. Gentlemen of the obsolescence of the base and of the sense of proportion which is vitally needed at the present time, not only in military dispositions but in all our attempts to establish human relationships between nation and nation.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: The hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) should try to answer that one.

Mr. Paget: I certainly do not disagree with what the Prime Minister has said.

Mr. Assheton: Then withdraw the previous remark.

Mr. Paget: What the Prime Minister has very clearly indicated is that he held one opinion until this Session began, when events which he has described in flowing language and which, I suppose, mean the hydrogen bomb, changed his view. That is all I was saying. The fact that he was wrong up to this Session encouraged back benchers to prevent the Foreign Office and the War Office taking the obvious and correct course which they could have taken honourably on good terms, a year before this Session started.
The right hon. Gentleman's action has compelled us to take worse terms, in circumstances vastly more injurious to our prestige. The reasons for leaving the Canal base were clear and evident to everybody two years ago except a group opposite and the Prime Minister. In this Session they have become obvious to the Prime Minister; they still are not obvious to a group on that side of the House.
Now I want to say something about the alternatives as to where we are going. It is said that we are going to Cyprus. Now what could be greater folly than to say, on the one hand, that it is necessary for us to leave Egypt because of a hostile population and then, on the other hand, to go into Cyprus where we challenge the Cypriot to show that he is at least as good a man as the Egyptian? What could be a crazier thing to do? The Cypriots showed their quality as guerilla fighters in the war. When we give them that sort of challenge, do we think they will not do it again? And it is totally unnecessary.
Let us look for a moment at the position in relation to Cyprus. In Cyprus, we have our interests, they are purely strategic ones. We require a base there and, apart from that, it does not matter the least to us who rules provided that there is a friendly population there for our base. Secondly, there are the Greeks and the supporters of Enosis. The Enosis movement is purely sentimental.

Its supporters do not pretend that jointure with Greece would give them any material or economic advantage. Their case is that they want to take their part in the heritage of Athens and Sparta and in the great stories of the past.
Thirdly, there is the interest of Turkey, which makes up 18 or 20 per cent. of the population and which has recently come into alliance with Greece. To deal unilaterally with Greece would blow wide open the new Turkish-Greek alliance. We have to come to terms on three matters: our strategic interest, which requires a base and control of a base such as Gibraltar or Malta; the sentiment of the Enosis population, which is tremendously strong—not the less strong for being sentimental; and the interests of the Greeks and the Turks.
I would urge that before we move any troops into Cyprus we should confer with the Greeks on this subject, with the Turks on this subject, and with local opinion in Cyprus. I beg the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary, and the Secretary of State for War, to take over these negotiations. The ham-handed way in which this was handled from the Colonial Office yesterday might well give us another war. We had a crazy display from that Box yesterday by the Colonial Office, showing utter misunderstanding of the sentimental position in Cyprus. For goodness' sake let these two right hon. Gentlemen, who have shown themselves such artists in negotiations, negotiate an agreement here which will please everybody. There is one available. We do not mind the jointure with Greece so long as we have our strategic control; it does not hurt us in the least. Do let us have some negotiation about this alternative. It will not be beyond our wit to devise safeguards for the Turks.
Finally, I ask them to consider whether Israel should be consulted as to whether she would like a brigade based there. I am informed that there is a good possibility that the Israelis would feel that it is a proposal which would add greatly to their security and which they would be willing to discuss. So before we make our new arrangements, let us consider that too, because English troops there would, I think, scotch any possibility of an Arab invasion, would stabilise that area and would provide us with a base from which we could move


and mobilise troops. Let us at least take the trouble to see we are welcome this time.
This has been done two years too late; it has been delayed as an act of appeasement to the 1922 Committee; it has been done, because of that, in circumstances of ignominy, and it has been done without consideration as to what that we do now. The Government have done ill in this and they are extremely lucky to have an Opposition which may be prepared to save their necks.

6.36 p.m.

Colonel Cyril Banks: I am sure that the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) will forgive me if I do not follow the line he has taken, because in many respects I find it too complicated. In my maiden speech in this House in 1950 I raised the issue of the Middle East and South-East Asia. I talked of conditions that I had found there after having made a study of the situation for about nine months and of the relation between those conditions and what we must face in the future.
During the course of that speech I cited Egypt and other countries surrounding Egypt and said that, unless we did something about them, we would be in serious trouble in a comparatively short space of time. I would not like the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition to get by with the attitude he has shown towards the problem this afternoon, because I want to remind him that even during his time in office I wrote to his Government and asked for their help. Also I suggested what could be done to help those countries and probably to stave off something that is happening at this moment.
To my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse), who has spoken against this Motion, I would only say that, if he saw conditions for himself in that part of the world, he would probably have a different viewpoint. I have been there four times in nine months and have visited the Palestinian refugees, of whom I have seen 400,000 in that time. I have seen their plight, I have seen how they live on the United Nations allowance for food and medical aid which is at the rate of only 6d. a day.
After seeing those conditions I made a visit to Egypt in April this year. I saw the Gaza district, where there are 200,000 refugees with no work to do and no possibility of work until schemes are started for them. Then I returned to Cairo to see what were the possibilities of employing refugees. Hon. Members opposite have said a lot about Israel this afternoon, and I spent three days there. I looked at the conditions that obtained in the whole of Egypt, where there are at the present time 100,000 people unemployed in light industries. In agriculture the minimum unemployed is a million, but the figure is probably far more than that.
I ask hon. Members opposite not to gloat over this, because it has been going on during their period of office, but the truth is that Egypt has been for many, many years a land of the haves and the have-nots. Something had to happen. We may take pride in many of the things which we as a country have achieved overseas, but I think that we should also be very cautious and take very great care when we talk about what we have achieved.
It is at that stage that I actually met Colonel Nasser. A great deal has been said about him in the Press. I would say this of him—that he is not someone who has just sprung up overnight. He has lived a dangerous life over a number of years planning to overthrow poverty in his country. He sat down with a group of people in his country and planned this revolution. As I saw him, he is a man of simple taste and is determined to rid Egypt of poverty. The more he does to that end the better it will be not only for Egypt but for the whole of the world.
He has been committed to the removal of our Forces from the Canal Zone from the start. On both sides of the House we know what it is to be committed at some time or another in our political life, and it would be wrong to judge Colonel Nasser as an individual merely because he says that British troops must leave the Canal Zone.
We have two alternatives in Egypt. The first is to agree to help the Egyptian people, to back the Egyptian Government in helping to feed the starving people, who are having a very bad time, and in getting on with land irrigation with water


from the Nile, and to send out our technicians. I think that they are far better ambassadors than people in an Embassy. Let them help the Egyptians to irrigate land hitherto untended and to grow food, and let our people build factories over there to employ the 100,000 who are now unemployed in light industry. By doing that we should earn the love and respect of the people of Egypt, and that is very important at the present time.
The alternative is to decline to do anything. The question is whether we should have troops in a hostile country. We would be in a hostile country. We would be shot at. I am no strategist, but in my opinion we shall want more men if, as we must, we spread further afield, but it is for someone else to say from where those men are to come. I say that here is an opportunity to co-operate with the Egyptian Government and the people in making their land a better place to live in and in getting rid of some of the things that have obtained there in the past. We should do that rather than say that we are going to sit there all the time. That would make a highly dangerous situation.
Both sides of the House support the United Nations and the Colombo Conference and anything which has as its purpose the making of peace in the world. We have done all that. If we truly believe in that, it means bringing our troops out of Egypt and bringing them back home. If we do that, we shall have the good will of 22 million people in Egypt and the possibility of earning their respect. That is a grand thing to do and I am all for it.
There has been much reference to "scuttle." I do not think that to put ourselves in the position to earn the love of 22 million people is a scuttle. Talk of loss of prestige has been bandied about in recent weeks, but I say sincerely that we can do an awful lot of damage to British prestige in the House of Commons if we are not very careful. In my experience in the countries that I have visited I have found that our prestige has not decreased. Our relations have been very friendly in Egypt. British people are popular there. The British business man is particularly popular at present. I believe that the Government will stay there for many years. I made a journey with Colonel Nasser of nearly

200 miles along the Upper Nile and I saw how he was received. I believe that he has a great future before him and that he earns all the respect and help that we and the United States can give him. I hope that, as a result of these discussions, we shall give a friendly hand to Egypt and let the Egyptians know that we wish them well and want to help them out of their very serious trouble.

6.46 p.m.

Mr. George Wigg: I applaud the sentiments of the hon. and gallant Member for Pudsey (Colonel Banks) and I certainly do not want to approach this debate in any spirit of gloating. I remind the hon. and gallant Member that his policy of the development of the Nile Delta and the furthering of the interests of Egyptian people, was also the policy of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition and the late Mr. Ernest Bevin.
The great tragedy is that when in 1946 and 1947 Mr. Bevin and the then Prime Minister were trying to rebuild British policy in the Middle East we received from the present Prime Minister, who was then in Opposition, not support but a response which forced us to go slow, because from one end of this island to another the cry of "Scuttle" was raised. However, I willingly join with the hon. and gallant Member in agreeing that we should drop the word "scuttle" and forget the past. I am prepared to believe that under the force of events the Prime Minister has been compelled to change his point of view.

Colonel Banks: I do not think that the hon. Member should blame the present Prime Minister for a position which he could not have influenced at all, because in 1946 there were plenty of schemes before the countries concerned. They had been put before them by the United Nations and the money was available, but they would not agree to them.

Mr. Wigg: The hon. and gallant Member was not a Member of this House then, but if he takes the opportunity to read HANSARD of 7th May, 1946, he will find that my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition announced in the House that negotiations were to be opened with the Egyptian Government. This prompted the present


Prime Minister to move the Adjournment of the House in protest. It was from that moment that we were forced to go slow on a policy which might have produced a much more favourable result than we have now obtained. The waste of eight years and the disappointment and the bitterness of hon. Members opposite are wholly due to the irresponsible action from 1946 onwards of the Prime Minister.
But there are others besides the Prime Minister. The Secretary of State for War said today that he went to Egypt to speak not as a soldier but as a member of the Government. Of course he did. There is a world of difference between what he has been saying in the last week and what he said in the 1946 debate. He then compared our policy to the selling of an Egyptian carpet. We do not want to gloat. But we are human beings, and I have been waiting for eight years to hear the speech which the Leader of the Opposition made today. Nevertheless, let us forget the past and try to look to the future.
The hon. and gallant Member for Pudsey spoke of two alternatives. I should like to put forward two others. We have been a great imperial Power. I agree with the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse). I am not ashamed of all that Britain has done in the backward corners of the world. I have been proud of the humble part that I have played, not on Parliamentary visits but in washing socks and opening tins of "bully beef" in those areas. It is not all lost; we are leaving behind a record of decency, a record of fair play, which will enter into the everyday lives of the peoples of those countries.
We have been a great imperial Power. I respect the point of view of hon. Members opposite and sympathise with them even if I do not agree with them. I sympathise with them because I respect some of the things for which they are standing. I have respected them in the past and respect them now. But there are other things besides the days that are gone. We can at this moment be borne down by our imperial memories and by looking over our shoulders to the memories and glories of our great past. We can leave the Suez Canal Zone because we cannot stay there any longer and can go into Cyprus or

Africa because they are second best and try to lay a base in Cyprus or in Cyrenaica, but the policy of second best based on memories of yesterday will not help us.
As every hon. Member opposite who has had any military service knows perfectly well the policy of going to Cyprus is a piece of utter nonsense. It has no military validity at all. It is common knowledge that the principles upon which a great base stands must be great sea communications—they are there, although the harbours in Cyprus are not good—good road and rail transport and great forces of native labour, but all those things are lacking. This is a prison into which we should be sending British troops for reasons of prestige.
In 1946—this is the last time I shall hark back to it—perhaps things might have gone differently if we had been wiser and if there had been wisdom all round. There is no monopoly of wisdom in any quarter of the House. We might have got a redeployment on much better terms than we can think about now. Israel might have become a seventh Dominion. Certainly, we would have had more good will than we have at present. So, let us look at the problem in order to get the maximum amount of good will we can get from not only the Egyptians and the Israelis, but also from the other countries of the Middle East. For what we want in the Middle East, above all, is stability, and there can be no stability without good will.
Last Christmas a number of hon. Members were prepared to give up part of their holiday to go to Egypt. We did not go as a result of a vindictive Press campaign, but because it was a good idea and it would be excellent if the Foreign Secretary would offer the Egyptian authorities a good will mission from this House in order to get the maximum results in the shortest possible time. Similar missions should also go to the other countries in the Middle East, for we want the good will of Egypt; we want the good will of Israel; indeed, we want the good will of the whole of the Middle East.
At present, we have to recognise the realities of the situation. Some hon. Members on this side of the House and some hon. Members opposite imagine that when we go out the Egyptian Army will be a great menace. That is not true. I


have not been back to Egypt for two or three years, but I was in Israel a couple of years ago and had an opportunity of looking at the Israeli Army. It is a very good Army and it has a much better system of mobilisation than we have. It is dovetailed into their needs and is the most effective fighting force in the Middle East. If there was any danger of invasion when we go out the Israeli Army would be on the Egyptian border in a couple of days. At the moment, there is no danger of the Egyptian Army invading Israel; for the moment it is the other way round, but there is no intention in that small country—which wants to get on with the raising of its standard of life—of pursuing an aggressive policy. But let us remember that the effectiveness of the Israeli Army gives us four or five years in which to lower the tension and get a policy of good will under way.
In 1946, I used to quarrel with Mr. Bevin, and even now I do not think that all the blame for the follies of Middle East policy is to be found on the benches opposite. Although, goodness knows, there is enough there, some of it had its origin over here. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) spoke as if he had talked with the Israeli authorities. I do not know whether that is so, but I know that Haifa is one of the best ports in the Middle East and could sustain a considerable force.
I suggest that the policy I advocate might lead the Israeli people and their authorities—as a free will act on their part and a gesture towards the policy of stability in the Middle East which is so essential both to this country and to the interests of the people of the Middle East—to consider not ceding Haifa—such a thought would be absurd—but coming to an arrangement whereby we could have the use of the port of Haifa and perhaps an area around it. That would be a much better and more realistic policy than the nonsense about Cyprus.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: I think there has been a misconception throughout the debate. I think the Leader of the Opposition and the hon. Member have fallen into the error of thinking that a base is to be set up in Cyprus. There is no question of that, but it is to be a head-

quarters. I quite agree with what the hon. Member said about Haifa.

Mr. Wigg: I hope that by a slip of the tongue I have not led hon. Members to think I suggest that Cyprus could be developed as a base like the Suez Canal. That is not so and I am sorry if I led the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) into the view that Cyprus would be a base for a considerable body of troops. What we want is an effective point from which we can rapidly expand should the necessity arise. It seems to me that, if the Israeli authorities are willing, Haifa would be much better for that purpose.
That might be done as a result of an act of good will by the Israeli authorities or the Israeli people, but it is no good us thinking of forcing our way back there any more than to dream of hanging on in the Canal Zone. That day has gone for ever. What I am pleading for is that we should forget the imperialist memories given expression to by the Secretary of State for War in the 1946 debate when he was speaking, not as a member of the Government, but, I think, as a soldier, and talked of the Suez Canal being a great imperial life-line—I think he called it a great artery of the Empire. That was the kind of romantic, sloppy, nonsense which the Conservative Party likes, particularly the female section. He may have been carried away by his own propaganda.

Mr. Head: It is still perfectly true.

Mr. Wigg: If it is still perfectly true, and it is an artery of Empire, has he cut his own throat?

Mr. Head: The hon. Member is being contentious—

Mr. Ede: Why should he not be?

Mr. Head: I do not see the slightest reason why the Egyptian Government should close the Suez Canal, because it is as much a life-line to them as to anyone else.

Mr. Wigg: The right hon. Gentleman must not be too clever. Of course it is a great life-line, but that is not what he said. He said that it was an artery of the Empire, and the policy of the present Government in Opposition was opposed to leaving Suez on just that thesis.
The right hon. Gentleman is too good a soldier not to know that it was sloppy nonsense then and that it is sloppy nonsense now. But let us get away from the past. Let us get the troops out. Let us build up recruiting and cut down conscription by six months. The right hon. Gentleman has another chance. We can do it, provided that we do not look over our shoulders; provided we do not want an imperial future, and provided that the troops do not do "three years hard" in Cyprus instead of "three years hard" in the Canal Zone. Let us bring them back—

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: From Korea, Malaya and everywhere else?

Mr. Wigg: There we go! The noble Lord is bowed down with the memories of the past.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Korea and Malaya are very much in the present.

Mr. Wigg: The noble Lord is thinking so much of the past that he has to throw across to this side of the House words of bitterness. He would charge us with a policy of "scuttle" at the very time when his hon. Friends have shown concern about this matter in a most realistic way. I am pleading that we should leave Egypt. I realise that we cannot withdraw from Malaya. Neither can we withdraw from Kenya, though I recognise that it is the follies of the former Colonial Secretary, the right hon. Member for Aldershot (Mr. Lyttelton), which has caused us to bog down a division of troops there.

Mr. Patrick Maitland: The hon. Member has said that he does not think that we should withdraw from Malaya. Would he consider that it is necessary for us to defend our maritime communications and that the defence of the Canal Zone—H-bomb or otherwise—is of great importance?

Mr. Wigg: I should delay the House too long were I to give the hon. Gentleman elementary lessons in geography as well as elementary lessons in strategy. In the First World War it was the strategy of this country—in which the Prime Minister played such a distinguished part, particularly over the withdrawal from Gallipoli—that the Mediterranean should be kept open. But it was clear on

Christmas Day, 1914, that that was impossible. On Christmas Day, 1914, the late Duke of Westminster, with an armoured car command, contacted the Turks, actually on the Canal, and a number of actions were subsequently fought in a vain endeavour to keep open the Mediterranean, to keep open the Canal Zone.
In the last war—though the hon. Member for Lanark (Mr. Patrick Maitland) appears to have forgotten it, and it appears that roughly 50 years of history has passed him by—we made no attempt to keep open the Mediterranean. We used the West Coast of Africa as our life line. The great burial ground of our maritime fleet was down the West Coast of Africa. Sierra Leone was the important base, not the harbours of the Mediterranean. The coming of the submarine and air power makes the policy advocated by the hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends complete nonsense. We have the H-bomb 750 miles away, and the hon. Member and his hon. Friends wish to provide a potential aggressor with the most perfect target in the world.
But I do not want to enter into an argument with hon. Gentlemen opposite. I am sorry that I have been dragged away into this digression. I wish to plead with the Government to take every step in their power, not only by words but by actions, to try to stimulate the maximum amount of good will both in Egypt and in Israel. I speak as a friend of both countries, indeed, as a friend of all the countries in the Middle East. I have visited them all—not as a member of a Parliamentary mission, not on a visit of two or three days. I have served in all those countries and, in a humble way, I claim to know something about them. I believe that the potential friendship for this country is enormous. I believe that memories are shorter than we sometimes think. I believe that in a very few months—certainly, in a year or two—all that has happened in Egypt in the last 70 years can be forgotten.
Perhaps I may be permitted to tell a story. I was serving in Constantinople in the occupation forces after the First World War. Heaven knows, there was bitterness between us and the Turks, because the Turk, although he is a good fighter, does not always fight according to Marquis of Queensberry rules. We


called him, "Johnny Turk" and for some reason they called us "Johnny," too. I left Constantinople on the last trooper. The last and the best troopship was, of course, reserved for the Brigade of Guards. They had to have the best. They travelled home in cabins, and I came on a trooper. It was a very old boat. It had been old at the time of the South African war.
I remember that as we pulled away from the quayside there was no chorus of abuse nor shaking of fists. The Turkish people, with whom there had been very difficult relations since the rise of Kemal, turned up in their hundreds shouting, "Goodbye Johnny, come back again." Give him the chance, and that is the kind of good will which is created by the British soldier; not because he has been trained in the Foreign Office, or kicked around in a public school, but because he is what he is. That is the kind of memory which the British soldier can leave behind. That is the kind of memory which will be left behind in the Canal Zone. The murders and the shootings and the robberies will be forgotten. But the simple kindness and the generosity of several generations of British troops will be remembered.
That is better than all the bases and, may I say, all the White Papers in the world. In any case, what fools we shall be if we do not create good will. We have not got the base any longer. The troops will come out in 20 months' time, so is it not far better for hon. Gentlemen opposite to accept this, and to say, "Well, after all, this is not what we should have liked and we are sorry about it but we must make the best of it"? It was clear from the emotion shown by the Prime Minister when he spoke that he is sorry, and I understand why, and I certainly do not gloat over it. But if we have to come out, let us, in the name of British common sense—which is one of the great national virtues to which we lay claim—make the best of a bad job. Let us come out and try to leave the maximum amount of good will behind; so that if ever we have to go back—and God forbid that the occasion should ever arise—we shall be greeted with friendship.
I hope that that will be the policy of hon. Gentlemen opposite. Do not let

them forget the fears which undoubtedly exist in Israel and in other countries as to what the effects of the redeployment will be. The efficiency of the Israeli Army will guarantee sufficient time for this Government, and other Governments concerned, to recognise that 29th July, 1954, marks the end of British imperial power in that part of the world, and the coming of a new era of friendship and kindliness. If that happens, I am sure that there will be a new respect, not only for Britain, but for everything for which she stands.

7.10 p.m.

Major Sir Roger Conant: For quite a number of years my contribution to our proceedings has consisted of the suggestion, "That this House do now adjourn." I hope that my observations today and on any future occasion when I may catch your eye, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, will be equally agreeable to hon. Members.
We are considering whether the Heads of Agreement initialled on Tuesday should form the basis of a treaty with Egypt or whether we should continue this long-drawn-out dispute. That is the simple issue—whether the dispute which has gone on for eight years should be continued. I agree that the base ingratitude of the Egyptians after the last war and the great length of time our troops have been in Egypt makes everyone reluctant to approve proposals for the withdrawal of our troops, but we must face facts.
Our troops are stationed in Egypt for defence. We must ask ourselves whether in the circumstances of today, bearing in mind the hostility of the Egyptians, modern methods of warfare, and in particular the possible use of nuclear weapons in a future war, it is wise to keep troops in Egypt and to maintain there the great base which we have kept up ever since the war. It is very easy to pick holes in any agreement and to suggest improvements. Today we are not concerned with hypothetical agreements. We are discussing this compromise Agreement which has been reached, and the alternative to accepting it is that we must face the job of maintaining 80,000 troops, or possibly a slightly smaller number, in the Canal Zone where they will be tied up indefinitely defending themselves as much as they will be defending the Suez Canal.


They live, as hon. Members know, under appalling conditions.
I would certainly have preferred a treaty which was to last longer than seven years, but I do not think that it is unreasonable to expect that with this great bone of contention removed our friendship with Egypt may grow and that at the end of seven years we may conclude another treaty. Therefore, I have no doubt that our defence needs are best served by the redeployment of our forces.
The effect of the treaty will be to reduce our direct overseas commitments considerably. I think that my right hon. Friend said that two and a half divisions would be relieved and made available for other uses. I am sure that this will lead to many demands for reductions in the period of National Service. In fact, the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) has already staked a claim. No doubt we shall also have suggestions for cuts in civil defence, but I hope that the Government will think very carefully before they agree to any proposals which would diminish the effectiveness of our defences.
Anyone who has read the Report of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission which met in London last month and which has studied the outlook of Soviet Russia on disarmament, cannot but feel the great urgency of maintaining our defences at the highest pitch if war is to be prevented. I am sure that all hon. Members hope that if this treaty is concluded it will result in more secure defences, and in a firm and lasting friendship being established with Egypt, and that in time to come the Egyptian people will appreciate the very deep debt of gratitude which they owe to British troops.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris): Mr. Crossman.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. Of course, it is not competent for me in any way to reflect on your choice of speakers and I do not attempt to do so. I could not suggest, for example, that the opposition in this debate comes from a small nucleus of 40 Members and that they should be called one by one, and I could not make any comment on your choice of speakers, but I should like to draw your attention to the distinct possibility that unless there is a selection of speakers from the

effective opposition in this debate it may be necessary in Committee on the Consolidated Fund (Appropriation) Bill, which occurs later in our proceedings, to make our views known.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The hon. Member has rightly pointed out that that was not a point of order with which I could deal.

7.15 p.m.

Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: I sympathise with the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke). I remember a good many times when I was sitting on the Government side of the House and thought that the effective opposition was not getting its full representation. Indeed, on the subject of the Middle East, I can remember a debate on Egypt when I thought that I was the effective opposition.
However, there is one difference which the noble Lord has not noticed. When he talks about the effective opposition, he seems to have overlooked the speech of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition. If that was thought to be a congratulatory speech, then the noble Lord's estimate of his own powers of oratory and of his own case is higher than I believed. I doubt whether he will be able to do a job of debunking the Government equal to that done by the Leader of the Opposition. My right hon. Friend castigated the Government. I assure the noble Lord that we on our side will play our part in exposing the Government, though I know that the stab from the rear hurts more than the stab from the front. I shall occupy no more than a very few minutes, and then I hope to see fratricidal strife between hon. Gentlemen above and below the Gangway on the Government side of the House.
I do not intend to spend a great deal of time in castigation, because that was done by the Leader of the Opposition once and for all. I want to speak shortly and not polemically. I think that some of us on this side of the House ought to say one or two things to the Government not in a polemical way. I am one of those who, unlike the Secretary of State for War, feel no conflict of emotion and common sense about this decision. I was aware that the right hon. Gentleman was


not really speaking to those of us who have been pressing this policy on him for two years. The fact that we have been pressing for it over here has been something of an embarrassment to him. I knew that he was speaking to his hon. Friends when he said that there was emotion on the one side and common sense on the other.
We are more fortunate. Our emotions coincide with his common sense, and we are delighted to realise that he sees the common sense reason. We also feel an immense relief that the 72-year occupation of a country, which was detested by that country, is to be ended, and we recall that on 17 occasions British Governments have pledged themselves to withdraw. At last that promise is to be kept. We do not see any great emotional tragedy about that.
On the contrary, we feel that at last there is a chance of a new beginning of relationships in the Middle East. I would say to the Secretary of State for War that it is touch and go whether this Anglo-Egyptian Agreement ends in complete chaos and collapse in the Middle East or whether it marks the beginning of a new relationship between our country and Egypt.
That depends not only on Egypt but on the attitude of the Government of this country. I should like to echo something said by my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg). I was proud to be the friend of the present Prime Minister of Israel when he was locked up as a terrorist by a Labour Government. I was proud to be the friend of the present Prime Minister of Egypt when he was reviled and despised by leaders on the Front Bench opposite only 18 months ago. I claim to be a friend of Israel and a friend of Egypt. I claim that unless we in this country can feel friendship for Israel and for the Arab States, including Egypt, and can genuinely want collaboration, there is no chance for all the military plans in the world.
The whole future of the Middle East depends on breaking that deadlock, that curtain of hatred, which divides the Arab world from Israel. It is only from this country that it can be broken. May I remind the House that we largely created it? By our action, the unnecessary and disastrous war in Palestine came,

and that divided these people. We must accept our responsibility. It is only if hon. Gentlemen opposite will accept the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement as giving the possibility of entering upon new relations with the Arabs and the Jews that it will not be a scuttle. It will not be a military disaster if only we take that new attitude.
That is what disturbed us about Cyprus. What happened? On the same afternoon a concession to common sense was made by the Foreign Secretary and half an hour later a concession to emotion was made by his colleague in his statement on Cyprus.

An Hon. Member: Is this a repeat performance?

Brigadier Christopher Peto: Would this not come under the terms of vain repetition?

Mr. Crossman: I am sorry that none of us had the privilege of speaking yesterday afternoon after the Colonial Secretary. He made a series of assertions which seriously invalidated the good intentions of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, for if the Agreement means the end of the Imperial relationship in the Middle East, then we cannot possibly assert British sovereignty in Cyprus on the same day. [Interruption.] I know that it is unpleasant to remind the unofficial Government opposition of this.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: I was saying that the hon. Gentleman was making a selfish and tedious speech.

Mr. Crossman: The noble Lord is usually courteous, but on the subject of Cyprus and Egypt he really must learn in time. We have had these mistakes made time after time during the last eight years. Hon. Members have never listened to our warnings. Each time we have got up and warned hon. Members what is likely to happen. Each time hon. Members opposite have called it tedious repetition and have turned it down. Then disaster comes, and it is too late.
All I do now is to beg the Foreign Secretary, who listened to sense, although I admit he was over-ridden by the Prime Minister for a year, to think again of what was said about Cyprus yesterday by the Colonial Secretary and ask himself whether it is compatible with the new relationship that we are trying to achieve in the Middle East that we should assert


to the people of Cyprus that they shall never get their sovereignty. I do not believe that we can have a military relationship with the Middle East except on terms of friendship with the people there. We have only got it with Israel today because Israel achieved her independence by force. We have only got it with Egypt because Egypt is getting her independence. Unless we give the people of Cyprus their will, they will not be with us.
This is the first thing that we want to emphasise to the Government today from this side of the House. Whether or not the Agreement leads to good will depends upon how the Government interpret it. [Interruption.] Of course it depends partly on the Egyptians. I assure the hon. and gallant Member for Pudsey (Colonel Banks), who made such an interesting speech about Colonel Nasser—I agree with him that Colonel Nasser is a charming man—that I am, nevertheless, not quite so one-sided in my picture of Colonel Nasser.
Colonel Nasser is a politician who is faced with realities in Egypt. The great danger about Egypt today is that, having lost one scapegoat—it has been the British who have been blamed for everything there in the last 25 years—she may find another foreign scapegoat next door. We shall have to see. It depends on whether Colonel Nasser is strong enough not to use the xenophobia there, which has given an excuse to every Egyptian leader for 25 years to blame the British, to find a scapegoat in Israel now with the result that there may be a possibility of a "second round."
It is our responsibility as a country to ascertain whether the military security arrangements which have been made will reduce the risk of there being a "second round." I ask myself whether we are doing it. [Interruption.] I was saying to the unofficial Government opposition—there are critics of the Government on this side of the House as well—that we are asking ourselves what security we have in the present world against a "second round" occurring. What are we doing to help Colonel Nasser to strengthen himself against that temptation? I agree that this is not likely to come for two or three years. The Israeli army is certainly stronger than the Egyptian army today, but there is that danger in the future. We have at the

moment a tripartite agreement which is merely a bit of paper. How can we give that bit of paper some substance?
I suggest that, much better than going to Cyprus and insulting the Cypriots by saying, "We will stay in your country and build a base here whether you like it or not," we should go to the one country in the Middle East which is now friendly to us, friendly because it got its freedom despite the British Government—Israel. Here is a friendly country, with a friendly people, which might really be a reliable ally in time of trouble.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Is it a friendly attitude towards Israel to suggest that we should put a bomber base there?

Mr. Crossman: I am not talking about a bomber base. I am talking about looking for allies in the Middle East.

Mr. Harmar Nicholls: To which "opposition" is the hon. Gentleman speaking now?

Mr. Crossman: I am speaking to the Chair. I suggest it is worth considering whether Israel would be prepared to lease us part of Haifa as a naval base. At least, it is an offer worth making to her.
I have said to the House previously that I think it is essential that the Gaza Strip, with its 260,000 refugees, should be taken, as a burden, off Egypt and that we should have there a battalion of British troops, a battalion of French troops and a battalion of American troops, as a token force and as proof that the tripartite statement means something and we should implement it if any trouble occurred. If we are to make a commitment, as we are making, that we will prevent aggression, I want some meaning given to it. I believe that small token forces in that area would deter both sides from aggression.
The Egyptians have previously stated that the Gaza Strip is a serious burden to them. Who wants the Gaza Strip, with the 260,000 refugees in it, today? My suggestion is worth considering. These ideas are turned down time after time until it is recognised that they make sense.
The last thing I say is this. While the 900,000 Arab refugees rot in their camps there will be no military security in the Middle East, there will be no friendship


between Israel and the Arab world, and there will be no friendship between us and the Middle East. When are we going to do something about the refugees? The British and the Americans should recognise that they might as well take on the compensation of the refugees. It may be said that we cannot afford to do that, but we are spending hundreds of millions of pounds on the military defence of the area while at the same time we are making the area impossible to defend. A few score millions of pounds paid out to the refugees to enable them to leave the camps, buy a bit of ground and develop their lives, would do more for the defence of the Middle East than any amount of guns and bombers.
I pray the House to realise that as long as we say to ourselves that military principle should over-ride common humanity we shall have no friends in the Middle East. If the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement is the beginning of a new relationship and not merely a scuttle out of Egypt into Cyprus, there is some hope for us in the Middle East, but if it is the same old thing, merely Imperialism grown weaker, then the military vacuum will end in final collapse.

7.28 p.m.

Mr. Julian Amery: Perhaps I might congratulate the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) upon his contribution, which, as his contributions always are, was dazzling and entertaining. The way he puts it, it always seems so easy. According to him, the great thing is to be friends with the Arabs and friends with the Jews, to establish a new relationship, and not to put the base into Cyprus but put everything into Gaza. Sometimes, in my more irresponsible moments, I should rather like the hon. Member to be at the Foreign Office, so that I could see what would then happen to all our interests and to the interests of other countries.
These is one point upon which I am sure there will be no difference in any quarter of the House, and that is the momentousness of the decision which is being taken here today. It is the end of a process which has lasted 72 years. It is 72 years since we went into Egypt, at the behest not of an Imperialistic Conservative Government but of a

Liberal Administration under Mr. Gladstone; 72 years which Colonel Nasser described yesterday as "72 years of bitterness," a phrase which was echoed by the hon. Member for Coventry, East just now; 72 years in which Cromer, Milner, Allenby, Kitchener, Lloyd and Killairn built modern Egypt as we now know it; 72 years in which we built the foundations of what became a British Empire in the Middle East after the First World War and has remained so until the other day. It is an area to which the forces of the Commonwealth came twice in a generation to defend freedom and civilisation. There has been a very difficult position in that area in the last three years. There has been a state of seige. Now the garrison is to march out with full honours of war, but after submitting to a full capitulation.
The documents which we have on this new Agreement are very few; in fact, only two. There is the communiqué which was put forward on the evening of the signature of the Heads of Agreement and there is the White Paper itself. Let me say a word or two first about the communiqué. It begins by telling us that the Agreement is not aggressive in its intentions. There will be no disagreement on that. It goes on to say that the Agreement aims at "removing sources of friction and misundertsanding." A study, however, of the Heads of Agreement shows that only one thing is to be removed—the British Army. I do not know whether that was a very happy phrase for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War to use about his service.
The communiqué ends by expressing the hope that the Agreement will "contribute to the maintenance of peace and security." That is really the vital question which we have to answer. Will it do so? I cannot escape the conclusion that when we go the last element of stability in Egypt goes with us. The country is beset with fearful social and economic difficulties, and nobody can solve them easily. In fact, I doubt whether any combination of forces in Egypt could succeed in solving them. The military junta may manage with dollar aid to control the dark forces for a time. But that, in the end, there will come an explosion is more than likely. Which


way it will go is anybody's guess, but there is at any rate a serious risk that it will involve an attack on Israel, or the suppression of the anti-Egyptian element in the Sudan, or perhaps a Communist revolution in Cairo. All or any of these developments could bring the Middle East down in ruins.
Now for the Heads of Agreement themselves. If we are to pass judgment on them, we must compare them both with what we had under the 1936 Treaty and what we might have had, for better or worse, as an alternative to these arrangements. First of all, a comparison with the 1936 Treaty. In 1936, we had a full alliance with Egypt; under this arrangement, we have none. In 1936, we had a right to station troops there; under this arrangement, we have an obligation to evacuate them. In 1936, we had a right of re-entry in the event of war anywhere in the world, or a threat of war or of an apprehended international emergency, whatever that curious legalistic term may indicate; in this Agreement, we have a right of re-entry only in the event of attack on certain Powers.
Here I should like to ask a question to which I hope my right hon. Friend will reply in winding up. What happens if, for example, Turkey becomes involved in a war in the defence of another member of N.A.T.O.? Will that constitute an attack against Turkey, and would that bind the Egyptians to open the Suez Canal to us, or would it not? It would not be an attack against Turkey, but against one of Turkey's allies in N.A.T.O., and I think we ought to know what is the position there.
The 1936 Treaty was of unlimited duration; this Agreement is to last for seven years. In the 1936 Treaty, it was stated that the Suez Canal was a primary interest of the British Commonwealth, as well an an international trade route; there is no mention of the British Commonwealth in these Heads of Agreement before us today. There is one other point, of which no mention has been made, but perhaps it will be covered in the Treaty, and perhaps my right hon. Friend will say something about it. Are there any provisions for naval facilities like those which are accorded to the R.A.F.? As to the facilities accorded the R.A.F., what

is meant by "most-favoured-nation-treatment"? Am I right in believing that it is the same treatment as that accorded to other countries?
Certainly, of course, we secure certain rights and pledges under this Agreement, and we might have had nothing at all. We have the right to maintain civilian contractors and the right of inspection of their work, and we have certain promises over the maintenance of the Canal Convention, but there is no security for any of these rights or pledges. Egypt receives the substance—control of the Canal, of the Base and of the land bridge from Asia to Africa. We receive the shadow—certain promises. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary yesterday expressed the hope that there would be a growing improvement in our relations with Egypt and that this might one day come to something. I hope that what he says will indeed come true, but there is very little foundation, for such hopes at present, and my right hon. Friend, of all men, after his bitter experience of Egyptian good faith in the Sudan last November, must have found it hard to give public expression to these hopes.
There is no evidence yet of good will on the part of the Government of Egypt, and we have to ask ourselves whether, even if they feel good will, they are in a position to show it. Powerful forces are arrayed against the Egyptian Junta. Indeed, I think that the statements made in Mr. Aboul Fath's letter in yesterday's "Manchester Guardian" are significant. He, a leading member of the Wafd, made it quite clear that the intention of himself and his friends was to try to outbid the xenophobia of the Egyptian Government. Any good will that we might receive may thus only be maintained by making further concessions to the Egyptians. We cannot make many more concessions to Egypt on Egyptian soil, but we might have to make concessions to Egyptian policy in other parts of the Middle East.
We have to face the fact that this Agreement is virtually unconditional evacuation of the Canal Zone. I am bound to say that it is hard to see that these negotiations have got us anything which we could not have got two years ago. I believe, as the House knows, that the whole of this Agreement is wrong. But if we were determined to go, then


there was a lot to be said for going quickly. As it is, lives have been lost, time wasted and money spent all in vain. The truth of the matter is that this Agreement falls between two stools, and, because of that, I do not think that it has much chance of commanding respect in the Middle East any more than it has a chance of commanding the respect of many people in this country and on this side of this House.
The Prime Minister, in an intervention earlier on, and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War, put a great deal of emphasis on the change in the situation which has been brought about by the advent of the hydrogen bomb. From a purely strategic point of view, what they said is no doubt true, but we have also to consider what will happen if there is no war. After all, our efforts in other spheres of policy are devoted to avoiding war; we have also to remember that there are British interests in the Middle East which we had before the Soviet threat arose and which I hope will still survive after the Soviet danger has receded. I think myself that the Agreement has to be judged as much on political as on military grounds; and, to understand it, we must try to look at it in the perspective of recent developments in the Middle East.
It is fair to say that the Middle East was chiefly important to Britain before the war because it was the area through which our communications passed by sea and air to India—India which was the great bastion of British power in the area of the Indian Ocean. With the coming of independence to India, the Middle East ceased to be simply important as a line of communications; it became itself the main bastion of British power looking towards the Indian Ocean, and it was from the Middle East that we had the strength to influence events in that part of the world. It was very important, I think, that we should have restained that strength, not only for our own traditional interests which bound us to that area, but because the new Commonwealth countries which have emerged on the Indian sub-continent needed to feel that there was, not too far away from them, a Power which could go to their aid in the hour of need. I know that public opinion in India and Pakistan tends to sympathise with Egyptian Nationalism. But I believe

that the leaders of those nations are much more concerned in their hearts with there being someone who can come to their help and who is not too far away. Their interest in the Commonwealth will be reduced by the withdrawal of British power from the Middle East.
British power in the Middle East was based in Palestine, the Suez Canal and the Sudan. I do not want to go into the rights and wrongs of the Palestine issue, but our withdrawal from there and our renunciation of responsibility led to a cruel and unnecessary war, the consequences of which will long bedevil affairs in the Middle East.
I must say a word about the agreement over the Sudan. In the 1936 Treaty, the Sudan and Canal problems were knit together. On this occasion, they have been separated. I am not sure that the separation has been very wise. It has led, by the way, to a curious fact. This Administration is the first Conservative Administration to lose nearly one million square miles of territory of the Empire since the day of Lord North. His policy towards the American Colonies suffered from excessive firmness. I do not think anyone will say that the Middle East policy that we are discussing today has suffered from that particular defect.
The agreement over the Sudan has never been fully debated, but in my view it was worse than the Heads of Agreement that we are considering tonight. What we have now is the surrender of vital British interests. What we did in the Sudan was a betrayal of trust. I would go further than that. I believe that the agreement over the Sudan was worse than crime: it was a blunder. There was a chance of giving genuine independence to the Sudan and at the same time of securing such military installations as we needed in that country, and of discharging our trust to the more backward peoples of the Southern Sudan. That opportunity was tragically lost, and there followed the whole miserable tale of elections in which bribery, corruption and pressure played a very full part.
Had we left the Sudan but kept control of the Suez Canal, our action would have been immoral but it would at least have been rational. Had we reached military agreements with Israel, as the Leader of the Opposition suggested, and at the same time kept our installations in Sudan, we


might with some equanimity have left the Suez Canal. In the result, we have left all three. There is now a withdrawal of British power from this central position in the Middle East to the perimeter. Of course, we all realise that the Government had no easy or clear-cut choice in this matter. The position they inherited was difficult and our resources were strained to the utmost. In circumstances of that kind withdrawals are sometimes necessary, but they are justified only when they are withdrawals to prepared positions.
We have introduced the word "redeployment" into this debate. I wonder if my right hon. Friend will tell us more precisely what is intended by "redeployment." How secure are our title deeds to the air bases in Iraq at Habanyah and Shaibah? How many troops are we allowed to keep in Jordan? Is it true that pressure is being exercised on the Jordan Government to dismiss British officers in the Arab Legion? How secure is our position in Libya? We are told that the Egyptians are already organizing raiders into French Tunisia. Is that happening under our eyes? Could they be turned against our men?
I cannot help feeling that the decision was taken to quit the Suez Canal before we had decided where to go, and that ever since we have been looking round but no very clear plan has emerged. I would echo here what was said on this point by my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse), when he asked what the plan was for some military bases south of Egypt.
It is all very well to talk of treaty rights in Libya; we have treaty rights in Egypt. It is all very well to talk of sovereignty over Cyprus; I believe that the moral position is much weaker in Cyprus than in Egypt. In Egypt we could rest our case on the very strong ground that we were there because the security of the Canal and of the base were of vital importance to many millions of people in other countries outside Egypt, and that we had the right to put their safety in front of the technical claims of Egyptian sovereignty.

Mr. John Baird: Does the hon. Gentleman say that we had the right?

Mr. Amery: Yes, we had the right. The hon. Gentleman queries the word "we," but it was we who undertook the responsibility when we went to the Middle East 72 years ago. It was we who built up this system of Arab countries which we liberated from the Ottoman Empire. You cannot create a structure in life and then renounce all responsibility for it just because it is unpopular or inexpedient to do otherwise.

Mr. Crossman: The hon. Gentleman says that we created and liberated the Arab world. Surely we do not liberate and then try to rule?

Mr. Amery: There is no question of our trying to rule Egypt. We were not keeping the Army in the Suez Canal Zone to rule Egypt, but were merely putting the interests of other nations before the technical sovereignty of the Egyptian State.

Mr. Baird: What is "technical sovereignty"?

Mr. Amery: The grounds which I have stated were something which our public opinion and our soldiers understood and for which they have shown themselves prepared to make considerable sacrifice. Shall we be able to work up the same will to resist about the other places to which we are proposing to redeploy our forces?
Now let me say a word or two about the effect of this decision on Africa. There is a tendency, fostered I think by some of our Middle Eastern advisers, to forget Egypt's African rôle. One effect will be that the pro-Egyptian party in Khartoum will be immeasurably strengthened by the Heads of Agreement announced in the House yesterday. Unless Her Majesty's Government are prepared to exert pressure to see that Sudan's independence is respected, the victory of the pro-Egypt party there will be almost complete.
But the Nile does not rise in the Sudan. It rises in Uganda. In the lifetime of the Prime Minister most of Uganda was under Egyptian rule. I have very little doubt that the crisis about the Kabaka which arose some months ago was not uninfluenced by the changes in the Sudan. Remember, too, that there are close links between Northern Nigeria and Khartoum. If Egyptian influence is to predominate


in Khartoum it will extend to Nigeria. Nor can we close our eyes to the repercussions of this decision on our French allies in North Africa. Whatever view we may take of French policy in Tunisia, Algeria or Morocco, it cannot be in the interests of Anglo-French relationships or of the security of the free world that the whole of North Africa should become, as it may well become, an area of insurrection.
There are wider implications even than these. To me it is rather shocking—I use the word seriously and frankly—that Ministers have not been able to say that they could claim the full agreement of the Commonwealth in this matter. I gather that there is pretty serious doubt about the decision in Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. [An HON. MEMBER: "What about India?"] The rulers in India and Pakistan are not in any doubt about what the decision means, and I fear it will diminish their interest in the Commonwealth.
My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said yesterday in answer to a Question that no one could speak for the Commonwealth as a whole. I do not disagree with that sentiment, but was this not an issue which justified, perhaps, an emergency conference among the countries of the Commonwealth? We are about to lose control of the communications which link the western half of the Commonwealth with the eastern half. Who will fill the vacuum which we leave? Probably, in the immediate future, it will be filled by the United States, and it is better that they should go there than that there should be anarchy and chaos. But is it a good thing to increase the dependence of the Commonwealth on the United States more than it is at present?
I could have understood it if these Heads of Agreement had been brought before the House by the party opposite. I should have disagreed with what they said, but such a course would at least be consistent with their opposition to an empire of direct authority. I can imagine what I should have said about it, and I believe I know what all on this side of the House would have said about it.
I am frankly rather perplexed by the decision that the Government have taken. Why have we done this? My right hon.

Friend the Secretary of State for War told us about the grave possibility of the use of the hydrogen bomb. If it is so grave that it makes the whole Suez Canal Zone of no further military use, and the effort of maintaining the base no longer worth while, then what is the outlook for Portsmouth, Chatham and London?
I do not know whether the premium on dispersal is high or not. I think that my hon. Friend said that it was. I do not know whether there is anything to be said for the case which I have heard put forward that concentration at least allows more radar and fighter protection, and makes it harder for aircraft to get through. But, surely, what we have to bear in mind here is not just the hypothesis of hydrogen war, but the reality of the cold war, the possibility of local war and the hope of peace. In all these things, the Suez Canal Zone and our presence there could be of the greatest value. I cannot help feeling that this mention of the hydrogen bomb was introduced as a political camouflage to make easier the Government's recent change of mind.
I will try to reply to the argument advanced by my right hon. Friend about manpower in the base. He said that we have a choice. We can either have 80,000 men there or—and his words struck me as rather surprising we can have 10,000, 15,000 or 20,000. He then said that if we had 10,000, 15,000 or 20,000 men we could hold the base area around an airfield and a port, but not the communications in between. But what is the figure to hold the communications too? Is it 25,000 or 30,000? There are 80,000 men in the Zone today because of the size of the installations that have to be maintained and guarded. But if the base were contracted and if the hydrogen bomb makes it unnecessary for us to have such a big base, then, surely, a smaller force, a division or a division and a brigade would be sufficient. We should then still be able to bring a division back, not as was suggested by an hon. Member opposite in order to reduce the period of National Service, but so as to have a strategic reserve.
I think that another consideration weighing with the Government has been world opinion, and here, I think, we have been guilty of a good many blunders in the field of diplomacy. There was the


possibility of mobilising a good deal of Commonwealth opinion on our side. France, too, with its North African and Canal interests, would have come on our side, as would Turkey and Israel. But no effort was made to mobilise the influence of these friendly countries.
Then there was the problem of American pressure against us. Was any effort made to see whether we could strike a bargain with the Americans under which they would agree to support our interests in the Middle East if we, in turn, helped them more in some other part of the world?
Finally, I want to say a word about Egyptian opinion. My right hon. Friend said that it is no use having a base in a hostile country. But Egypt has not become as hostile as it is simply because it does not like the presence of British troops. Terrorism has been encouraged by the fact that we have yielded to it, and because we allowed Sabis, Lawrence's soldier, to be put to death by the Egyptians because he worked for us. There are now very few moderates in Egypt. There would have been many more had we pursued a different course in the past.
It is only fair to say that these mistakes coincided with the illness of the Prime Minister and of the Foreign Secretary a year ago. I doubt whether even now, the burden of administration is sufficiently adjusted to make the preparation of long-term policy easy enough. Fearful mistakes have been made, but it is not because of such mistakes that we are leaving Egypt. We are leaving because we are undergoing a certain moral collapse. The responsibility may rest nominally on the Ministers concerned but it goes far deeper.
All too often in this House, in the Civil Service and in the country at large we have lost sight of the pursuit of British interests and of the defence of Britain's honour. Even now, our vision is obscured by alien values. We have tended to put the United Nations and the Atlantic Community before our first duty, which is to guard the honour of this country and of the Commonwealth.
All this is natural enough. Material weakness has made heavy inroads on our influence, and only a supreme effort of will can keep us as an independent force in the world. We have not made that

effort of will in Egypt. We have taken a step which it will be very hard, if ever possible, to repair, because mistakes of foreign policy, unlike mistakes of domestic policy, are not so easy to retrieve.
It is easy to say hard things about the policy of others, and I may have done that tonight, but it is not easy to vote against men for whose persons and policies I have so much respect as I have for the leaders of my party. But I shall do so tonight because I can do no; and because what is happening is to my mind the repudiation of a fundamental principle of the party to which I belong. Loyalty must be a two-way traffic.
I know that our vote tonight is unlikely to effect any change of policy, but I do not think that our action, either before or during this debate, will be in vain. I fear—I hope I may be wrong—that the consequences of this Agreement will not be long in showing themselves. Then, perhaps, those who now oppose or deride our efforts may think again and may realise that this is not a fight in the last ditch, but perhaps the beginning of a return to that faith in Britain's imperial mission and destiny without which, in my belief, our people will never be prosperous, or safe or free.

7.59 p.m.

Mr. J. Grimond: The hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery) has made a most courageous speech, from his point of view. He has ranged from the Atlantic to Persia and from the Equator to the boundaries of Russia. But as I understand it, the proposal which he and his hon. Friends put forward is that this country should keep a division, or thereabouts on the Canal. Personally, I fail to see how the presence of a division, or of any force of comparable size, would solve the tensions which he regarded as being such a serious threat to the future of the Middle and Near East.
I agree with the hon. Gentleman that the whole area is highly dangerous. There are appalling dangers in North Africa, in the Arab States, and on the Arab border. But I fail to see that by keeping a division in a hostile Egypt we should be making any great contribution to the solution of these problems. He may say that prestige is at stake—keep our forces


in that area and it will maintain our influence in a way which is not possible once the troops are taken away—but will we really maintain our prestige by keeping this small number of troops there who will be immobile, who will be engaged largely in defending themselves against a hostile population, and who certainly will not be able to protect the Canal?
I suggest that always—and more especially today—the prestige of a country does not only depend upon the presence of armed force. Throughout the Middle East the British are respected for their fair dealing, and for the benefits which they have brought with them. I think that the House was much impressed by an earlier speech which drew attention to the good which we had already done in Egypt and to the greater good we are capable of doing. Although I do not in any way minimise our obligations to protect the area; nor do I for a moment say that it is not essential to keep forces where we wish to maintain our influence. But military forces are not enough today. To take one extreme example, there is the case of the Quakers, who gained for themselves immense prestige in very many countries simply because of their reputation and good works.
I agree with a great deal of what the hon. Member for Preston, North said about the order in which these negotiations have been carried out. I have always thought that before we left the Canal we should have come to a firm agreement with Iraq about our air bases there. In Jordan, too, which is about the only Arab country in the Middle East which is consistently friendly to us, we should have been quite certain that we should be able to maintain our troops and our Air Force.
Perhaps we can, but I entirely agree with the hon. Member that we need more reassurance from the Government as to what is to be done to introduce a general defence plan throughout the area. I suggest that even if we have not done that—and we ought to have done it—we do not rectify that error by maintaining our base in the Canal Zone. On an earlier occasion the Prime Minister said that one did not cure a mistake such as putting a left boot on your right foot

by putting your left foot into a right boot.
It is, I think, essential to remember—and the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse) and the hon. Member for Preston, North should face it—that the purpose of the base is to maintain an Army somewhere towards the Russian frontier. It is generally agreed by everybody that it is now no longer suitable for that purpose. We have to keep too many troops there. The atomic and hydrogen bombs have altered its value, we have no means of protecting it from the air even without those bombs; and it is at least far enough away.
Now the argument is changing to one of keeping the base for prestige reasons and for the protection of the Canal. Prestige does not depend on keeping troops there. It depends on pursuing, throughout the Middle East, a consistent policy, I thought that the announcement about Cyprus made in the House yesterday was most foolish and flatfooted. I do not think that can help our prestige anywhere in the Middle East. But if we can really build up the friendship of the Arab States and assure our position in Jordan and Iraq this agreement may well lead to a much better feeling towards us throughout the whole area.
We have also an obligation under the tripartite guarantee. I feel very far from happy about that. I do not see how, in fact, we are to discharge our obligations if there is war between Israel and the Arab States. I do not see what we would do if Egypt attacked Israel, or, for that matter, if Israel suddenly flowed down into the Jordan valley. I cannot believe that this country would be in other than a most unenviable position. That, too, should have been dealt with and cleared up before, and not after, we came to an agreement with Egypt.
Most hon. Members must have been greatly surprised by how little was said by the Secretary of State for War about the Canal itself. Can we be assured that the Commonwealth countries were really consulted over this? Can we be assured that the Commonwealth will be there when the treaty is made and signed? I ask because there is no doubt that Australia and New Zealand feel very strongly about that part of the world, whether or not it is defensible in time of


war. Without, at the moment, worrying about war they are deeply concerned about free navigation in time of peace.
Are the Government taking any steps to see that that will be guaranteed? I do not think that a division there would guarantee that but what alternative steps are the Government taking in that regard? What will happen when the Canal Company's concession comes to an end? Have the Government any proposals for putting the Canal under international control or putting in an international force to protect it, if we are not there ourselves?
Like the hon. Member for Preston, North, I was astonished at the introduction of the hydrogen bomb into this debate. If we are to maintain a civil defence organisation for Coventry in the face of the City Council there I cannot believe that the bomb makes it absolutely impossible for us to maintain a base anywhere in the Middle East. I do not think that that argument is tenable. Furthermore, surely what we are faced with very often is not a world war or a hydrogen bomb war, but local aggression at secondhand such as we have seen in Indo-China and Korea—such as we may see in the Middle East. It is against that sort of attack that we have to provide defences just as much as for a full-scale world war with hydrogen bombs.
What is to happen if there is that sort of attack in the Middle or Far East and the Egyptians for reasons which may seem to us very shortsighted—and the Egyptians are not always moved by the most logical calculations—should decide to interfere with our shipping in the Canal? How are we to retrieve such a position? It is all very well to say—and quite true to say—that it is very much against the interests of Egypt to close the Canal. She draws enormous revenue from it and she is bound by treaty obligations.
It is quite true that Italian ships went through in the Abyssinian war, and Russian vessels during the Russo-Japanese war, but we cannot absolutely rely upon the Egyptians being moved by enlightened self-interest. After all, she is losing revenue now by denying passage to oil tankers for Haifa. I do not think that even if we get a guarantee that in that sort of situation it will be worth very much, but we have to make up our minds that

the problems will arise and be ready to take appropriate action.
The whole value of the treaty depends upon placing a lot of trust in the Egyptian Government. I hope and think that that trust may be justified, but I am well aware that it might not be justified, and we might be deluding ourselves to take such an optimistic view as has been taken by the Secretary of State for War. I think that the real outcome of the Agreement, in the long run, will be that the base, in its present form, will be written off. I think that this Agreement is the least harmful way out of the situation, but we must face the dangers, and the sooner we negotiate a new agreement about the Canal the better. This is the end of one period and the beginning of another. It is the least bad way facing the country, but I do not think that we should delude ourselves that it is a very good way.
I can only hope that it is the beginning of an effort by the Foreign Office and the War Office to build up a defence system in the Middle East in which the Commonwealth will play its part in peace and in war. I hope that, as in the past, we shall make every effort to increase our trade and economic interests throughout the area—and not least in Egypt. We have to go further than before. It is on the friendliness of the Egyptian and Arab peoples that we must now depend to safeguard our interests in one of the most important areas in the world.

8.10 p.m.

Brigadier O. L. Prior-Palmer: It is never a very easy task either to oppose the policy of one's own Government or to argue against hon. Members on one's own side. I am perfectly certain that we all feel that, whatever my hon. Friends have said, they have said it from the deepest possible sincerity and belief. There are others on this side of the House who believe that their emotions have dominated their practical common sense in these matters; and that is the reason why there are others who agree wholeheartedly with what the Government have done on this occasion.
I want to refer for a moment to the speech by the Leader of the Opposition. He chided us and almost sneered at what had been said by the Conservative Party, then in opposition, when he was in power. He said that it had always


been the policy of his Government to evacuate the Canal Zone, and he said that we should have done it two years ago when we first came into power. May I ask him one question? If he was so convinced that that was the right policy, why did he not carry it out when he had an enormous majority in the House for nearly six years?
My right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse) did neither himself nor my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War justice when he suggested that my right hon. Friend had been told to get out there and sign anything. I am convinced that no Foreign Secretary of this country worthy of the name could have said such a thing, or have intended to suggest such a thing; nor would such a Secretary of State as my right hon. Friend have accepted such a commission. I do not take that statement by my right hon. and gallant Friend very seriously.
I quarrel with him, however, over the subject of nationalism in the world today. I agree with him that it is a danger, but I am convinced that we cannot subdue it by force. It is something which has come to stay. It is a new force in the world. We may say that it is equally as dangerous as Communism, but there is one way in which we cannot deal with it—and that is by an attempt to subdue or frustrate it.
My right hon. and gallant Friend spoke of the morale of the troops and asked whether it would be raised or lowered by this Agreement. I can tell him that there is nothing as devastating to the morale of troops as to know that they are on guard one night out of two or out of three—when in peace-time it is normally one night out of five—and to no purpose whatever. They are on guard, and yet the base is being pilfered and robbed every night; and although there are police dogs in use, the Brigade of Guards, the finest troops in the world, cannot stop it from happening. That is devastating to the morale of any soldier.
My right hon. and gallant Friend also spoke of Communism in Egypt and suggested that to keep 80,000 troops on the Canal would be a deterrent to Communism in Egypt. I cannot see how. Indeed, I suggest that precisely the opposite is the case.

Captain Waterhouse: I said nothing of the sort. What I asked was what we should do if Egypt went Communist.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: I apologise to my right hon. and gallant Friend; I misunderstood him and therefore will not pursue the point.
The last point which I want to put to him applies also to my hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery), who has just made what was, in my view, one of the most brilliant speeches he has made in the House. Neither my right hon. and gallant Friend nor my hon. Friend has given us the alternative. They have had the question put to them fairly and squarely by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, but they offer no practical alternative. My hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North suggested that the base should be reduced and that one division would therefore be able to look after it, thus releasing another division to return home to form our mobile reserve. That is a very facile argument; but it is not the point.
The point is this: if we are to retain a base, however small, and are to depend on civilian labour for the operation of that base; and if we are to maintain it in a country where sabotage has been kept down to its present level only because there were hopes of a solution; then if those hopes of a solution went overboard, we must recognise what the consequences would be. German saboteurs have been training the Egyptians Sabotage would have broken out on the widest possible scale and the consequent loss of life would have been immeasurable. That is the point; let us keep troops there by all means if there is willing agreement, but it is impossible to do so in present conditions with a country so determined that the troops shall not remain there as the Egyptians have shown themselves to be.
We have debated this subject often, and it is therefore difficult not to repeat oneself, but in my view the strategic argument here is quite overwhelming. I want to emphasise only one point in my right hon. Friend's speech: when Lord Alexander's campaign was being waged along the North coast of Africa and when it outran its communications from this base by 300 miles, there had to be a pause while he built up forward bases before


he could advance. This base is 900 miles from the nearest possible killing ground in the event of a hot war and a campaign through the Caucasus between the Black Sea and the Canal. Strategically, therefore, it is quite useless for supporting the South-East flank of the Turkish Army, and the Turks have been very disturbed about that South-East flank since they came into N.A.T.O. and have been wondering what would be done to help them to defend it.
The bases, clearly, should be Alexandria, Basra in the Persian Gulf, or, as suggested by the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), with the agreement of Israel—if that is possible—Haifa. That is the conception of a redeployment which, I believe, is complete and absolute commonsense for the hot war.
This is not only a question of a hot war, however, but of what we are to do in the situation of the cold war. This is a question of whether we are doing the right thing in that situation. In my opinion, those political considerations are just as weighty as the strategic considerations which, in my view, are overwhelmingly in favour of evacuation. Had we decided to keep those troops in the base against an unwilling nation, what would have been the position when the Treaty came to an end in 1956? Should we not be in a sorry position if Egypt took us to U.N.O. and if we were branded by U.N.O. as an aggressor with no right at all to be in the Canal Zone? Carried one stage further, if we insisted on remaining there, would not U.N.O. have a perfect right under the Charter to send in a combined force to turn us out, as they did in Korea?

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Does not my hon. and gallant Friend conceive it possible that for once we should use the veto in our own interests?

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: I do not think I need answer that.
Another political aspect to consider is that there is always the Wafd in the background. The present régime in Cairo exists and has existed because it supports and has supported a policy of the evacuation of the Suez Canal. I do not think Nasser's head would have been worth five minutes if we had remained there very much longer, and then we should have had to deal with a Government like the Wafd Government or a similar Govern-

ment. I have met Neguib, but I have not met Colonel Nasser; at one time I knew Neguib quite well. Fundamentally those two men like us. I am pretty certain of that, and I believe that they know perfectly well that it is in their own interests to see that there are friendly relations between the two countries. In their view, rightly or wrongly, such friendly relations could not exist as long as we remained in the Canal Zone.
Hon. Members have asked what the effect of the Agreement will be on Pakistan. I have not been able to obtain the quotation, but I have been informed that according to the Press yesterday some voice of Pakistan has suggested that this course which we are pursuing will do more to consolidate Moslem opinion in the Middle East in favour of Great Britain than anything we have done for many years. I am hopeful that that will be so. I have spoken to people from Jordon, Iraq, Syria and other countries in the Middle East, and I know that that is their view.

Mr. Patrick Maitland: With regard to alliances with the Arabs, the hon. and gallant Member has suggested that somehow or other we might also contrive an arrangement with Israel—this at the same time as we improve our relations with the Arabs. How can we expect to get an alliance with Israel and still keep Arab friendship? That is a point I find difficult to understand. Perhaps the hon. and gallant Gentleman would explain what he has in mind for our deployment in the Middle East?

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: I think it was the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) who suggested that. I have not yet used the word "Israel" in my speech, although I may do so in a minute or two. That brings me to the Treaty with Iraq, about which I wanted to ask my right hon. Friend. Would it not be a sound idea to negotiate a fresh treaty with that country before the present one expires? Is there not the danger that if we do not do that a similar thing will happen in Iraq?
My solution to such a problem is this: that bases in other countries can only be maintained in a similar fashion to that which obtains here at the moment, where there are American bombers based by complete agreement with us. I do not


believe that ever in the future can a base be maintained in any land whose people do not wish to have it. Therefore, I suggest to my right hon. Friend that he should consider the possibilities of negotiating treaties with Iraq, Jordan, and, if necessary, with Israel, on the basis that the Israelis might welcome such bases, particularly at Haifa, on a similar kind of understanding. That is the right deployment for us to follow in the Middle East.
Before I sit down, I want to say one word about this nationalism. In the Middle East and in Asia it is a new force which is raising its head, although it is one which is as old in history.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: As old as Moses.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: Just like some hon. Members.
It is a force which has to be recognised. It is no use thinking it does not exist, or that it is only a flash in the pan. It is a searing, tearing force in many of these small States, and it has to be treated as such and, if possible, guided into right channels. We have to recognise it and sympathise with it.
The danger of this nationalism is that the moment small States achieve their independence they are in danger of losing the day they achieve it, because they immediately become a prey to larger nations such as the Soviet Union unless there is somebody near to give them a helping hand. It is vitally important for us in the Middle East, and elsewhere, through our diplomatic channels to impress this fact on these people, because one must realise that they are prone to think only of their own problems in their own area, being completely unaware of the dangers outside and in the distance. These facts must be brought home to them, and they should be made to realise that they risk losing the freedom for which they have fought so long unless they follow a proper course.
This old conception of Empire dies hard with us. People seem to forget that we have had three Empires, each one different from its predecessor. It is my firm opinion that we are on the threshold of the fifth British Empire and Commonwealth. Tremendous opportunities open before us if we handle these matters properly, but it will not be done on the old basis and on the old conceptions. We

have the greatest constitution in the world, and it has been copied by many small and large nations. If these people are built up and brought to self-government in the proper time, they will comprise a part of a new Commonwealth far greater and more glorious than anything which has existed in the history of the world.

8.25 p.m.

Mr. M. Philips Price: This is one of the occasions when this House can be regarded as the sounding board of public opinion in the country, and as the debate has shown, opinion is not entirely on party lines. There are divisions on the Government side of the House and there are various shades of opinion on this. All the views that have been expressed are very sincerely held, and party shackles are somewhat less strong because we all feel that the issue at stake is very vital nationally and internationally.
The Government have performed an act of wisdom in what they have done. It must be painful to some hon. Members opposite to have to eat their own words. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition has already quoted some of the things that were said by the Prime Minister on the occasion when the last Government were faced with a similar problem. On the other hand, there are some hon. Members opposite who take a reasonable and realistic view on this matter. It is a good thing that at least some of the Conservative Party show themselves ready to reconsider problems as they arise. This country has been saved from much internal trouble in the past because of the fact that the Right has always been ready to think out problems again.
We are faced with that situation today. I did not hear all the spech of the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse), but I heard most of the speech of the hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery), and both showed that neither realises the new world into which we are moving. However, the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) certainly does so, and is to be congratulated on the clear view he takes of public opinion in these Middle Eastern countries.
There are not two groups in the world today—the group behind the Iron Curtain and the Western world—but three; those two, and the nationalist world of the Middle East and Southern Asia, which is rising because those who have been dominated by the Western nations for many generations have acquired freedom and a nationalist feeling. That feeling ran through Eastern and South-Eastern Europe during the greater part of the last century, but only now has it reached the Middle East and Southern Asia. That is the problem we are facing today.
There is an old Turkish saying to the effect that for the weak there are no friends. It is very true, and we must be strong and not ignore prestige. But we must also be wise, and this Agreement is an act of great wisdom which is more likely to safeguard the interests of peace in the Middle East than any other conceivable alternative. It is not a bad thing that it has taken some time to negotiate this Agreement. The Leader of the Opposition twitted the Government on having delayed so long, but I believe that the delay has made it possible to get the Egyptians to agree to something of vital Importance.
The Egyptians I have met were not inclined to agree two years age, or even a year ago, to the reactivisation of the Canal Zone if Turkey is attacked—but only if the Arab League is attacked. Last year I was in Turkey and spoke to many statesmen and editors there. They were extremely worried about the situation because they felt that they might be left out on a limb and let down. I believe the Egyptians have only recently come round to this point of view, and therefore the delay has been of value and I am glad that the Government have succeeded in getting the agreement.
Turkey is the key point for the defence of the Middle East. In this age of atomic warfare it is unwise to concentrate large supplies and forces in one place. Another point to remember is that in the last war the enemy came across North Africa from the West, when the Suez Canal base was a good deal nearer the area of danger than it would be if the enemy came from the North, across the highlands of Kurdistan to the plains of Mesopotamia or into the plateau of Eastern Anatolia. So there is a great deal to be said for

having our defence bases farther north and far more dispersed, and while it is a good thing that the Government have succeeded in getting agreement to the reactivisation of the Canal Zone, it should be by no means the only base used for the defence of the Middle East.
Of course there is Cyprus, about which we have had some discussion in the last 24 hours. Whatever is the political future of that island, it certainly ought to be a defence base; whether for our Forces alone or N.A.T.O. forces is a matter for the future to decide. In Turkey, however, bases are already being developed. Last year I made a point of visiting the port of Iskanderun in South-East Turkey, which is already becoming an important base for supplies, I also visited a naval station which is being developed by N.A.T.O. Turkey, with that wisdom which goes with long experience of government, realises that she cannot defend herself alone. She has never been able to defend herself alone against Russia but has always needed assistance throughout the course of her history, and more so during the last 50 years, from other Powers against the overwhelming power in the North.
Turkey knows more about Russia and the Russian danger than any country of either Europe or Asia. Therefore she has realised that she must pool her defence resources with the Powers of the West, and there is no difficulty about having defence forces on her territory. She is making no difficulty about N.A.T.O. bases, either inland as airfields or on the coast as naval stations.
Turkey prefers to be a junior partner in a sound Western alliance than a senior partner in a weak league of Middle Eastern States. There is, however, one weakness in this Agreement which might lead to trouble. The "Manchester Guardian" referred to it in a leading article yesterday. There is no provision for Persia. Can the Canal Zone be reactivated in the event of trouble there? Apparently the Egyptians have held out against it and we have not pressed it any further.
I know the position of Persia only too well. The Persians are always people who sit on the fence, and they will probably try to do that as long as possible. I can well understand it. They are perhaps


too near the source of danger and, unlike the Turks, they have not a strong military tradition as far as the central Government is concerned. Indeed, they have the very opposite.
On the other hand, suppose Persia were attacked by Russia and the Russian force was coming down through North-West Persia towards Iraq and the Persian Gulf. The only way to defend Persia would be for a Turkish military force, backed by Western air forces, to intervene on the right flank of the Russian force. Would that be possible? Would it be still possible to reactivate the Canal Zone in a situation of that kind? It appears not. We should bear in mind that a situation of that kind might arise and we should try to see if later it is possible to get the Egyptians to agree to something of this kind.
There is another point of importance. I do not want to consider only military matters. I entirely agree with the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing that one has to consider questions of morale and prestige and matters which are not entirely material or strategic. I feel that this Agreement will result in the Egyptian ascendancy over the Arab League going. Up to now, Egypt has acquired an ascendancy over the Arab States because they all felt that they had to support Egypt against us on the question of the Suez Canal. Once this is out of the way I believe that Egypt will lose that dominant position which she has had up to now and that Iraq who, along with Jordan, is potentially the most friendly of the Arab States, will be much more ready to take part in a defence system for the Middle East.
Until this Agreement was reached, the most important event of the last year in the Middle East has been the signing of the Turkey-Pakistan Pact of Friendship and Co-operation which may lead to something further. The question of Iraq joining it might be raised. I do not think that Iraq would have considered that until the Canal question was out of the way. Now that it is out of the way there is a very good chance that that will happen. I do think also it is desirable, as the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) said, to consider our future relations with Iraq and to come to new treaty relations with her,

particularly concerning the air bases we have in that country. I know the internal situation in Iraq is a little uncertain at present, but we must hope that in the course of the next few weeks—or at any rate the next few months—the situation will clarify itself and become sounder.
I know that some of my hon. Friends are concerned about what will happen to Israel when we leave the Canal Zone. I can only agree with the Foreign Secretary who said yesterday that the best defence of Israel will be friendship between Egypt and the Western Powers, particularly ourselves. I believe now that this problem is out of the way and Egypt knows there is this tripartite agreement, by which she is bound to leave Israel alone, that is the best defence Israel can possibly have.
I think we all agree in this House that one of the problems is to try to bring about today in the Middle East an understanding between Israel and the Arab States, although many of us—including myself—have much regretted the way in which the State of Israel came into existence and thoroughly understand and sympathise with the feelings and bitterness of the Arab States in that connection. The Foreign Secretary has done a great work in getting this Agreement for which all who want to see peace in the Middle East will thank him. It is for that reason that I hope the House tonight gives this Agreement its full support.

8.42 p.m.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: The hon. Member for Gloucestershire, West (Mr. Philips Price) has been talking about Turkey. He knows a great many things about Turkey. I also hope, after a visit there this summer, to know a few things about it. At present I only know one—that they do not want us to get out of Egypt.
The Secretary of State for War asked those of us who disagree with the policy of Her Majesty's Government to consider well whether we should not be silent in future once this Agreement has been arrived at. Of course, that is a demand which always has some force. When one is preparing opposition to a measure there is always some limit beyond which one cannot go if that opposition is not successful. On this issue of Egypt, although it may be not on the wider themes of foreign policy behind Egypt, my opposition


extends to the Division Lobby tonight and not beyond it.
I have no intention of going down to my constituency during the Recess, perhaps finding some troops who have been flown back from the Middle East as a result of this Agreement, and telling them that they must go back to where they were before. I have no intention of going to Egypt—as I hope to go later in the Recess—and machinating against Her Majesty's Government, or the Government of Egypt, as a result of this Agreement. Once it has been done it has been done. Faithless and unwise though it is to have done it, we shall have to see what we can do to make something workable, understandable, real, politic and useful out of it for the cause of British policy afterwards.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War said that the only solution he knew about which had come from this quarter of the House was one which was not tenable. He was referring to the solution which my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse) and my hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery) have adumbrated in previous debates of maintaining a force of, as my right hon. and gallant Friend described it, a division or two brigade groups or, as the Secretary of State for War described it today, a force of 15,000, 20,000 or 25,000 men in the Canal Zone.
The Secretary of State said that that was impossible. It is only impossible on the basis of the existing situation without an agreement, just as the situation of the corps of civilian technicians left alone at the base would be impossible without an agreement, and may be is impossible now or will be impossible with an agreement; that is what we fear. But what my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and Her Majesty's Government have never understood about the solution to the situation which we on our side of the House offer is that it is a solution based upon agreement with Egypt—the retention of a force sufficient to give us a strategic reserve, sufficient to maintain the ports and the airfields, with the agreement of Egypt.
At no time have Her Majesty's Government gone to the Egyptian Government and said, "We want an agreement to maintain such a force," and it is no use

the Secretary of State for War talking in terms of strategy and in military terms, because the answer to our question is not to be found in military terms; it is entirely in political terms. That demand or request to Egypt has never been made, and it is because it has never been made that we are in the situation that we are in today.
I say only a few words in passing about the remarks of the Secretary of State for War about the need for a strategic reserve. I do not put myself forward as a judge of military matters by any means, but I should have thought that if we want a strategic reserve we want it in the area where it may have to be used. Is Aldershot such an area? We have had trouble in British Guiana. We had, I believe, to mobilise part of Her Majesty's personal guard to deal with a situation in Bermuda.
But it is not in the N.A.T.O. area, where Britain is the centre and fulcrum, that a central reserve is needed. From what we can see about foreign policy needs all over the world these needs show that the place for a strategic reserve is in that vital pivot of world power which we have always understood the Middle East to be and it will remain there so far as we can see.

Mr. Paget: rose—

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: I am sorry, but I wish to be brief.
I feel I must say something about the hydrogen bomb argument. I shall not repeat what has been said so very cogently by my right hon. and hon. Friends. Some very clear, definite and hard things have been said in the House today, and I think usefully said. For my part, I am in the most appalling mental dilemma about the outlook of the Prime Minister today upon this subject. The Prime Minister has been telling us, in a voice reverberating with emotion, for the last few weeks and months, about this terrible danger of the hydrogen bomb. I am sure that it is a terrible danger.
But it seems to me that there is an equally terrible dichotomy between the political and military extensions of the fears of the Prime Minister. In the debate on the Address last November, and in the recent debate on the hydrogen bomb, the Prime Minister was saying to


us that perhaps, by the creation of the hydrogen bomb, a tremendous era of peace to mankind would come, because no one would dare to use it. He talked of the consequences in prosperity and the rejuvenation of nations and of the building up of hopes.
All this has gone along with the sea-change in his thinking on foreign policy which began with that great watershed speech of 11th May, 1953; and after which we have had—not "appeasement." because that word has sinister connotations—

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Realism.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Realism, if the hon. Gentleman likes—pacification; the lowering of tension; ending in the accepted policy of co-existence with the Communist world which now rules the day.
But when it comes down to this debate on Egypt, we are told that the consequences of the hydrogen bomb are so appalling that we must move out of a vital base in the Canal Zone. What is the message to Russia, or to the Communist world, in that? The message must be, "The Western world is trying to make peace with you diplomatically in the high councils of the nations; but, on the other hand, they are making secret preparations behind the scenes to get out from vulnerable existing bases and move further forward against you." At the appropriate time I should like to have a full explanation of this dichotomy of thinking, because it puzzles me. It must present a two-faced attitude to the Communist world, who will not be slow to take it up, and I do not believe that it is giving to the people of this country the service which they should be given.
On other grounds, I fully accept the view of my right hon. and hon. Friends that the hydrogen bomb argument has been dragged in at the last minute in order to give speciosity, plausibility, to this new desire to clear out of the Middle East. [HON. MEMBERS: "Speciosity"?] "Speciousness," I think, is a better word, although I think that "speciosity" is to be found in the dictionary.
I have only one other thing to say, because I have no desire whatever to waste time repeating the most powerful arguments which have already been

advanced in this debate. I wish to refer to what my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leicester, South-East and my hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North stressed in sombre, but real notes towards the end of their speeches. This to me—as regards the heritage of the British Empire, the prestige of Britain and our influence throughout the world as a great Christian force for peace and good will—is a more lowering cloud even than the atomic cloud. It is not a subject one can enlarge upon so late in the evening; but it is represented to me by a coherent series of decisions made by the United Nations originated for their own purposes by the United States and originated, alas, even by ourselves.
Since the First World War, a great many people have ceased to think in national terms, in imperial terms, in British terms. They have transferred their thinking to a new concept of international government. They have erected this as a kind of godhead which is sent to judge us and to judge other nations as to how we should behave. What we in this country have failed to do is to realise that at all times we are part and parcel of that United Nations and that every decision made in it reflects our own will and should be made according to our own standing and our own beliefs.
If we accept the automatic godhead of the United Nations while other nations inside it, like the United States and Russia, do not accept it, then perforce we must see our world power and influence reduced. Experience since the war is that the United States of America have largely used the United Nations as an instrument of their policy. There it is, sitting firmly in New York where my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, wisely or unwisely, placed it at the end of the war. The Americans have not hesitated to use it for their own purpose.
Russia, by contrast, has used the veto. That is equally effective to maintain the interests of Russia. But if we neither use the veto in our own interests nor the machinery of the United Nations in our own interests, then we must inevitably sink as a world Power, so that our situation becomes worse than if we had pursued the ways of the old diplomacy.
We dared not take this issue of Egypt to the United Nations. My hon. and


gallant Friend the Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) said just now that we might take it to the United Nations and lose. I will not deal with the argument, but I cite it as an example. I echo the words of my hon. Friend who said that he believed that this country has to determine upon a new path of policy. We have to realise that we have reached the nadir of our imperial fortunes, of our power to influence events in a sense equal to the opportunites of our great Christian nation. We have to determine that. Let this be the very night when a new policy begins. From now on we must move forward into an era of greater opportunities and greater hopes.

8.59 p.m.

Mr. Frederick Lee: I should imagine that from now on we shall not hear from hon. Gentlemen opposite that anti-Americanism has emanated only from the Labour benches. I do not think that I have ever heard a more virulent anti-American attack than the one we have just heard from the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke).
It is most important that the attitude of the House towards this Agreement should be known in the Middle East. For my part, I detested the attitude of the present Government when, in opposition, they attempted to infer that we were indulging in a policy of scuttle. My right hon. Friends, who did more to ensure world peace and the avoidance of a third world war when they gave freedom to India, were actuated by the same type of policy when they tried to negotiate a settlement on the Suez question. Unfortunately, in those days we had even the present Foreign Secretary talking about gunboats being necessary in order to bring Egypt to her senses. We also had the Prime Minister talking about policies of scuttle.
Although I think it is right and proper that the Labour Party should support the efforts of the Government now to get a settlement in the Middle East, it is also right that we should try to show the peoples there that, anyway, we are supporting the present policy in a consistent line flowing from the attitude which we adopted when we were the Government; in other words, that we do not adopt one

attitude when we are the Government and another when we are the Opposition.
I wish—I agree with the noble Lord on this point—that the issue of the hydrogen bomb as a reason for leaving Suez had never been brought into the argument. It is important that we should seek to show that, although we recognise power arguments, we really are desirous of leaving peace and security in the Middle East and that this contribution of ours is designed to lead to that end and is not mere expediency and not merely a matter of being influenced by the new forces of atomic and hydrogen bombs.
We should seek to relate the position in Suez to what is happening not only in Egypt but throughout the African Continent. An hon. Member asked whether there could be a Communist revolution in Cairo. I do not know whether there could or not, but I do know that as long as there is a feeling throughout Africa that the white races are still niggardly in their approach to the problems of the coloured races, Communism can always triumph by its argument that the white peoples are still somewhat ashamed and defensive in their attitude to the new nationalism which is arising in various parts of the world.
I believe that the attitude of mind displayed by the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse), utterly sincerely held as I am sure it is—I pay him the compliment that I consider he made one of the most courageous speeches that I have ever heard in the House—is actuated by a desire to move backwards into the days of the British Raj in India, into an era in which he could feel that the coloured races could advance only through the charity of British Imperialism. I hope he will realise that if he and his hon. Friends are to continue to deploy such arguments we can never hope to influence the minds of men in China and other places, which may well determine the future peace of the world, because it can always be said by the Communists that we are merely retreating to a new position from which we shall attempt to re-assert our old supremacy over the so-called backward peoples.
It is important that the right message should go out from this House. It is important not only that an Agreement


like this should be signed but that it should be seen that we sign it in good faith in the knowledge that by accepting such an Agreement we are demonstrating that the West has a new conception in its dealings with the peoples of the Middle East and, indeed, of the Far East.
We were born in the days when Suez meant something in the history books that we read. It is not easy for us to feel that we are now no longer the great world power which we once were. There is nothing to be ashamed of in wanting to feel that we are citizens of a first-class nation. Indeed, if in the days which lie immediately ahead this nation, which is not now the great material, physical Power it once was, can play the part which it alone can play by reason of its diplomacy and its vast experience in dealing with other people, therein resides the main hope of avoiding a third world war.
It is a country which, I believe, no matter what we may say about Toryism or Socialism, has accepted what the Minister of Housing and Local Government once described as the middle way, a country which recognises, as the adolescents in neither Moscow nor Washington have accepted, the idea that by living together in amity and using the great wealth which our scientists have given to us we can avoid a third world war. If that message can not go out from this House of Commons, then I think this world is doomed. On this question of the Suez Canal, I believe we have reached a testing point.
I applaud the attitude of the Foreign Secretary. It cannot be easy for the right hon. Gentleman in the knowledge that his policy is not acceptable in some parts of his own party, but I applaud his determination to go ahead with it. I hope, however, that he will agree with me that it is not only the act of coming out of the Suez that matters, but that it is also necessary to show to the peoples of these areas that this is merely the crystallisation, as it were, of the new thinking of this country, showing that we in Britain realise the great rôle which we still have to play in the world, and that we are giving an earnest of our sincerity in our approach to world politics.
From now on, I believe that we are taking the moral leadership of the whole world, because we are trying to show that

the old smears that used to be made about "perfidious Albion" no longer apply, but that we believe that we have an even greater part to play in the future of the world than ever we have had in the past. Those who have talked of Britain as a decadent nation have gone; the Hitlers and those who sneered at us have gone. We now have an opportunity, and it may be the last, because we are all aware that if some madman once pulls the trigger in this atomic and hydrogen bomb age, then this island will be completely and utterly undefendable. It may well be that our best opportunity lies in this Agreement on Suez, because I think it can be shown that this party, at least, has accepted the fact that we are now living at the end of the colonial era, and entering an age in which the younger nations can see that it is no longer necessary for them to accept the yoke of supremacy from the white people; that, rather than attempting to retard them in their advance, we are doing everything possible to assist them in order that this nationalism of today may become the responsible internationalism of tomorrow.
I believe that it is for this House and for this great nation, which has done so much in the past to enlighten men's minds and improve their health and well-being, to take a lead which neither the United States nor any other nation has the power to take. I hope the House will try to show that this is not a niggardly retreat merely because it is inconvenient to stay in Suez, because of fear of the hydrogen bomb, but rather that we believe that the time has come when we accept the logic which is forced upon us by events in the second half of the 20th century. We should try to show that, without turning to the extremes of Communism or any other "isms," we have a rôle to play in the world towards the achievement of that peace which alone can come by understanding of the problems, and that that is the basic reason why we desire to renounce our own powers abroad, believing that the time has now come when the best interest of world peace may be served by a lead given in that direction.

9.10 p.m.

Mr. Fitzroy Maclean: I should like to say at once that I am not happy about the Agreement we are discussing. I have given my reasons, in a


number of speeches, for disliking the idea of a British withdrawal from Suez and I put my name last year to the Motion which stood in the name of my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse), with other of my hon. Friends. I am not happy about the political or the psychological implications of the Agreement and I should like to be reassured more than we have been about the Government's plan for redeployment after evacuation.
On the other hand, the Agreement is, or soon will be, an accomplished fact, and, speaking for myself, I do not feel able to disregard the assurances that we have been given by the Government, to the effect that during the last six months or year the strategic situation has changed, and that in the present circumstances the course which the Government are taking is the only possible course. The Government, we must remember, have the benefit of the expert advice of the Chiefs of Staff and of the Foreign Office. They have in their possession a mass of information which we, as back benchers and private Members, do not possess.
I, for my part, would not venture to lay claim to greater foresight, courage or strategical understanding than the Prime Minister or his colleagues in the Government and if, after all that they have said in the past on this subject, they are prepared, in the light of the changed circumstances, to accept the present Agreement, then, so am I. If I were not I should take the courageous course which has been followed by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the Isle of Ely (Major Legge-Bourke). I do not see that there is any course in between. That is why I shall vote, though reluctantly, for the Motion that stands in the name of the Prime Minister and his right hon. Friends.

9.13 p.m.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: I find myself in the embarrassing situation, at this time of the Session, of having to go into the Lobby in support of the Government. I looked hopefully at the Government benches when the Egyptian news came, as I thought there would be a rebellion on the Government side. In principle, I approve of rebellions in politics. I believe that I have been

associated with most of the rebellions in this House since 1945.

Mr. S. N. Evans: What about mine?

Mr. Hughes: I was strongly attracted by what was said by the hon. Gentleman, but that was an occasion on which I did not approve of his conduct. I have listened very carefully to this debate and I have come to the conclusion that I cannot offer my services either as organising secretary or as a Teller. In fact, I find myself wholeheartedly on the side of the Prime Minister in this debate. Although there have been strictures on the Prime Minister from the back benches opposite, I must say that I have never so thoroughly agreed with the right hon. Gentleman as I do on this occasion.
The noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke) criticised the Prime Minister on the ground that he had introduced the argument of the hydrogen bomb. I do not know whether that argument was introduced as an afterthought or not, but it is entirely relevant to this debate and to the question of strategy and politics today.
I entirely approve of a Government which says that we cannot continue to have this base in Suez because it is obsolete in the atomic age. That is what the Prime Minister said, and I believe that in stressing the danger of the atomic and hydrogen bomb at the present time—even though it may seem to be slightly inconsistent in this debate—the right hon. Gentleman is doing an essential national and international service. He has pointed out that this is something which dominates everything else.
If the Suez Canal base is untenable in the atomic age, the dilemma arises, where are we to go? The decision of the Government to go to Cyprus has resulted in a great deal of criticism from this side of the House. I entirely agree with the statement made by an hon. Member opposite in the previous debate that in the atomic age a hydrogen bomb might explode over Cyprus. In that case, the answer would be, "Well, that was Cyprus." But that applies equally to other bases.
I cannot agree with the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman). He is opposed to the base going to Cyprus, but he is in favour of it going to Haifa.


I do not believe that a base is likely to be acceptable to the people of Israel once they realise the implications of what it would mean, because the hon. Member for Coventry, East argued that the base was to be used against the Egyptians. If we put the base in Israel, that will be regarded by the military authorities as a potenial base in the strategy of war against Russia.
I believe that in the hydrogen bomb age any country which has bases which are liable to be regarded by the other side as offensive bases is in very serious danger indeed. We have now come to the conclusion that, whether we like it or not, from the point of view of realism, the Prime Minister has said the right thing, even though what he has said might be rather inconsistent with the polemics of this debate.
Though I may be embarrassing the Prime Minister and the Government, I must say that they are doing their duty towards the country and towards humanity by stressing the importance of the fact that the hydrogen bomb age has arrived, and that we must adapt our diplomacy, our strategy and our politics to this grim and terrible fact. Although I have been a frequent critic of the Government I believe that if they strive consistently and persistently for peace, whether in Egypt, in Indo-China or in Germany, they will represent the point of view of the ordinary people of this country.
I am glad to see that the Foreign Secretary is here. I was in Geneva during the first week of the recent conference there and met the Swiss photographer who took the first photograph of the assembled delegations. I asked what he thought were the prospects of the conference. He replied, "There are no prospects for such a conference where so many people so obviously hate each other." I am glad to see that that prophecy has not turned out to be corect, and to see the change which has come about in international tension.
By this further step of easing the tension in Egypt there is one fewer trouble spot. I believe that Her Majesty's Government, in their attitude towards Egypt and their decision to take a step—a reluctant step—away from the old policy of British imperialism and to face the fact that a new international policy needs

to be worked out in the atom age, are more in line with the feeling of the country than are those hon. Gentlemen on the other side, sincere though they may be, who oppose them on this issue; and on this occasion we can only go into the Division Lobby in support of the policy of the Government.

9.22 p.m.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Anthony Eden): We have had a remarkable debate in which hon. Members on all sides of the House have spoken with vigour and conviction and in which there has been at times deep feeling. I should like to say, for my part, that though some of my hon. and right hon. Friends have certainly been severe in their strictures of the Government, I have on that account no hard feelings, because I know that they have deep conviction. At the same time, I must also tell the House that a Government which has to face issues of this kind has to face them in the light of the realities and of the existing alternatives, and carefully though I have listened to this debate, I have not yet been able to find any practical alternative to the course which Her Majesty's advisers now submit to this House.
I am attempting to delay a little because I would like the Leader of the Opposition to be present. Perhaps feeling a little in holiday mood, he was extremely severe in his strictures on the Government. He was very severe in regard to our attitude in Opposition for those six years. According to him, our behaviour was in all respects unworthy. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] That is all right, but that does not excuse the Government of the day for what they did or did not do.
I see the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition is now in his place. He is so invariably courteous that I did not want to reply to his remarks until he was here. I was saying that he was severe to us in his strictures this afternoon, and particularly critical of our conduct in regard to these issues when we were in opposition. Though I think that probably he would admit—at any rate in a benign mood he would admit—that, generally speaking, in those years both at home and abroad we did try to support the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government of the time over


a pretty wide field of endeavour, still the issue which we would really have to debate would be, not whether the Opposition did well or badly, but whether the Government of the day did well or badly. Although the right hon. Gentleman told us all that he had wanted to do, with a great deal of which I cordially agree, the fact remains that during those six years it was not possible to do it and that he failed to get the kind of agreement which he says ought to have been reached.
The fact remains that by the end of his period of office he was driven largely to reinforce our troops in Egypt, with the result that we had 80,000 men there, and when the present Government took office, as I do not think he will deny, we were left with a situation in which the civilian labour force was rapidly being withdrawn, the Egyptians had denounced the treaty—perhaps encouraged by what had happened in Persia—and a state of general turmoil existed. Nor will the right hon. Gentleman deny that the Persian situation which we inherited was not precisely a happy one. While strictures may be passed by him on the Opposition's behaviour at that time, it seems to me that in all fairness he must admit that the heritage left to us was not entirely enviable.
If we can get agreement thus far, I must also remind him of some other things. He let slip one or two sneers, particularly at the expense of Wimpey's—nothing was being left in Egypt, he said, except Wimpey's. I must give credit where credit is due and I must confess that the idea of the civilianisation of the base—if that is the right word—was not mine; it came from the right hon. Gentleman's proposals of April, 1951.

Mr. Attlee: I was not complaining about that. What I was complaining about was that there is a complete lack of defence in the area. There is nothing whatever of what we were trying to do—to get some defence organisation; there is a complete vacuum.

Mr. Eden: I am coming to the question of the vacuum; I have thought of that one, too. At the moment I am dealing with the civilianisation of the base, and I think it is not unfair to say that the right hon. Gentleman sneered at

this a little and said that all that is left is Wimpey's. I am merely pointing out that the idea of Wimpey's is his. If hon. Members want me to read out the text, I am prepared to do so. I am quite ready to claim any ideas of which I have the originality, but I am also prepared to give the authorship to those to whom it belongs, and it is right in the circumstances to say that my attention was drawn to this passage from the proposals of April, 1951:
The progressive civilianisation of the base which it is suggested should be completed by 1956"—
almost exactly to the month the date when we will complete. The passage continued:
… essential British civilian personnel being introduced as military personnel are withdrawn.
I do not think it was very wise of the right hon. Gentleman to taunt us with having done what was in his proposals.
The right hon. Gentleman also spoke about the countries covered by the Treaty. The Bevin-Sidky agreement, with much of which I agree, contained one clause with which I do not personally agree which deals with the countries concerned. The countries concerned in the definition of that Treaty were those which were called "adjacent countries." With respect, I think that is a very bad definition to put in a Treaty. We want to know which are the adjacent countries to Egypt. I should have said, from my reading of the Bevin-Sidky proposals, that it is pretty clear that Turkey, for instance, would not have been covered by that agreement. I am not quarrelling with the right hon. Gentleman because the agreement was not reached but merely pointing the facts out to him, for he attacked us The present proposals, as far as that is concerned, are infinitely to be preferred to the Bevin-Sidky proposals. On that account, I do not think his attack was justified.
Let us consider this question of the vacuum. The right hon. Gentleman said that we were leaving a vacuum in the Middle East. I do not know whether he heard the speech of his hon. Friend the Member for Gloucestershire, West (Mr. Philips Price) which was an answer to that criticism better expressed than I could express it. The hon. Gentleman said he thought that the Leader of the


Opposition was mistaken in criticising us for delaying the agreement so long because it is only recently, he said, that the Egyptians have been willing to include Turkey in that agreement—and Turkey is the vital defence factor in this agreement.
The hon. Gentleman went on to say something else with which I agree. He said that Cyprus is not enough. Of course it is not enough. We are not proposing to create a new base in Cyprus. Nothing of the kind is proposed. The main base, as the base for war, will remain in Egypt.
I hope and believe that under this Agreement there will be other forward bases, and I agree with some of the ideas of the Leader of the Opposition about that. He is absolutely right, but he will not expect me to describe where those forward bases will be or what arrangements may be made for them. It is somewhat ludicrous to accuse us of scuttle when, by the arrangements we are trying to make, we shall get nearer to the possible enemy than we were before. It seems to me a misuse of terms. I am not attacking the right hon. Gentleman.
Then there was this reference to a vacuum. There is no vacuum because, as a result of these arrangements, we shall be able to redeploy our forces and make them mobile to an extent that they have not been hitherto. I should have thought that, instead of the right hon. Gentleman's criticism, he would have endorsed what we are doing, because he would have been right if he had said that there is a vacuum in our Middle East, arrangements which exist at this very hour. There most certainly is, because if 80,000 men are unable to do anything effective, then that is a vacuum. If we get this Agreement and we are able to bring about the redeployment I have mentioned, it will bring the vacuum to an end.
How, then, shall we redeploy our forces? As my right hon. Friend said, we will bring part of these forces home to form a strategic reserve. To base our forces here does not mean they are not in any sense available to the Middle East or to any other part of the world. We have to remember the increasing mobility of our forces by air and other means. We have to adapt our minds more and more

to the conception that countries, wherever they are, do not like to have foreign troops on their soil. Western countries tolerate it more easily than those where nationalism has been recently resurgent. No nation likes it, and more and more we shall have to base ourselves upon our own strategic reserve here and our ability to fly it to whatever quarter it is needed.
That is the conception behind this Agreement, especially when we add to it the treaty which we have made with Libya, for which the late Mr. Ernest Bevin worked very hard and for which I certainly have no desire to take the credit, but which we have signed and ratified. Under it our forces are in Libya and they can be increased. When we remember the possibilities of redeployment there and also the possibilities of increasing our forces in Jordan and elsewhere, and when we take into account our Air Force in Aden, we can see the pattern of redeployment which will add to our mobility, and, as I maintain, add enormously to our strength.
Now let me deal with some of the criticisms of this document. I would ask some of my hon. Friends to consider what would happen in 1956 if they were successful in their appeal tonight and if the House did not approve these decisions. In 1956 we could renew the treaty with Egypt as it is now, and if agreement was not reached then we would have to go to the League of Nations—I suppose it is the United Nations now—or to arbitration. Well, of course, we could wait until 1956 and base ourselves on those articles of the Treaty of 1936 which provide for a continuing alliance, but does anybody in this House really suppose that, if we waited until 1956, and went to arbitration then, we could hope to get the rights and facilities of the 1936 Treaty exactly as they had been in 1936, with the Egyptians strongly resisting them at every point? I think that some of my right hon. and hon. Friends are under a misconception in respect of the 1936 Treaty—which I well remember, for I signed it—and the conditions at that time.
The 1936 Treaty allowed us to station troops in Egypt in order to fulfil an Anglo-Egyptian alliance for the joint defence of the Canal. That was the purpose of that Treaty. We would have no chance whatever of going to international arbitration and saying, "Instead


of doing that, we are now going to maintain 80,000 troops in Egypt to prevent the Egyptians from doing whatever they want to do." The case would be utterly indefensible and my noble Friend would have to use the veto, not once but almost every day.
What would be the position if we did not reach an agreement? I do beg my right hon. and hon. Friends once again to face this, and I will face it as fairly as I can. First, no redeployment of any kind would be possible. The 80,000 troops would remain in Egypt and probably there would be a clamour for their reinforcement if conditions grew worse in the great cities. [An HON. MEMBER: "Nonsense."] Does my hon. Friend who says "nonsense" not remember that two years ago, when my right hon. Friend was on the high seas, I had the responsibility, when the riots threatened in Cairo and it seemed likely that our forces would have to march into Cairo to save the white population of that city? If my hon. Friends think that is a task which could be carried out by small forces, they are living in a world of illusion.
I think we are all agreed about this. Only one alternative has been given to us today, so far as I can understand, and that is that we should reduce the figure. My right hon. and gallant Friend said, I think, two brigades or something of that order; that is to say, something within the actual treaty limits of 1936. I am not clear at all about what the value of that arrangement could be. If it is intended that those two brigades are to defend a restricted base, such as we now contemplate creating, without the agreement of the Egyptian Government, then I must say frankly that two brigades would be completely useless and in a short time we would be back again to the 80,000 men.
If, on the other hand, they are not to guard the base but are to be there as a token force on the Canal, I would say that they are of no military or strategic value whatever and would simply be under the constant irritant of a continuing request that they should be reinforced.

Captain Waterhouse: I know that my right hon. Friend does not want to misrepresent me. I did not develop the whole subject today, but he will remember that when last I spoke I tried to make it clear that our view was that had there been a

different approach to Egypt from the start, had we not been talking about evacuation from the start, we would not have arrived at this decision, and that if now—even now—we let it be clearly understood that we meant business and meant to stay there, we could come to an agreement with this or some other Government in Egypt which would allow us to maintain our forces and maintain our position.

Mr. Eden: That simply means that we should be able to reach an agreement with Egypt on the basis of our keeping troops in Egypt. I can only say, in reply to my right hon. and gallant Friend, that for years past, long before this Government came into office, the persistent position of the Egyptian Government has been that they would not make such an agreement. My right hon. and gallant Friend might be able to do that. I can only say that I do not believe it to be possible or diplomatically within the range of possibility. I do not think we ought to pretend to ourselves that these things are realisable when we must know in our hearts that they are not.
What would happen in 1956 if we had no arrangement? We would have no place, no establishments, no workshops, no possibility of going in again, no right of re-entry whatever and no assurance of the upkeep of the base. We would have the absolute assurance of the worst possible relations with Egypt and with all the other Arab countries, leading to rising tension.
How far does this Agreement, with its admitted shortcomings, meet our needs? For the first time we shall have installations and facilities in Egypt by agreement, because we had no such rights under the 1936 Treaty. What we need now is a working base and not a beleaguered garrison. Our ability to return in the event of crisis is a strengthening element which will enable us to defend our position in the Middle East, and the air transit rights are of real value.
I should like to answer further questions that have been asked by our critics. With regard to the claims question, we need not wait for the Agreement. We are trying to get them settled now and have begun to discuss them already with the Egyptian Government. Certainly we have not lost interest in the Sudan. We have


said that the Sudan must decide its own future. Tonight I do not want to say harsh things—though I could do so—about the past in respect of agreements about the Sudan. I will only say that we in Britain are not opposed to friendship between Egypt and the Sudan. We want to have friendship ourselves both with Egypt and the Sudan, but we trust that all concerned will give to the Sudan a real opportunity to decide its own national life and future. All the reports we have had for the last few months show that there is an increasing determination in the Sudan to do just that. Beyond that, we have no claim which it would be within our rights to make.
My right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leicester, South-East asked about redeployment to the south. There are no plans at present in that direction but it could happen, and one example is that some of the redeployment will consist in strengthening our air forces in Aden. My right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery) asked about the position of Turkey. Any armed attack on Turkey would bring this Agreement into operation. The situation in which Turkey came to be attacked would not affect that right.
Now I come to a heavy burden of criticism and I think the strongest case that can be made against the Agreement. That is in respect of the navigation of the Canal, the freedom of the Canal. Strong views have been expressed in this debate about that. In listening to some of the debate, one would almost have had the impression that traffic on the Canal has largely been held up. Actually the volume of traffic on the Canal has never been greater than it is at present. What we are discussing is a particular aspect of that traffic, and that is the strategic goods for Israel going through the Canal. It is to traffic in that respect that Egypt and the Arab States have been opposed.
The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition tried rightly to have international action to resolve this problem. We tried also. When the right hon. Gentleman was Prime Minister a resolution was passed by the United Nations which Egypt did not observe. We attempted to have action taken at the United Nations and Soviet Russia vetoed it. Although it is very hard to say how

it can be best handled, in my view if this House wants to see an end to hostilities between Israel and the Arab States—and surely we must all want that—the only hope of doing so is that we should be able to create for ourselves better relations with both sides.
Everybody knows the history of our relations with the Arab States in recent years and that these have been largely bedevilled by the actions of Egypt, whose influence in this respect is very powerful. If we can improve our relations, it might be possible to do something to reduce in its turn tension between the Arab States and Israel and to try to obtain agreement and final peace. Truly, short of warlike action, I do not believe that it is possible to do anything effective in this particular situation unless we can reduce this tension between the Arab States and Israel.
That is the heart of this matter and every matter in the Middle East, of which the refugee problem is the most tragic of all. If I have any hope of this Agreement, it is that it will perhaps give us more opportunities to use our friendly influence to bring those together who should be on good terms instead of, as they are today, harshly staring at each other or sniping at each other across uncertain frontiers.
I have been asked about the position of the Commonwealth. I think my hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North said it was shocking to think that Ministers cannot say that they are in full agreement with the Commonwealth, although he rightly added that it was for the Commonwealth themselves to say that rather than for us. I have two messages here which might interest the House. Pakistan has been much mentioned in this debate and its attitude has been inquired about. I have had a telegram today from Sir Zafrulla Khan, known to this House as Foreign Minister of Pakistan, who, after beginning with some nice observations which I will not read, goes on to say about the Agreement:
I am sure this lays the foundation of firm friendship and beneficent co-operation between Egypt and its people and the other free democratic States in the service of all the peoples of these regions. The Agreement is a great achievement and an outstanding instance of the exercise of wise statesmanship and courageous handling of world issues on the part of Her Majesty's Government.


The Foreign Secretary of Australia, Mr. Casey, well known to us all, made a Press statement which has been published. I will not read the whole of it to the House, but I will read one paragraph:
The Australian Government have watched the course of these negotiations closely and, like Britain, we have been sympathetic with Egypt's request for full sovereignty over its territory. At the same time, however, we have realised the inescapable realities of the situation resulting from Egypt's geographical position and the military needs of the free world. It is satisfactory that these two conflicting interests have now at length been reconciled.
Those are two Commonwealth countries: it will be for the others to express themselves in due course if they wish.
I will conclude with some observations, not only on the Heads of Agreement, but on the policy we are seeking to pursue in the Middle East. I do not think the only purpose is to hold to a particular position that one may have to hold to at that moment regardless of surrounding circumstances. I and Her Majesty's Government are as anxious as anyone that our influence throughout the Middle East shall continue and be increased. I thought that what the hon. Member for Newton (Mr. Lee) said in his speech about the influence we have in the world today was a fair and true observation. It is ludicrous to pretend that, as a result of this Agreement, our influence is going to be undermined throughout the Middle East. I do not believe that for one moment, and I will tell hon. Members why.
The conditions as they exist now in all these countries, their sentiments, their national feelings, bear no parallel to those of even 15, let alone 20, years ago. Yet I believe that, on a basis of friendship, we have an opportunity, on an entirely new basis—a new conception—to influence them and work with them. That is just what we have been trying to do. Will the House look for a moment at that picture?
Let us start with Persia. We hope before very long to conclude an agreement with Persia which will result in oil flowing again to the markets of the world, bringing her back revenue and prosperity and raising the standard of life of her people. That is what we want to do, not for selfish reasons but for Persia's sake as much as ours. It is to our interest that she should be prosperous and free

where she lies in that part of the Middle East. So I hope that will be fostered. If so, it will be a bit of rebuilding—I am not criticising the past, but it can be compared with what we inherited.
It is the same with Saudi Arabia. We have just concluded an agreement to arbitrate our differences there. In Libya we have reached this agreement. With Jordan we have our treaty. With Israel we want and shall maintain the friendliest relations we can establish. There is no question of us forgetting our obligations. That is why yesterday we reaffirmed the obligations which we have under the 1950 agreement, by which we stand and by which our allies have recently said they stand.
We realise all these responsibilities. Does not the House see that through all these things, and finally, most important of all, this agreement with Egypt, we shall be creating a new pattern of friendship throughout these Middle-Eastern regions? That is what we want to do. It is the only way we can hope to work with those countries. We cannot hope to work with them by putting 20,000, 30,000, 80,000 men there and telling them what to do. They simply will not do what they are told and that leads to endless trouble for us all.
I ask the House to consider the alternatives. We can go on as we are now until 1956, with a continued waste of manpower, immobilisation of what should be an essential part of our strategic reserve, with considerable hostility in Arab States and very probably an unlimited commitment if that leads, as it could have led, to serious anti-British outbreaks in many of these nations, all of them leading almost certainly to adverse arbitration decisions in 1956 and total evacuation without rights and without the advantages we have obtained by free consent, at any rate for the next seven years.
Set in this context, I suggest to the House that the prospect of a new and growing collaboration with our Arab friends is now opened up. We have heard a lot today in this debate about failure of will power. I do not believe that to face unpleasant realities in a changing world shows a failure of will power. I believe that to maintain the conditions there are as we would have them, and as they once were, and to behave as we could then, or did then, and


as some would have us do now, is to show a lack of adaptation to the realities of the present time.
I believe that this Agreement is militarily sound. It gives my right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for War a strategic reserve which they have not got and which they ought to have. I believe it is politically sound because it enables us to re-establish, I trust, conditions of friendship with all the Arab lands while not losing our friendship with Israel. Of course, it is true that no one can foresee how it will work out in direct terms of our relations with Egypt.
I want us in this House to say plainly to Egypt tonight that we are going to enter into this new era with a real determination to try to make it succeed. If they will do the same by us they will find full reciprocity and understanding here. It is in that spirit that I hope the House will affirm these heads of understanding, because if from the beginning we start to criticise and disbelieve those whose hands

we have shaken in the signing of these Heads of Agreement, we shall lose everything before we have begun.

I conclude by saying that I believe that this instrument, while not perfect, is one which can be made of service to the cause of stability in the Middle East. By that, too, it can serve our nation's interests and, wider still, the cause of peace.

Mr. Paget: The right hon. Gentleman has made an unanswerable case, but he has not told us why it has taken him three wasted years to do it.

Mr. Eden: I had hoped that I had made it plain, although I could not cover all the points, that it is only in the last few months—three months I think—that we have been able to obtain from the Egyptian Government the undertaking in respect of Turkey. Without that undertaking the agreement was not one which would have been satisfactory to this House.

Question put.

The House divided: Ayes, 257; Noes, 26.

Division No. 214.]
AYES
[9.55 p.m.


Allan, R. A. (Paddington, S.)
Cole, Norman
George, Rt. Hon. Maj. G. Lloyd


Alport, C. J. M.
Colegate, W. A.
Glover, D.


Amory, Rt. Hon. Heathcoat (Tiverton)
Conant, Maj. Sir Roger
Godber, J. B.


Anstruther-Gray, Major W. J.
Cooper, Sqn. Ldr. Albert
Gomme-Duncan, Col. A.


Arbuthnot, John
Cooper-Key, E. M.
Gough, C. F. H.


Astor, Hon. J. J.
Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)
Gower, H. R.


Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.
Crookshank, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. F. C.
Grimond, J.


Baldwin, A. E.
Crowder, Sir John (Finchley)
Grimston, Hon. John (St. Albans)


Banks, Col. C.
Crowder, Petre (Ruislip—Northwood)
Hare, Hon. J. H.


Barber, Anthony
Davidson, Viscountess
Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)


Barlow, Sir John
Davies, Rt. Hn. Clement (Montgomery)
Harvey, Air Cdre. A. V. (Macclesfield)


Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)
Do la Bère, Sir Rupert
Harvey, Ian (Harrow, E.)


Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.)
Deedes, W. F.
Harvie-Watt, Sir George


Bennett, F. M. (Reading, N.)
Digby, S. Wingfield
Hay, John


Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gosport)
Dodds-Parker, A. D.
Head, Rt. Hon. A. H.


Bennett, William (Woodside)
Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. McA.
Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel


Bevins, J. R. (Toxteth)
Donnelly, D. L.
Heath, Edward


Birch, Nigel
Doughty, C. J. A.
Henderson, John (Cathcart)


Bishop, F. P.
Douglas-Hamilton, Lord Malcolm
Higgs, J. M. C.


Black, C. W.
Drayson, G. B.
Hill, Dr. Charles (Luton)


Bossom, Sir A. C.
Dugdale, Rt. Hon. Sir T. (Richmond)
Holt, A. F.


Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. J. A.
Duthie, W. S.
Hope, Lord John


Boyle, Sir Edward
Eccles, Rt. Hon. Sir D. M.
Hopkinson, Rt. Hon. Henry


Braine, B. R.
Eden, Rt. Hon. A.
Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.


Braithwaite, Sir Albert (Harrow, W.)
Eden, J. B. (Bournemouth, West)
Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Florence


Braithwaite, Sir Gurney
Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.
Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)


Brockway, A. F.
Erroll, F. J.
Hudson, Sir Austin (Lewisham, N.)


Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W. H.
Finlay, Graeme
Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)


Brooke, Henry (Hampstead)
Fisher, Nigel
Hulbert, Wing Cdr. N. J.


Brooman-White, R. C.
Fleetwood-Hesketh, R. F
Hurd, A. R.


Browne, Jack (Govan)
Fletcher-Cooke, C.
Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'rgh, W.)


Bullard, D. G.
Ford, Mrs. Patricia
Hutchison, James (Scotstoun)


Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.
Forman, J. C.
Hylton-Foster, H. B. H


Butcher, Sir Herbert
Fort, R.
Iremonger, T. L.


Butler, Rt. Hon. R. A. (Saffron Walden)
Foster, John
Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)


Campbell, Sir David
Fraser, Hon. Hugh (Stone)
Jennings, Sir Roland


Carmichael, J.
Fraser, Sir Ian (Morecambe &amp; Lonsdale)
Johnson, Eric (Blackley)


Carr, Robert
Fyfe, Rt. Hon. Sir David Maxwell
Johnson, Howard (Kemptown)


Cary, Sir Robert
Galbraith, Rt. Hon. T. D. (Pollok)
Jones, A. (Hall Green)


Channon, H.
Galbraith, T. G. D. (Hillhead)
Joynson-Hicks, Hon. L. W.


Churchill, Rt. Hon. Sir Winston
Gammans, L. D.
Kaberry, D.


Clarke, Col. Ralph (East Grinstead)
Garner-Evans, E. H.
Keeling, Sir Edward




Lambert, Hon. G.
Nield, Basil (Chester)
Speir, R. M.


Lambton, Viscount
Noble, Comdr. A. H. P.
Spence, H. R. (Aberdeenshire, W.)


Lancaster, Col. C. G.
Nugent, G. R. H.
Spens, Rt. Hon. Sir P. (Kensington, S.)


Leather, E. H. C.
Nutting, Anthony
Stevens, Geoffrey


Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)
Oakshott, H. D.
Stewart, Henderson (Fife, E.)


Lennox-Boyd, Rt. Hon. A. T.
Odey, G. W.
Stoddart-Scott, Col. M.


Lindsay, Martin
O'Neill, Hon. Phelim (Co. Antrim, N.)
Storey, S.


Linstead, Sir H. N.
Ormsby-Gore, Hon. W. D.
Strauss, Henry (Norwich, S.)


Llewellyn, D. T.
Orr, Capt. L. P. S.
Stuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray)


Lloyd, Rt. Hon. G. (King's Norton)
Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)
Studholme, H. G.


Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)
Orr-Ewing, Sir Ian (Weston-super-Mare)
Summers, G. S.


Lockwood, Lt.-Col. J. C.
Page, R. G.
Sutcliffe, Sir Harold


Longden, Gilbert
Peake, Rt. Hon. O.
Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)


Low, A. R. W.
Perkins, Sir Robert
Taylor, William (Bradford, N.)


Lucas, P. B. (Brentford)
Peto, Brig. C. H. M.
Thomas, Rt. Hon. J. P. L. (Hereford)


Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
Peyton, J. W. W.
Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)


Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. O.
Pickthorn, K. W. M.
Thomas, P. J. M. (Conway)


McCorquodale, Rt. Hon. M. S.
Pilkington, Capt. R. A.
Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)


Macdonald, Sir Peter
Pitt, Miss E. M.
Thompson, Lt.-Cdr. R. (Croydon, W.)


McGovern, J.
Price, Henry (Lewisham, w.)
Thorneycroft, Rt. Hn. Peter (Monmouth)


Mackeson, Brig. Sir Harry
Prior-Palmer, Brig. O. L.
Thornton-Kemsley, Col. C. N.


McKibbin, A. J.
Profumo, J. D.
Tilney, John


Mackie, J. H. (Galloway)
Raikes, Sir Victor
Turner, H. F. L.


Maclay, Rt. Hon. John
Ramsden, J. E.
Turton, R. H.


Maclean, Fitzroy
Redmayne, M.
Tweedsmuir, Lady


Macleod, Rt. Hon. Iain (Enfield, W.)
Remnant, Hon. P.
Vane, W. M. F.


MacLeod, John (Ross and Cromarty)
Renton, D. L. M.
Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.


Macmillan, Rt. Hon. Harold (Bromley)
Ridsdale, J. E.
Vosper, D. F.


Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)
Roberts, Peter (Heeley)
Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)


Maitland, Comdr. J. F. W. (Horncastle)
Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)
Wakefield, Sir Wavell (St. Marylebone)


Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir Reginald
Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)
Walker-Smith, D. C.


Marlowe, A. A. H.
Roper, Sir Harold
Wall, Major Patrick


Marples, A. E.
Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard
Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)


Marshall, Douglas (Bodmin)
Russell, R. S.
Ward, Miss I. (Tynemouth)


Maudling, R.
Ryder, Capt. R. E. D.
Watkinson, H. A.


Maydon, Lt.-Comdr. S. L. C.
Sandys, Rt. Hon. D.
Webbe, Sir H. (London &amp; Westminster)


Medlicott, Brig. F.
Schofield, Lt.-Col. W.
Wellwood, W.


Molson, A. H. E.
Scott, R. Donald
Williams, Gerald (Tonbridge)


Monckton, Rt. Hon. Sir Walter
Scott-Miller, Cmdr. R.
Williams, R. Dudley (Exeter)


Moore, Sir Thomas
Shepherd, William
Wills, G.


Mott-Radclyffe, C. E.
Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.)
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Neave, Airey
Smithers, Peter (Winchester)



Nicholls, Harmar
Smithers, Sir Waldron (Orpington)
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Nicholson, Geoffrey (Farnham)
Smyth, Brig. J. G. (Norwood)
Mr. Buchan-Hepburn and


Nicolson, Nigel (Bournemouth, E.)
Soames, Capt. C.
Sir Cedric Drewe.




NOES


Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)
Hyde, Lt.-Col. H. M.
Powell, J. Enoch


Assheton, Rt. Hon. R. (Blackburn, W.)
Kerby, Capt, H. B.
Rees-Davies, W. R.


Crouch, R. F.
Kerr, H. W.
Teeling, W.


Darling, Sir William (Edinburgh, S.)
Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.
Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.


Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.
Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.)
Williams, Rt. Hon. Charles (Torquay)


Fell, A.
Maitland, Patrick (Lanark)
Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)


Graham, Sir Fergus
Maude, Angus



Hinchingbrooke, Viscount
Mellor, Sir John
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Holland-Martin, C. J.
Nabarro, G. D. N.
Sir Robert Grimston and


Horobin, I. M.
Pitman, I. J.
Sir Patrick Donner.


Question put, and agreed to.

Resolved,
That this House approves the heads of agreement initialled in Cairo on 27th July between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt.

Orders of the Day — CONSOLIDATED FUND (APPROPRIATION) BILL

Considered in Committee, and reported, without Amendment.

Motion made, and Question proposed. "That the Bill be now read the Third time."

ANGLO-BRAZILIAN TRADE

10.9 p.m.

Mr. John Hynd: I wish to discuss a subject tonight in which, I am afraid, a great deal of political interest has not been shown lately, and to which a little time might be devoted now.
There has been a great deal of talk in political circles in this and other countries about the need for the development of trade with the East. Generally, that does not include Japan; Japan is not a Communist country, and, therefore, there does not seem to be a great deal of interest in trade with her.
I want to talk about another non-Communist country. I want to talk about the need to concern ourselves a little with West-West rather than East-West trade. I want to talk particularly about Brazil.
Brazil is a country in respect of which trade difficulties with this country are in some ways the same as those which exist between Great Britain and China, but they are not complicated by such questions as strategic considerations. In the last two years, something has gone wrong with trade between this country and Brazil, as was pointed out in a very important and striking article in "The Times" of 17th February this year. Three years ago, Brazil was one of our best markets in South America. In 1951, only 14 countries offered better markets for British goods than did Brazil. "The Times" drew attention to the situation in these words:
Never before in the history of Anglo-Brazilian relations has the trading atmosphere been as dark as it is today … The Anglo-Brazilian Payments Agreement has soured relations all the more, and the recent visit of Mr. Heathcoat Amory, Minister of State at the Board of Trade, did little to sweeten the air.
It behoves us to ask ourselves why we have got into this serious state in our

trading relations with Brazil, when only a few years ago our reputation and trading connections stood higher, possibly, than they did in any Western European country.
First, the House ought to know what is the picture of trade relations with Brazil. In 1951, we imported from Brazil £66 million worth of goods; by 1953, our imports had fallen to £29 million worth. We exported to Brazil in 1951 £55 million worth, and in 1953 only £17 million worth. These figures are sufficient, without going into the tables year by year, to indicate how serious was the drop in those two years.
The case is pretty well-known to everybody. It is that of the commercial debts that exist between Brazil and this country. The House knows that this commercial debt position arose from a quite unexpected and unprecedented situation that occurred in 1950, when Brazil, like many other South American countries, was persuaded that there was a great possibility of war within the next few months, the result being that there was a considerable amount of panic buying and sterling resources were exhausted. This was followed, when the war scare disappeared, by inflation, and many Brazilian goods were driven from the markets of the world.
The immediate result from our point of view was seen in the fall in cotton purchases from £32 million in 1951 to £1 million in 1952. Total sterling debts at that time developed to about £65 million or £67 million. I understand that the position was not made any better by the fact that the Export Credits Guarantee Department decided to suspend cover on Brazilian trade. The immediate result of that was the situation which was reported in "The Times" article, to which I have already referred. Our trade relations with Brazil are worse than they have ever been.
I must confess that my attention and interest was drawn to this matter by the reports which began to appear in the Press followng "The Times" article, and representations made to me by some of the steel firms in Sheffield which are interested in Brazilian trade. I should like to quote a few lines from a report which was circulated by the managing director of one important Sheffield steel firm only


a few months ago, following a visit to South America in March and April of this year, in which he tried to develop trade between Brazil and the Sheffield steel industry. He said:
This market"—
Brazil—
is closed to British steel and likely to be for some time unless our policy alters … one of the largest importers … can easily take 100 tons of Sheffield steel per month.
He goes on:
We called at the following Brazilian ports: Bahia, Rio, Santos. I walked the lengths of the docks at two of the ports, and part of the other. There were plenty of imports, agricultural machinery from U.S.A., machinery and parts from Germany, steel and tubes and pipes from Japan, wire from Belgium, etc., etc. At each port I asked if I could be shown any British material on the dockside—alas, no.
I know that this picture is true of other places, but I am dealing with Brazil, which may be even worse than other places.
What is happening is shown by the three extracts from the report of the Sheffield director, to which I have referred. This report can be elaborated, for example, by a report in the American "Journal of Commerce" dated May, 1954, to show how our competitors are cashing in on the situation. This report, which is not directed to Britain, says
Japanese and Brazilian officials are negotiating the renewal of the commercial agreement between the two nations that will regulate exchange of goods expected to reach a record value of more than 100 million dollars both ways this year. … Japanese purchases of Brazilian raw materials and goods reached the astonishing level of 55 million dollars in 1953, moving Japan up from 14th to seventh among the South American nation's world customers.
At the same time, it became apparent by the end of 1953 that Japan would obtain a much larger slice of Brazil's total imports this year than it did during 1953.
The article concludes:
Japan … will … continue to ship to the South American country finished textiles, raw silk, chemicals, machinery, iron-steel products, coastal craft, and sundries.
That is the position of trade between Brazil and Japan, and I have no objection to it. If Japan can get the markets she is as much entitled to them as is anybody else. However, we have to consider our own position and to get our share of the markets if we can. It is not only a matter of Japan. The same thing can be said about other countries. The article in "The Times" drew attention to the fact that Germany is cashing

in very much on this market and that, for example, British cars are off the market altogether.
Need this situation go on indefinitely? It is true that we have a debt problem, but so have other countries. I understand that Germany had a very much heavier debt in Brazil than we did. Germany has been in the market for only two years and now has a credit of some £90 million, and has not ceased to give credit to Brazil, realising that Brazil is a developing country and a fairly safe investment. As a result, her exports are soaring in that country.
There has been a slight improvement in recent months. I saw reports in some of the Brazilian commercial magazines, such as the Chamber of Commerce Magazine, that English Electric has recently sold locomotives to Brazil worth about £7 million, but I am also told that there was a long and bitter struggle before the company could get cover for that money. I believe that a certain amount of television equipment is going to Brazil from this country, which is all to the good. I understand that the result, up to date, is that our imports from Brazil have gone up from £29 million in 1953 to £18 million for the first six months of this year. Of course, that does not mean that our imports this year will amount to £36 million, but it does represent an increase.
What is important is not just the total figures. Assuming that we take imports at £36 million based on the first six months of the year—ignoring the seasonal changes which take place in trade—as against the £29 million of last year, that looks good; but when one takes the figure in relation to the existing debt and looks at the arithmetic of the thing, it does not look so good. If we take the total amount which we import from Brazil and which we pay for in sterling, including the oil from the sterling countries, that gives Brazil £36 million to play with and with which to pay for goods from this country and the sterling area.
We have a fixed agreement for £15 million for payment with the sterling area, and then there is the question of the debt payment which is likely to amount to some £12 million. On top of that, we have, of course, the invisibles, including the interest on the debt, which is estimated at £5 million. This accounts for


£32 million out of the £36 million, leaving £4 million for current purchases from this country for the whole year.
I believe that the Bank of Brazil has only just released £1 million, which means that £3 million remain in the kitty for the rest of the year. What kind of prospects are there for any substantial development of trade or for the cutting in on markets which have been so considerably exploited by our competitors, so long as that situation exists? On 25th May, I asked the President of the Board of Trade, in a Question, what the debt position was and what reduction had been achieved under the 1953 Agreement. He replied:
Commercial debts owed by Brazil to the United Kingdom have been reduced by about £20 million since October last and now stand at approximately £40 million.
That is a reduction of roughly one-third of the total in six months. He added:
It is not to be expected that normal trade will be fully restored with Brazil so long as Brazil is in balance of payments difficulties."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 25th May, 1954; Vol. 528, c. 17.]
I now want to examine why it is not possible, and whether, in fact, some modification of the position cannot be made, because here we have a credit—that of the £60 million commercial debt, of which, in the first six months of the Agreement, Brazil has repaid £20 million due, I quite agree, to special considerations such as the borrowing of up to £10 million from the International Monetary Fund and the heavy cotton buying which took place at the end of 1953 which enabled Brazil to accumulate a sterling reserve. The fact is that, on top of that, Brazil is continuing to pay towards the reduction of this debt.
I understand that she paid £1 million this month, and on that basis it will take 5 or 6 years to repay the whole debt unless there is, for instance, some more heavy buying of cotton or an arrangement for spreading the debt. Does not the Minister think that, as Brazil has not only repaid a considerable portion of the debt in such a short period, but has shown evidence of wishing to clear off the remainder as speedily as possible by allocating a considerable amount of the very little sterling which she gets from exports to this country, we can consider making a bolder approach towards the

development of trade by giving a little more credit and by showing a little more confidence in that way?
Here, of course, the Export Credits Guarantee Department comes in. I do not want to develop a debate on that but I understood that that Department was set up for the purpose of encouraging and developing the export trade when the commitments were possibly too risky and too dangerous for private enterprise to undertake, or when private enterprise was unnecessarily hesitant. It seems, however, that the Export Credits Guarantee Department is developing into something like the ordinary commercial concern which is not prepared to look at anything in which there is not the prospect of an immediate and easy profit.
Is it not possible for that Department—which does make a profit I believe in a number of its transactions—to risk those profits? In this case I do not think there is much risk but where there appears to be risk, or where private enterprise is hesitant to undertake it, is it not possible for some of these profitable transactions to be transferred to secure an easing of the situation in several directions? I am no economist and I do not propose to analyse any of the proposals which I put before the Minister. I only put them to him in the interests of my constituents to see whether they have been considered and what the answers are.
Another proposal might be a long-term Government loan to cover the outstanding debt and so release the amount of sterling earned by Brazilian exports to this country which would develop imports by Brazil from this country. Another alternative might be to try, by some means or other to boost imports from Brazil, say this year, from a figure between the £36 million and £38 million which it seems likely to be to something like £45 million. I understand that if by some special boosting we raised the figure above its present rate Brazil would be prepared to consider repayment of her debt on a sliding scale from £6 million to £7 million or £7½ million.
Alternatively, would it be possible—in the light of developments since the 1953 Agreement, the amount paid off and the obvious willingness and determination of Brazil to pay off the rest—to make a new agreement spreading the instalments over a much longer period


and so releasing sterling during that period for the development of trade? Amongst a number of letters which I have received on this subject here is one which refers to one disturbing fact. In this letter I am told:
… it is cheaper to buy Brazilian produce such as, for example, raw cocoa beans for shipment via the continent than for direct shipment to the United Kingdom. The reason for this is that, through the intervention of a dealer on the continent, Brazilian offers in 'Convention' dollars, say to Holland, can be switched into sterling which shows a considerable discount against offers in sterling from Brazil for direct shipment to the United Kingdom. The result of these operations is that the United Kingdom importers are paying continental countries, principally Holland, for Brazilian produce thereby helping those countries with their exports to Brazil and preventing Brazil from earning sterling.
That kind of thing is likely to develop unless we can find ways and means of encouraging direct trade between this country and Brazil rather than driving the Brazilians to these roundabout methods of getting into our markets.
I do not know how far the Government are responsible for the situation. I now find myself in the somewhat embarrassing position of suggesting that, because private enterprise does not seem able to face the position, the Government should intervene, so assisting private enterprise to make more profits—but there is not much point in going into that question. The fact is that we have a Conservative Government. We must rely on private enterprise. If private firms cannot do it we must face the alternative either of letting things slide or of the Government taking steps to enable the trade to develop.
Brazil is bigger in space than the United States. Its potentialities and untapped resources are probably greater even than those of the United States. In one journal recently I read that in the last 10 years there has been in Brazil a 100 per cent. increase in passenger train miles. That is comparatively big, but it can obviously go on increasing by 100 per cent, as the development of Brazil gains impetus in the modern world. Roads are being developed even more quickly than rail and there is therefore every reason for us to have the maximum confidence in Brazil and to take what in other countries—fully-developed countries—might be regarded as unusual risks in credit facilities.
I understand that Sir George Nelson, Chairman of The English Electric Company, Ltd., is in Brazil and has said that he is there with the full support of the British Government in order to improve trade. If he is there with the full support of the British Government, I want to ask the Government what that support represents and how Sir George Nelson will be assisted in any opportunities he may find for developing trade with Brazil. How will he be assisted—by Government action or, alternatively, by some other action; and if by some other action, what action? If he is there with the full support of the British Government, presumably the Government have something in mind to see that his work is not entirely useless.
I am not seeking to criticise the Government; I am asking for information. My constituency of Sheffield is largely dependent upon the steel industry and the steel products industry, for which there is a considerable potential market in Brazil, and we are very interested in this question. I have no doubt that the people of the Lancashire constituencies are also interested in it, because British textiles previously found a good market in Brazil and I understand that at the moment they find no market at all. Our textile industry can do with all the markets it can get. No doubt Binning-ham and other car-producing towns are equally interested.
I am therefore pleased to have had this opportunity of bringing this matter to the notice of the House in order to give the Minister a chance to reply fully to the points which I have made. I hope that he will be able to give us some positive assurance so that we are not left with the thought that Brazil, in which British enterprise, investment and trade have played such a large part, is now to slip through our hands and to find its way into the hands of Germany, Japan and our other competitors.

10.33 p.m.

Commander J. W. Maitland: I am grateful to the hon. Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. J. Hynd) for having raised this question. I little thought, when I arrived back from Brazil last night, that on my first day here there would be a debate on the very subject which I have been trying to study on


the spot during the last three weeks. That is not the only reason for my gratitude; I am also grateful because the debate gives me an opportunity to congratulate my right hon. Friend, who is to reply, on his new appointment. It must be almost a unique occasion when a Minister of Agriculture replies to a debate on trade with Brazil.
The hon. Member was right when he said that the problem arose from the fact that Brazil bought too heavily as a result of her fears about the outbreak of a world war after Korea. It has made the position astonishingly difficult. No one is more interested than I am in exports to Brazil, but the fact remains that those who have exported to Brazil want to be paid for their goods. The hon. Gentleman spoke of extending credits or loans, but we must realise that this country is not in a particularly happy position for extending loans and credits at the moment. We have not a very large surplus which we can afford to use for that purpose. There are many countries in the Empire which are desirous to take any opportunities in this direction which exist.
Having said that, I must say how much I sympathise with much of what the hon. Member said. Brazil is a country in which we have inherited wonderfully good relations. Apart from our traditional friendship which is a very real factor there is a tremendous feeling of real business friendship in Brazil today, but the brutal fact of sterling shortage remains and is extremely difficult to overcome. I should like to make one point about the question of export credit guarantees. The present system of obtaining sterling in Brazil, which is by auction under the Aranha system, means that when an importer or agent has obtained a licence and the necessary sterling to import goods from this country he creates a guarantee in himself. The great majority of exports from Great Britain to Brazil are guaranteed by the peculiar and interesting method that the Brazilians use to provide sterling credit to finance these operations.
I seriously ask my right hon. Friend to consider the question of extending these guarantees even further, though obviously he cannot give an answer in a debate at this late hour. This is a

matter which deserves far greater consideration than we can give to it now. I hope that one day we shall have a full-dress debate on the important question of trade with Brazil. When one talks about trading with Brazil many people think only that one is talking about trade with one of the countries of South America, but the population of Brazil is rather more than that of the whole of the rest of South America put together and in size the country is larger than the United States.
Brazil has made a tremendous effort to pay off her debts and I think that the visit of the Minister of State, Board of Trade, had a successful issue. At the time it created a certain amount of despondency but after consideration I think that it was realised that the douche of cold water was necessary. When I was in Brazil I heard from many sides indications that people were ready to face the realities of the trade situation between Great Britain and Brazil.
Quite soon a deputation of exporters is coming to this country from Brazil. They will not be the official guests of the Government but it is vital that the Government should do their utmost to see that these people have every possible opportunity to meet their opposite numbers, the importers in this country. I am certain that when they arrive they will be ready to do their best to do business. I hope that this will prove a very satisfactory experiment. It is up to the Government to do all in their power to increase trade by increasing exports from Brazil to this country and I am confident that they will make the most of this opportunity.

10.38 p.m.

The Minister of State, Board of Trade (Mr. Heathcoat Amory): I am very grateful to the hon. Member for Attercliffe (Mr. J. Hynd), on probably the last occasion that I shall be addressing the House from this Box on behalf of the Board of Trade, for raising a subject which falls fairly and squarely in the field of overseas trade. Whether I shall do justice to it I do not know, because my mind is already being re-filled with subjects like eggs, foot and mouth disease and myxomatosis. I fully understand the hon. Member's concern at the low level of trade between this country and Brazil and I assure him that his


concern is shared by Her Majesty's Government.
The hon. Member will agree that the basic reason is Brazil's shortage of sterling. The hon. Member has already referred to some of the difficulties and I can illustrate them. In 1951 our imports from Brazil amounted to £66 million. In 1952 they had fallen to £15 million. In 1953 they had risen again to £27 million. This year they are running at the rate of £36 million. That fits in fairly well with the figures quoted by the hon. Gentleman. I am afraid that we must acknowledge that the figure for 1951 was abnormal. It reflected abnormal purchases of cotton.
The point I want to make is that Brazil is perfectly free to earn sterling not only by selling to the United Kingdom but by selling in almost any other country in the non-dollar world. As a corollary to that, she is not only free to earn sterling in those areas but is also free to spend her sterling in those countries, and we can have no objection to her doing that.
Our imports from Brazil have traditionally been cotton—most important, coffee, cocoa, softwood, iron ore, nuts and bananas. In case we feel too depressed about this, it is encouraging that our imports from Brazil are showing an upward trend now, as I hoped they would when I was over there six months ago. It is also interesting that last year Brazil succeeded in earning £6½ million in sterling through sales of coffee in countries other than the United Kingdom.
The hon. Gentleman implied that we were doing nothing to help Brazil in a positive sense, but we are doing something in a positive sense in that we have opened our markets here to the exports of Brazil, making them almost entirely free of restrictions. If the hon. Gentleman says that that is a rather negative thing to do—

Mr. J. Hynd: Does that apply equally to cotton?

Mr. Amory: Yes, it applies to cotton and all the main exports of Brazil except bananas. Bananas are subject to a quota, but after June next year they will also be on open general licence. When we look round the world and see how few countries that applies to, surely we can say that that is a positive act to assist Brazil.
I turn now to the question of commercial debts. As the hon. Gentleman said, these amounted to about £60 million, though at their peak they rose to £70 million. Today they are something under £40 million. They began piling up, in a rather dangerous way by the latter part of 1952.
The debt agreement arrived at last year provided for an initial repayment of £10 million. As the hon. Gentleman said, this was going to be raised by Brazil by a loan from the International Monetary Fund. Then there was to be an annual payment, not of £12 million but of £6 million, which could be increased on a sliding scale if Brazil's earnings of sterling exceeded the estimate of that time. The figure is £6 million or better, but I do not think that we ever visualised anything like £12 million.
At the time the debt settlement was arrived at the criticism against Her Majesty's Government was not that the terms were too severe but that the repayment was spread over too long a period. Now we are meeting the kind of criticism which the hon. Gentleman has mentioned—that we have spread the repayments, in agreement with the Brazilian authorities, over too short a period. However, when I look at it—I have looked at it on very many occasions—it seems to me to be about right on the whole.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned an estimated earning of £30 million to £35 million sterling. That is a reasonable estimate, but out of it only £6 million is allocated, as it were, for debt repayment. I do not think that that is an unreasonable proportion. I am told that we should not have agreed to the Brazilians spending £15 million on oil, but they would have liked to have spent more. They are spending more, but are making up the difference in dollars. Brazil is short not only of sterling, but of dollars, and I think in all the circumstances that the settlement of the commercial arrears is not far wrong.
I should like to make the point, because sometimes one hears the statement that very substantial proportions of the arrears were covered by the Export Credits Guarantee Department for which the Government, indirectly through that Department, were responsible, though they were less than half.
It is sometimes suggested that the Government should have taken over the debts. That was considered, but the Government came to the conclusion that it would not be reasonable in all the circumstances. If the terms of the payment had been spread over a lesser period it would not have helped Brazil; it might have helped the creditors, but the only way we could help Brazil was to spread it over a longer period.
But our resources are not unlimited. We have from all over the world and from the Commonwealth many demands for loans and investments. What we can afford to do must be related to the surplus we can earn on current trading. In addition we have to consider the claims of one country as against another. If we found ourselves unable, as we did, to spread the repayment over a much longer period, that was because our resources were insufficient. We are very appreciative of the way in which the Brazilian authorities have carried out the debt agreement in the last nine months. They seem to have set to work to carry it out scrupulously.
The hon. Gentleman referred to the German position. To the best of my knowledge the amount the Germans were owed in commercial arrears was not as large as ours. It was something less than 100 million dollars.
The hon. Gentleman also referred to the Brazilian import policy, and my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Horn-castle (Commander Maitland) also mentioned the auctioning of sterling. The currency available to the Brazilian authorities after paying for necessary imports is put to auction in different categories. Only £1.4 million sterling has been auctioned so far.
I want to say a few words about the E.C.G.D., because otherwise there might be a danger if I were to accept what the hon. Gentleman said. The Department is under a statutory obligation to pay its way, and it must operate on commercial lines. The hon. Gentleman said that he does not believe that it makes money. For 30 years it has just paid its way. In the last year or two, mainly because of the unfortunate situation in Brazil, it has got in the red. It is in the red now. There again it must have some regard to commercial considerations. It must

operate, largely on the advice of the advisory committee of men skilled in finance and commerce.

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: Can my right hon. Friend tell the House the extent of our indebtedness through the system of E.C.G.D. in the Brazilian market? Is it not the case that if the advice had been taken of those best informed on these matters and the Government had taken action dictated not by political considerations but by commercial transactions the extent of that debt would not be nearly as great as it is today?

Mr. Amory: My hon. Friend brings a blush to my face because I must acknowledge that there is something in what he says. There is £16 million outstanding to E.C.G.D. in the case of Brazil, but there was a sum of £20 million to £25 million. It is true that our commercial advisers recommended us to stop earlier than we did, but, looking back, I cannot say that the Export Credits Guarantee Department could possibly have postponed withdrawing cover longer than it did. If it made a mistake it was that of continuing too long, and it may be that we could be criticised for having postponed re-opening cover unnecessarily long. But within a few months of the settlement of the debt and the initial payment under it, we have re-opened E.C.G.D. We may be condemned for not doing that sooner, but I hope not.
I should like to add that we have the situation continuously under review and we are hoping that gradually we shall be able to remove the restrictions, such as they are, that we have on E.C.G.D. cover. We did re-open cover only within limitations, but we shall consider the points that have been raised this evening in that connection. We look forward to the time when we shall be able to offer the same cover to Brazil as we do to other credit-worthy countries.
I want to say a few words about the Parliamentary delegation which has recently visited Brazil under the leadership of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Horncastle. I wish that there had been more time this evening to hear more about that visit from my hon. and gallant Friend and his colleagues on that delegation. Judging from the reports


which we have had from Brazil, the mission was a great success. The Brazilians liked my hon. and gallant Friend and his colleagues from both sides of the House. They did a good job. I have received reports about the visit from members of the delegation, and I should like to thank them for their help. I can assure hon. Members that we are giving them careful consideration, for we attach very great weight to what is said in those reports.
I should also like to refer to the visit which Sir George Nelson recently made to Brazil. We welcome that visit, for it is the kind of visit from our leading industrialists that we like to see. Sir George is a man of tremendous energy and experience, and we hope that many other people will follow his example.
We are delighted that the Brazilian Exporters Association are to send a trade delegation here in the Autumn to study the United Kingdom market for Brazilian exports. That seems to be an excellent thing to do, and it received our support directly we heard about it. Her Majesty's Government will do everything they possibly can to ensure that the delegation's visit will be fruitful from every point of view.
In conclusion, I should like to say that we share fully the hon. Member's concern about the low level of current trade with Brazil, but the key to the whole situation is somehow or other for Brazil to earn more sterling. We should do everything we can to promote and to foster an improvement in that respect, and to help and to promote the sale of Brazilian exports to this country.
As the hon. Gentleman said, the Government do not buy cotton, timber, cocoa, or other commodities. It depends on whether our importers find Brazilian products at the right price and of the right quality. We have every hope that we have passed the bottom and are on the upgrade. We are sincerely anxious to see the volume of trade rise to a better level, and I believe that it will. We agree that Brazil has tremendous potentialities. Her development is going rapidly ahead. Within our powers and the scope of our responsibility we will do all we can to help forward an improvement in the level of trade.

MOCK AUCTIONS

10.56 p.m.

Mr. Norman Dodds: We have had important debates today about Egypt and Brazil. It might seem presumptuous of me to raise what some people would consider the piffling matter of mock auctions. No matter how important the other debates were I claim that among the people of this country there is as much, if not greater, interest in mock auctions. This is largely because many have had experience of the swindling tactics of the mock auctioneer. It is 12 months since I raised this subject on an Adjournment debate. The Minister who replied then is to reply tonight.
I am well-informed about the activities of these mock auctioneers, both by the general public and by men who work, or worked, in this type of racket. My information is that this July there is much less activity by mock auctioneers than there was a year ago. I also know that many of them are marking time, and that if they could believe that the limelight would be taken from their activities they would be operating again. I ought to say, with respect to the remarks I have just made, that many of them have left their usual haunts in the large towns and seaside resorts and gone to small towns and villages where several days pass before the local people get to know their tactics and they are forced out.
What is remarkable is that the best pickings seem to be among Scottish people. Last year the biggest profits and easiest pickings were made at the Highland Games. A newspaper this week indicated that the Scottish visitors to a northern inland town were found to be easy pigeons for plucking. I wonder what has happened to the canny Scot, whom all of us knew to be loath to spend a penny if a halfpenny would do.
We cannot thank the Home Office for the improvement in the position in regard to mock auctions. I have been more than disgusted at the types of letter I have had from the Department, and I think that that disgust is shared by many. We have to thank the Press for the improvement. The Press has done a good deal to educate the public. For instance, the "Sunday Chronicle," the "Daily Herald," for the last few days "The Times" in its correspondence columns,


and the "News Chronicle"—all the daily papers, and many of the Sunday papers—have carried stories about mock auctions. Consequently many more people know about these things than knew of them 12 months ago.
We must give credit to the B.B.C. for the television show of two or three weeks ago that portrayed in a glaring fashion the swindling techniques of the mock auctioneer. The action of the Brighton Corporation in getting a Private Bill through the House has given splendid publicity to the matter and helped to pinpoint the evils of this trade. Quite modestly, I think that some of my activities have had more than a little interest for the general public in this connection. During the past 12 months some terrible threats have been made by mock auction people to me and to members of my family about what would happen. Four or five weeks ago Scotland Yard found a plot against myself and I was offered police protection. Of course, in these matters I am not asking the police to be a wet nurse. I think that it is a public duty to keep on exposing these mock auctions, and I hope that I shall have the health and strength to continue to do so as long as they operate.
What are the views of the Home Office about the B.B.C. television show? It surprised many people that there could be such a clear exposure of swindling technique. The Home Office must know about it. Do they agree with it? They must know whether it is desirable or undesirable. If it is undesirable, are these tactics within the law, and if they are, what is the Home Secretary going to do about seeing that these people are not operating within the law?
A week ago I gave notice of this matter so that we could expect an answer tonight. Do the Home Office think that the B.B.C. imagined these things and were unfair to the mock auctioneers? Many people would like to know the answer.
The B.B.C. exposed a technique that was easy to portray. They showed quite clearly that there was a confederate in the audience who was taking part in the bidding. Is that not unlawful? Many people will think that it is. There is a much deadlier technique than that, operated by the big circuits of mock

auctioneers. They do not have a confederate in the audience. They believe there are dangers of blackmail in that, because even mock auctioneers fall out sometimes. The confederate may be stupid, or not too clever, and he has to be paid.
The modern technique is that goods which are never intended to go to the public are "planted." The auctioneer pretends to have accepted a bid from the audience that has never been made. The man in the front of the counter, while on his way through the crowd, having paused in the meantime to sell a pair of braces for 6d. or a pair of scissors for 1d., will produce notes himself for the expensive bid—collect the 6d. or 1d.—hand up cash to auctioneer—the goods never intended to be sold go behind to be wrapped up and appear at the next sale.
Is that not illegal? If it is, what is happening about it? I see it almost every day, when I go to the mock auctions. I have gone to some trouble, because last year, when I spoke, I generalised and realised it was not anybody's business. Since then, I have rather put the Home Office on the spot and at least made them get a report about it.
Following investigations in Oxford Street, I went to the Tottenham Court Road police station and made a complaint about a practice, which I stipulated, and asked that it should be looked into. I did the same thing in respect of Petticoat Lane at Commercial Road police station. I have done it with the City Police and been interviewed by a representative of the fraud squad.
I informed the Home Secretary of the specific complaints and asked that I be informed, following investigations, whether these techniques were seen by the police and if so whether they were illegal and what steps were being taken to deal with them. I got a letter back from the Home Secretary, months after I put in the complaints, and only when I asked about it. That letter was very vague. I have, since then, sent a letter to the Home Secretary asking for further information and asking whether these techniques have been seen. I have repeated the other questions I asked prior to that. I should like to know the answers tonight.
During the last few weeks, I have been checking to see if these operations still exist and they do, in Oxford Street at No. 80. I should say that the two big mock auctions in Oxford Street, that I specified last year, have, of course, closed down, but recently two others, but smaller ones, have opened. It is difficult to twist when there is a small number of people but in No. 80 I saw the technique again. It was rather remarkable, because the British people know about the evils of mock auctions; one could hear them in the shops, talking about the B.B.C. show and the various newspapers that have been reporting about it. In the districts in which people read the papers and really know what is happening in life, the mock auctioneers are having great difficulty.
They are finding it difficult to get away with the technique, because of the knowledge people have; but, what a scandal it was in Oxford Street—and it is happening every day—to see that most of the people who were swindled were foreigners, people coming to Britain and buying goods marked British and guaranteed as Sheffield steel which really were absolute rubbish. I saw a Persian man, who could not speak English, with his young son of 12, who was showing off his knowledge of our language and who was fleeced of a lot of money.
We want to encourage these people to come here and we want to build up a thriving tourist trade, but visitors are being swindled and it is an absolute disgrace. Let us think of someone else's testimony. Earlier in the year, the National Chamber of Trade held its conference at Margate. A resolution was passed expressing disappointment with the replies of the Home Secretary to points about mock auctioneers.
Later in the conference, reference was made to the fact that Brighton got a Bill through the House, and of course they mentioned that it seemed to be all wrong that the ratepayers of the various towns, should be put to the cost of thousands of pounds to get the powers to control mock auctions. There may be something to be said for the view that it might be a good thing for Brighton to try this out and to see how they get on, but when one reads the minutes of the evidence of the Committee on the Brighton Corporation Bill there, at least, is testimony as to the tactics adopted by these people, which, I

am sure, no one could claim to be anything but undesirable.
I have here the testimony of the Incorporated Society of Auctioneers. It says:
The Society has always taken the view that mock auctioneers swindle the public and injure legal practitioners and bona fide traders in general, and that more effective action should be taken than at present to prohibit or control their sales. Since these people use what looks like auction technique—that is to say, they stand on a rostrum and use patter to excite the interest of crowds—they are frequently confused in the public mind with proper auctioneers, and our members are far from happy about this result.
I have been criticised for the fact that in my activities in this connection I may have damaged the legitimate business of auctioners. I want to say that at all times I shall endeavour to correct that impression, because I have no quarrel whatsoever with the legitimate auctioneers who, I think, represent a valuable part of the British way of life. In support of my argument, I will read to the House a letter from a man who practised for two years as a mock auctioneer, but who, because of the adverse publicity which made the job more and more nerve-wracking, was advised by his wife to give up the job and to seek a more legitimate means of making a livelihood. It says:
Previous to the slick salesman getting the audience to bid for the bigger lots like canteens and brush sets, etc., he will offer an article, run it up to £2 to £3 and may be more, and knock same down to a fictitious customer. The floorsman works his way round the side of the audience and asks them to come forward please assisted by the auctioneer. In the shuffling forward of the audience, the floors-man works his way back and hands up to the auctioneer £2 or £3 which the customer, a fictitious one, is supposed to have bid. This money the floorsman has concealed in his hands, and it is the money he is given to use during the sale. This indeed is a glaring incident of obtaining money by means of a trick. If the police watch for this move, they can catch the floorsman with the money in his hand.
I do not wish to go into the technique of how I think these people can be caught, but I should be willing to accompany two or three plain-clothes police officers to a mock auction and point out how it is done. I was able to get behind the scenes in one mock auction in Petticoat Lane, and I saw what happened to the tray of goods which was supposed to have been knocked down to a bidder for £4 or £5. I saw how when the goods


were handed back, ostensibly for the purpose of being wrapped up, they were taken off the tray and put on the shelf ready for the next sale.
It is beyond my comprehension that the police cannot get proof of the trickery that takes place. Every mock auctioneer who confesses to it says that it is absolutely impossible to make money unless this trickery is practised. I am sure that one prosecution would cause the collapse of the whole racket. I said at the beginning that the mock auctioneers were going to the small towns and villages. Here are some of the bills:
Great Sale—M. Browne &amp; Co.,
Crown Hotel, High St., Pateley Bridge,
Harrogate, Yorks.
£5,000 worth of Household Linens.
200 Turkish towels at 2s. 6d.,
500 Heavy Pattern Tablecloths at 3s.,
also £2,000 worth of Glass, china, canteens of
cutlery.
Great Sale—Dixon's
The Assembly Rooms, Barton-on-Humber.
Here, strangely enough, the articles are exactly the same. It is only the name which is different, which clearly indicates that these rackets are being worked by big people who send these mock auctioneers round the towns and villages.
Another reads:
Wisdom Clubs invite you to a £1,000
Advertising Sale at Vallis Way, Frome.
Tea sets 2s. 6d., stockings 1s. a pair,
pillow cases 1s. a pair etc.
Here is the trick: none of these things ever appears. The man comes with a motor van and all his usual junk but none of the household linen or towels. These are the bills which bring the people. There is plenty of evidence that in some areas these mock auctioneers have been bundled out of the district. That is due to the education carried on by the Press and the B.B.C.
In one of my letters to the Home Secretary about five weeks ago I told him that trouble was brewing in Petticoat Lane. Many of my friends from the North visit that bazaar in a thoroughfare when they come to London, as I did years ago as a country yokel. Some still think that I am a country yokel, but there was no doubt about it then. I spent many happy hours there and got many a bargain. There is a great feeling of animosity among the many people who have had stalls there for tens of years that they have among

them this growing body of dishonest people. In this morning's "Daily Herald" it says:

PETTICOAT LANE MEN START WAR

Tricksters who flood London's famous Petticoat Lane market with shoddy goods are to be driven out. Every Sunday, visitors fall for their smooth patter and are wheedled into buying junk at high prices.

The 1,200-strong Stepney St. Traders Association has declared war on the tricksters. 'We are determined to stamp them out,' said one member. 'We are losing trade and our reputation because of them.'

Fifty sandwich-board men have been employed to parade Petticoat Lane and the borough's seven other markets, warning the public against mock auctions."

I am informed that it is only necessary for one man organising them to get them to tip up their stalls and there will be real trouble in Petticoat Lane. I hope that it will not be necessary and that the honest decent traders in Petticoat Lane will get the protection for which they pay well from the authorities who are required to look after them. In all the circumstances as we see them today it is shocking that the Home Secretary is doing nothing about this menace. If, of course, something is being done then tonight is the night to let us know what is happening on the mock auctions front.

11.20 p.m.

The Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Sir Hugh Lucas-Tooth): It is a year since the subject of mock auctions was last discussed in the House and I can assure the hon. Member for Dartford (Mr. Dodds) that the Government have treated the concern which he expressed last July with the respect which it deserved. I very much appreciate the interest which he has taken in this matter, and it may well be that the publicity which he has given to it has done something to produce the effect which he has described today.
It is unfortunate, in a way, that this subject has been raised on the Consolidated Fund Bill, because that is bound to present a somewhat one-sided picture. The hon. Member can describe the proceedings of these mock auctions—and he does not mince words in describing them—and can imply, as he has implied this evening, that the Government are responsible for action, but I reply I am in a difficulty because, in the first place, the Home Secretary is not responsible for taking proceedings and, in the second


place, reference to legislation is out of order in this debate. There is very little which it is open to me to say.
The Home Office and the police have paid a great deal of attention to this question of mock auctions. No doubt undesirable practices take place at these auctions—there is no question about that at all; but that does not necessarily mean that criminal practices take place, for there is a considerable difference between the two.
The kind of thing which would be criminal under the present law would be, for example, if there were sham bidders who pretended to be real bidders and forced up the price against those who attend auctions. If it could be shown that that was taking place, the promoters of the auctions could be charged with conspiracy with intent to defraud.

Mr. Dodds: The B.B.C. showed that.

Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: It may well be that an example of that was given in the television programme. There is no difficulty in putting on an example if one wishes to do so; but that does not necessarily mean that that kind of thing takes place in real life.

Mr. Dodds: Is the hon. Gentleman saying that the B.B.C. were making this up?

Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: I have no doubt that the script of the B.B.C. programme was written by some able script writer. Every thriller or murder play is made up in that sense; it may correspond to something which occurs in real life or it may not. I have no doubt that the overall picture was a good picture. It brought home to people's minds the kind of thing which may be occurring. But that is not evidence that crime of this kind takes place.
If goods were knocked down to someone who had not bid for them and he were intimidated in some way into paying for them, that would be a form of larceny; or if goods were sold—this is the sort of case which the hon. Member had in mind—by some false description—for example, if cutlery were sold as silver when in fact it was nothing but base metal—those engaged would be guilty of obtaining money by false pretences.
In view of the representations which the hon. Member has made, both in the

House and by correspondence to the Home Secretary, that criminal acts of this kind were taking place, the Home Secretary called for reports from the police, and particularly for reports of what was happening in this connection in London. I have seen the reports and have studied them carefully. They are full and careful, and a great deal of time and trouble were taken by the police in attending the auctions and preparing the reports.
The police have been advised that there is no evidence which would justify criminal proceedings. There is nothing that they have seen and reported upon which would enable criminal proceedings to be taken against those who hold these auctions. I quite agree that undesirable things go on. Those who conduct the auctions are no doubt guilty of sharp practice which goes just as near the edge of crime as they dare go. Unless they step over the boundary, and evidence can be produced that they have done so, it is not possible to take proceedings.

Mr. Dodds: If the Joint Under-Secretary says that these undesirable practices are near to criminal offences, does he not make out a case for giving local authorities power to prohibit them?

Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: I shall say something on that subject.
There is a great deal in the way of blandishment and what is generally known as ballyhoo, but neither blandishments nor ballyhoo are illegal. The hon. Member will agree with me that it would be wrong in principle to make such things illegal. The policy of the law has been not to insist upon protecting people against themselves. I think that that is the right policy, and I am perfectly certain that the House would be very loth indeed to depart from it. The hon. Member has suggested that the law could be amended. It was easy for him to make that suggestion, but he will appreciate the difficulty in which it puts me.
As a result of a deputation from the National Chamber of Trade, my right hon. and learned Friend caused inquiries to be made of chief constables about the scope of the problem. We also sought the views of the Association of Municipal Corporations and the Urban District Councils Association. It became quite clear from the chief constables


that the problem was a localised one. It exists in London and in the larger seaside towns, that is to say, in places where people resort for amusement. The people who attend these auctions are not, for the most part, serious buyers. They go there for amusement and they are the ones to get caught in the toils.
In the second place, it became clear that the local authorities favour dealing with this problem on a local rather than a national basis. I cannot possibly give reasons now why there are objections to dealing with this matter by general legislation, but perhaps I can say within the bounds of order that one of the Home Secretary's administrative duties is to report upon Private Bills which come before the House, and I take it that I can refer to what has been done in past legislation.
In a recent case a large seaside town was seeking new powers. It promoted a Private Bill containing a Clause requiring the registration of premises used in the borough for the conduct of auction sales, and, as the hon. Gentleman indicated in his speech, the purpose of the Clause was to enable the borough to control the holding of auctions of this kind. The Clause was amended by the Select Committee to make an exception for auction sales conducted by members of certain organisations representing reputable auctioneers.
I think it is right that I should read the advice that was given by my right hon. and learned Friend in this connection, because it is generally applicable. It is:
The Secretary of States takes the view that provisions of this nature, which confer upon a local authority a discretionary power to grant or refuse permission for the carrying on of a lawful occupation, should not be allowed except on clear evidence that it would be in the public interest to do so. He recommends, therefore, that Part II of the Bill should only be allowed if the promoters can show that there is a serious public mischief in …
the borough
… that cannot be dealt with by other means and, if any provision is to be allowed, it should be limited to what is really necessary to deal effectively with that mischief.
Here is a way of dealing with the matter in the particular places where it is a nuisance. It is a way which can be easily followed. It has not the objection which

I have indicated in broad outline to taking general legislative powers which would be vastly in excess of what is necessary to deal with the matter.

Mr. Dodds: Would it cost much?

Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: I should have said that in the case of a substantial borough the cost would be negligible.
I suggest to the House that the right way to deal with the matter is by mobilising public opinion and by enabling those areas which are seriously afflicted in this way to take action on the lines that I have indicated.

TRAFFIC CONGESTION, PURLEY WAY

11.33 p.m.

Mr. Charles Doughty: Today we have discussed many subjects, and at the conclusion of the day I want to raise a matter which, although it primarily concerns my own constituency, must affect large numbers of people who live in the southern part of this country.
The Brighton Road passes through Purley and Coulsdon and right through East Surrey. I want to speak particularly of the very bad crossroads at the end of Purley Way at the junction of the Brighton Road and the Eastbourne Road.
Before I explain the problems which I have to lay before the House, I ought to describe the geographical position at that place. Between the wars a new arterial road was built past Croydon Aerodrome, which at that time was of great importance as an international airport. That road came down to Purley Corner via Purley Way, narrowing like a funnel as it came to the corner, where it met the old road which came through Croydon, and so from South London. Then the two roads branched off at right angles, one to Brighton and one to Eastbourne. As if that was not sufficient complication, there is another local road which comes in there, the Banstead Road, which is of great local importance, although it has no significant through traffic.
Coming from London on either of those main roads, there are, of course, many delays, but there is nothing compared with what happens at busy times of the


day, particularly at weekends, at Purley Corner. The traffic coming along Purley Way is held up as it approaches Purley Corner. It is then stopped at the lights, after which it goes straight on to Eastbourne or to the right to Brighton. The lights are as efficient as they can be, but the inevitable result is that traffic moves for only a short time before it is stopped again when the lights change. Once the traffic has moved off, although I would not say that it has a clear run to Eastbourne or Brighton, it has certainly got over the worst of the journey.
Some improvements have been made in the last few months. The fountain which used to be in the middle of the crossroads has been moved to the side and the tramcars from Croydon which used to have their terminus there have been removed. In addition to the traffic difficulties, this is the main shopping centre for miles around. It is time that something was done to relieve this considerable congestion, which will continue until something is done.
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation has been good enough to visit these crossroads. I am sure he must agree that some remedy must be found for the problems as soon as conviently can be. My own suggestion is that there should be a roundabout. Some roundabouts have recently been constructed on the main road to Purley Way, and I am sure a roundabout could be constructed at Purley Corner. That is the only feasible way I can see by which the flow of traffic can be kept continuous, and the only method by which the congestion at the weekends can be relieved.
Some miles further south of Coulsdon there is on the main Brighton road on which a lot of traffic travels extremely fast, and I do not criticise it for that, a road junction of extreme danger because it is not apparent. There has been one serious accident there in which two persons lost their lives and there have been others in the not too recent past. Two important sideroads come in there, both partially blind, the one coming from the East is hidden by the bend in the road and the hill, and if one comes out slowly one is likely to find oneself in the stream of fast moving vehicles. Again I have had the opportunity of

discussing this with my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary, whom I find sympathetic about it. The solution is not to extend the 30 miles an hour speed limit or to provide lights, which must inevitably slow down the traffic, but once again to provide a roundabout for the safety of both vehicles and pedestrians.
I do not wish to detain the House any longer except to draw the attention of the Parliamentary Secretary to the danger and inconvenience to the people in the locality and the drivers who have to pass these dangerous and awkward places, and to the necessity to ensure not only the flow of traffic but the safety of pedestrians and those who travel in the vehicles. We cannot allow our main roads—and these are very important main roads—to be neglected. We cannot allow the traffic to increase without anything being done for its speeding up. I would ask my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary if we can hope in the near future for anything to be done in this part of the county which will alleviate the difficulties and assist in preventing the serious delays which occur at Purley Corner and the dangers at the crossroads which I have already mentioned.

11.42 p.m.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (Mr. Hugh Molson): No one can be long Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport without being very well aware of the amount of inconvenience and danger which is caused by the inadequacy of our roads to deal with the present volume of traffic. I make no complaint that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Surrey, East (Mr. Doughty) has raised the question of two roads in his constituency where there is a great deal of traffic which does not come from his constituency but which uses those roads in travelling between London and the South Coast. My hon. and learned Friend is a very pertinacious representative of the interest of his constituency, and he persuaded me to go to Purley Corner to study on the spot the problems which he has again brought forward tonight. I am glad that he has described my attitude to these matters as sympathetic, and certainly he has done me no more than justice when he has so described me.
I have studied both the problems of Purley Corner and the question of congestion and danger as well as the other problems which he asked me to study. I have had the matter looked at by the divisional road engineer concerned with that part of the country. But when he asks me to give a date when remedial measures can be taken, he is asking for his particular problems to be dealt with on their own without taking into full account the many other parts of the country which are concerned with equally or even greater problems.
In the new road programme which was announced by my right hon. Friend, who is shortly to become the Secretary of State for the Colonies, on 8th December last he indicated what the priorities would be. The first was that he would try in spending the additional money which was made available to give priority to those industrial areas where improvement of communications was likely to have a direct and beneficial effect upon our industry. In the second place, he indicated that he would try to complete some of those large road schemes which had been interrupted by the war and where a large sum of money had been left unused because of the failure to complete those schemes.
My right hon. Friend indicated that where there were black spots he would try again to carry out such alterations and improvement of the road as would be likely to reduce accidents. It is only under the third of those categories that my right hon. Friend would be able to bring either of the projects which the hon. and learned Member has mentioned tonight. I am glad that he has not attached too much importance to the idea of extending the speed limit. Having looked at both of these stretches of road, and having been advised by the divisional road engineer I do not believe that a general extension of the speed limit would have beneficial effect.
In the case of Coulsdon, the solution in the long run will probably be found by provision of the roundabout for which my hon. and learned Friend asked. That will be a considerable undertaking, and it will involve acquisition of a considerable amount of land, which will need fairly large expenditure. When so many demands are being made on the

resources at the disposal of the Ministry, I am not able to indicate when it will be possible to carry out the improvement. I can assure my hon. and learned Friend, that I have not forgotten what he showed me. The matter is still being carefully considered in the Ministry. We will do what we can to give priority to this scheme if we are satisfied that provision of a roundabout is likely to reduce accidents.

Bill accordingly read the Third time, and passed.

WELSH SLATE INDUSTRY.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. Vosper.]

11.47 p.m.

Mr. Goronwy Roberts: I wish to raise the problems of the slate industry. I am sorry that the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Works is not in his place. I am wondering whether the new Financial Secretary to the Treasury, whom I congratulate on his elevation and welcome to the Front Bench, on this first occasion in his new office, is going to reply.
By location, extent, and social character, the slate industry can practically be described as a Welsh industry. Much more than 80 per cent. of the slate produced in the United Kingdom is quarried in North Wales, in the counties of Caernarvon and Merioneth. Welsh slate is the best roofing material in the world. It is found roofing palaces, universities, schools, hospitals, and homes in almost every land. There is Welsh slate on the roof of this building. It is a natural product, processed for ages by nature herself for its protective task, and as a result it has withstood the test of centuries. It has considerable aesthetic appeal, too, especially in some settings. It is durable and dependable. One could almost say that Welsh slate is capable of resisting the rigours even of an English summer.
Why is it that this industry, which produces this fine product in a country bound to make the best use of its resources, has declined so much in the last 50 years? Why is it that in the last half


century the annual output has dropped from more than 600,000 tons to fewer than 200,000 tons?
I pass to the human and social aspects of this problem, and I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Conway (Mr. P. Thomas) will speak in support of me in this respect. The number of slate workers in North Wales has declined from 14,000–50 years ago—to barely 3,700 today. The industry is well-served by its management and its union, and yet when I, with my hon. Friend the Member for Conway and my hon. Friend the Member for Merioneth (Mr. T. W. Jones) who will, I know, speak on this subject on a future occasion, met representatives of the industry last February in Caernarvon, we learned that, even in a period of building boom, orders for slates were falling fast, that there was short time in the industry and that 8 million roofing-slates and 4½ million slates for damp courses had to be held in stock. This has meant a tying up of a disproportionate amount of the capital which is badly needed in the industry for development.
The Minister may say that the position in the industry is now slightly better and that slate is moving again. That may be true, but the basic conditions of steady prosperity are still lacking. The industry still feels far too insecure; operators still have large stocks, particularly of the small-size slates for damp-courses, on their hands, and no-one can say that the position will not worsen once more. All this inhibits investment and recruitment in an industry which, with a very little official encouragement and help, could be revitalised, with great moral and material advantage not only to Wales, but to the United Kingdom as a whole.
When we look at the reasons for the decline and the insecurity in the industry we must remember that the slate industry was very badly damaged in the two world wars. In the last war in particular it received very heavy blows indeed. Its manpower was dispersed and its markets were dislocated. In 1945, the industry was told that it could not supply slates for new buildings and that priority would have to go to the supply of slates for war-damage repair work. The roofing of new buildings became the prerogative of the tile manufacturers. In this way, long-established markets for the slate industry were lost, some of them irrevocably. In

that sense, the slate industry is a war casualty and is entitled to a little first-aid.
What I have described is serious enough, but in the post-war years even worse was to come. Local authorities have been encouraged officially to substitute tiles for slates in their housing schemes; not directly, perhaps, but indirectly and very effectively; and not because local authorities prefer tiles—more often than not they prefer slates—but in order to effect economies which will bring the tender price per house below the ceiling fixed by the Ministry of Housing. I ask the Parliamentary Secretary to give his special attention to this problem.
The saving from substituting tiles for slates in a house costing £1,400 to build is only about £35, or, about 2½ per cent. of the total cost. The extra cost of putting in slate damp courses is only about £2 10s. There is really no comparison between this small initial cost and the future saving in repair bills, yet the fact remains, that, whenever a tender has to be cut, the Ministry of Housing officers immediately attack the roof and the damp course, probably the two most vital aspects of a new house.
I have here a letter from a Liverpool building merchant, to the managing director of a large quarry in my constituency, stating that an important rural district in North Wales, the home of the slate industry, is, after many years, reluctantly discontinuing the use of slates in the roofing of its houses, because of the difficulty of keeping down to the Ministry's prices. What a short-sighted policy this is. For the sake of a few pounds now, we are laying up a lot of expensive trouble for ourselves in the future—and in the near future, too.
It is well known, that the vast influx of cheap tiles which afflicted our roofs about 1935, are now already rotten—ripe for replacement, at very great cost. Faulty damp courses and leaking roofs also account for much of the dry rot in the buildings of Britain and for the colossal annual bill, amounting, I am informed, to more than £20 million per annum, for making good that dry rot. Where is the real economy in all that?
Then there is the quite unjustified importation of foreign slates. When nearly 10 million Welsh slates lay in stock in 1953, we were importing slates, to the value of £106,000, into this country and


they were disastrously inferior to our own. Some of the roofs, which were slated with these importations, have had to be stripped and re-roofed.
One contractor told me many of these foreign slates are so brittle, that he was able to crumble them to dust with his bare hands. How can these importations be justified? How can we justify, also, the importation of hessian from the Far East when we have, or had until quite recently, redundant stocks of slates, suitable for damp courses to the extent of 4½ million units?
What the slate industry needs is a reasonably steady market which will enable it to plan development and recruit manpower on a reasonably secure basis. It cannot do that—no industry could do that—when Government policy appears deliberately to throw such obstructions in its path. But it can do so if action is taken at appropriate levels on one or two simple points.
The first is that a proportion of new roofing should be allotted to slate. That proportion need not be more than a minute percentage of the whole, but it will be enough to revitalise the industry. I am told that the Scottish slate industry has precisely that guarantee and, in addition, that it has received considerable advances from the Treasury towards development and the clearing of debris and overburden.
I ask whether that is the case, because, if it is the case, the Welsh slate industry has an absolutely equal claim to similar treatment and I and my hon. Friends will expect the Parliamentary Secretary to deal firmly with that point tonight. At the very least, I would press him to consult his opposite number in the Ministry of Housing and Local Government to see that, in Wales at least, not only are local authorities not dissuaded from including slate in their specifications but are actually encouraged to use it for roofing and damp courses.
My second suggestion is that the hon. Gentleman should talk seriously to the Board of Trade and to the Treasury about importations of foreign slate. The amount involved is very small compared with the total trade of the United Kingdom, but it is of great importance to the turnover of the slate industry.
Thirdly, I wish to say a word or two about manpower. As I have said, the war took away hundreds of skilled quarrymen, many of whom have never returned to the industry. The age old rhythm of recruitment, whereby son followed father and grandfather into this industry, has been shattered, and we find it very difficult to attract apprentices to it today. Conditions in the industry have never been better. The relations between management and men are excellent, and the terrible threat of silicosis is now practically mastered by the introduction of dust suppressors, at considerable cost, I may add, to an industry which is largely organised in rather small units. Nevertheless, young school leavers are still holding back from entering the industry.
I think that the Ministry of Labour could help, partly by publicising the improved conditions and partly, also, by taking a sympathetic view of applications for deferment of National Service by slate workers. A skilled quarryman needs to go through an apprenticeship of five years. If that apprenticeship is interrupted, it is extremely difficult to start the training again and to complete it satisfactorily.
I personally consider that slate quarrymen should be grouped with coalminers in the matter of National Service. They are already grouped together in the matter of safety regulations and legislation. At the very least, I should like the Parliamentary Secretary to take up with the Ministry of Labour the question of the sympathetic consideration of all applications for deferment of National Service for slate quarrymen.
In conclusion, I wish to say that to Britain this industry is an asset, but that to Wales it is vital. The House will easily grasp the economic implication of the decline of the industry, but I also want to emphasise the incalculable social and cultural importance to Wales of the slate industry. These quarries are located in the heart of Wales, in Snowdonia, which is the reservoir of all those things which distinguish the Welsh race as a separate and significant element in the world.
In Bethseda, Llanberis, the Nantlle Valley and Ffestiniog there are communities whose democratic way of life is a thing of beauty. Here the Welsh language flourishes as a modern tongue, and among its people there is a deep passion


for the simple graces of life, for literature, music, education and religion. Their lives are patterned by the influence of two great fellowships, the Church and the quarry.
I ask that action be taken to see that these unique communities do not disappear from the Welsh scene, for their loss would not only be economically serious, but socially irreparable. We are determined that that shall not happen, and we appeal to the Parliamentary Secretary, who knows North Wales very well, to come to our aid and to give to this gallant little industry the help and encouragement that it so richly deserves.

12.5 a.m.

Mr. Peter Thomas: The hon. Member for Caernarvon (Mr. G. Roberts) and I have been closely connected with this problem for some time, and I congratulate him on his good fortune in getting the opportunity to ventilate these problems on the Motion for the Adjournment. I wholeheartedly agree with what he has said and fully support him. He has described the slate quarrying industry as being a Welsh industry and that, of course, is so; it is indigenous to North Wales industry.
In the past, the quarrymen of North Wales have made an immeasurable contribution to the social, cultural and educational life of Wales. The continuance of what is sometimes described as the "Welsh way of life" in my opinion depends to a great extent on the future of the quarries of North Wales, for in the quarrying towns there you find almost the only urban industrial societies in Wales where Welsh is still the unconscious and unaffected language of the hearth.
From every viewpoint it is important that this industry should be given security for the future. The hon. Gentleman has given the problems in a succinct manner. He has posed the reasons for the decline of this industry from one of 14,000 men employed in 1885 to about 3,700 today. He has described it as a war casualty and that is so. After the war the Ministry of Housing and Local Government in their wisdom decided that a directive should be issued that no new house should be roofed with slate. The small number of quarrymen employed at that time were required to repair existing war damaged houses. That was a great blow to the

industry because the Government have given great assistance and encouragement in every manner to the synthetic tile industry which now, of course, forms great opposition to the future of the Welsh slate industry.
I should like to reiterate what the hon. Gentleman said about certain matters. I do not ask the Ministry to deal with this matter from any Welsh point of view. It may be difficult for them to do that. I ask them to look at this problem from the point of view of hard common sense. We have heard about how a slate roof will last for about 150 years. A synthetic tile roof which, admittedly, is £30 to £35 cheaper will last only about 30 to 40 years. A damp course, which is admittedly superior when made of slate, costs £2 10s. more. It will last immeasurably longer than any synthetic damp course. The subsidy which the Government spends on a new house is about £35. It is only common sense that the Government should insist that the materials put into a house should at least last as long as the period of the rent they are subsidising. That is all we ask.
As far as the import of foreign slates is concerned, it seems to us who are interested in the slate industry of North Wales absolute nonsense that we should be imparting thousands of pounds worth of foreign slates when we in North Wales depend so much for our welfare and livelihood on the production of slates. I would ask my hon. Friend to put these matters as strongly as he can before the various Ministries concerned.
There is security for a number of people for some time on the repair of existing houses, but what we need is new entrants and here, I believe, the Government can do something to help. Safety in the mines has greatly improved of late; there are dust extraction appliances; and the old fear of silicosis has been largely removed. The pay compares favourably with many other industries, and all that is needed is some assistance from outside to give people who want to enter the industry a feeling of security.

12.10 a.m.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Works (Mr. J. R. Bevins): I am sure that the House is grateful to the hon. Member for Caernarvon (Mr. G. Roberts) for his interesting


speech, and also grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Conway (Mr. P. Thomas) for his contribution. If I speak quickly I hope the House will forgive me, but time is short.
The hon. Member for Caernarvon was right to refer to the rather calamitous effects of two world wars on the slate industry in North Wales, but even before the First World War the Welsh industry was contracting. Many things contributed to this. Perhaps the two most important factors were the changes in house building and the competition of the tile-making industry.
We should bear in mind that during the last century most of the houses built in this country were back-to-back working-class properties. Streets were narrow and it was not easy to see the roofs from street level. Nowadays, as we know, roads are wider and the Jones's of 1954 demand semi-detached houses with gardens back and front. In the main, the roofs of the new houses are more conspicuous than used to be the case in the 19th century, and that is one reason why the demand for coloured tiles, in preference to slates, is so much stronger than it was.

Mr. Garner Evans: Is my hon. Friend suggesting that a tile roof is more beautiful than a Ffestiniog roof?

Mr. Bevins: I am simply suggesting that it is more colourful and it appears to be in harmony with current demand.

Mr. Evans: Can anything be more colourful than Ffestiniog or Dinorwic slates?

Mr. Bevins: That, of course, is a matter of taste and a matter of opinion. I am simply recalling the fact that today there is a preference, by and large, for tiles rather than slates, for reasons of colour and on various other grounds. It is not, of course, the only reason; there is also the question of relative costs. The slate industry, as the House knows, is an extractive industry which works under diminishing returns, whereas the tile industry is a manufacturing industry and is able to take advantage of modern processes and mechanisation.
What the hon. Member said about the decline in the industry and the impact on

the labour force in North Wales is true. What he said about the incidence of silicosis, or what we know now as pneumoconiosis, is also true, and I am sure we are all glad to know that so much progress has been made in the provision of dust prevention plant in the sheds attached to the North Wales quarries.
Perhaps I may come rather quickly to one or two of the questions which the hon. Member asked. First of all, the question of imports: for both hon. Members appeared to think that it was wrong that imports of slate should be allowed into the country. I thought that doctrine came a little strangely from hon. Members representing North Wales constituencies, but the fact is that this industry is already protected by a 10 per cent. tariff and I hardly think it my duty to make representations on the subject to my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade. If there is any question of representations to my right hon. Friend, it is open for the industry itself to make them in the ordinary way. It is only right that I should add—and I think this is pertinent—that at present we are moving towards the liberalisation of European trade rather than in the contrary direction.
The hon. Member also asked about financial help for the industry. I should like to make it clear that there is no financial subsidy to the slate industry in Scotland. It is true that in 1948 money was made available for Scottish re-equipment and development in this field. That money was advanced out of the Building Materials Fund then in being to stimulate the production of building materials. Following the improvement in the supply of building materials generally, that fund was wound up in 1953, and I am sorry to say that there are no Government moneys available for the purpose which the hon. Member had in mind.
The principal point which was put forward in the debate was the question of a partially guaranteed market for the products of the North Wales slate industry. My right hon. Friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government, quite rightly, allows local authorities in England and Wales a free choice in the matter of roofing material. Whether we like it or not, we have to face the fact that, generally speaking, local authorities prefer tiles to slates. Even in Wales, where we have tried to encourage the use


of slates rather than tiles, the efforts of Her Majesty's Government have been frustrated by the costliness of slates.
There is one rather hopeful feature in the recent legislation affecting rents and repairs. I hope and believe that this legislation will create an increased demand for slates from the North Wales industry, for many of the rent-restricted houses which are affected by that Measure are slate roofed and essential repairs carried out by landlords will often include roof repairs. The slum-patching provisions will also be helpful to the industry.
As to questions of labour, apprenticeship and National Service, I do not think that there is any real analogy between the position in this industry and the coalmining industry. Nevertheless, my right hon. and learned Friend the

Minister of Labour and National Service, whom we have consulted, will continue to consider any applications for deferment from men undertaking courses of training based on the customs and practice in the trade.
I am sorry that I cannot be more helpful than, possibly, I have been, but I assure the House that I shall bring to the notice of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government all that has been said on the question of a guaranteed market. If there is any other way in which the Government can help the industry we shall gladly do so.

Adjourned accordingly at Seventeen Minutes past Twelve o'Clock a.m.